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Abstract 
 
 
 Eighteenth-century, British georgic poetry’s shift away from its conventional theme of 
agriculture is often discussed as justifying Britain’s commercial imperialism and a broader 
commitment to progressivist Whig history.  I argue that such approaches neglect its participation 
in the intellectual history of the liberal state itself.  Georgics are exemplary texts to read 
alongside politico-economic treatises like Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (1776).  James Thomson’s The Seasons (1730) moralizes personal 
industry and innovation while veering from detailed examples of natural phenomena, to vast 
ecological networks, to nature’s determinative, physical and moral laws.  Given georgics’ 
expanding, scientific and economy-adjacent interests, they notably omit the role of government 
in administering socio-economic order.  Such poems indirectly communicate a moral philosophy 
amenable to the system of natural laws and natural rights in John Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government (1689) which gave rise to economic and political liberalism.  In light of the 
groundbreaking economic science of François Quesnay which Smith influentially revised in his 
more historically-informed, open-ended analysis, states were increasingly regarded as serving 
rather than served by their subjects who now best fulfilled their natural law-based obligation to 
thrive by freely pursuing their rational self-interests. 
 I provide case studies of georgics that indirectly justify liberalism’s own depreciation of 
the state.  These poems primarily undermine a conception of state government as a locus of 
moral authority and social order by presenting alternative, nominally natural sources of socio-
economic stability.  William Mason’s The English Garden (1782) asserts that proprietors 
possessing enough wealth and taste to landscape their estates in a naturalistic style thereby prove 
their fitness to participate in liberal government.  Scientist-poet Erasmus Darwin’s The Temple of 
ii 
 
Nature (1803) rigorously argues for emergent order by presenting a physiological model in 
which a universal pleasure principle drives all organisms to imitate and synthesize ideas which 
enable innovation and self-transformation.  He defines liberty as immanent to organisms’ 
volitional capacity and locates potential progress in his model’s innate operations.  In Darwin, as 
elsewhere, government becomes an imperfect, refinable technology subservient to a nation’s 
economy. 
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Introduction 
 
The georgic tradition 
 The georgic is an antique, poetic genre fundamentally concerned with the production of 
order.  Both in its classical form and in many of the versions written during its resurgence in 
eighteenth-century Britain, this production of order primarily appears in terms of humans 
confronting the problem of food scarcity by understanding and harnessing nature’s own 
productivity through agronomy and farming.  Hesiod and Virgil (70 BCE-19 BCE) wrote the 
exemplary, classical Georgics.  Hesiod’s Works and Days, written at the end of the eighth 
century BCE, argued for the moral value of industry while also functioning as a guide for 
managing a thriving oikos.  The oikos was a self-sufficient, productive, social-unit with 
nominally natural power relations between husbands and wives, parents and children, and 
masters and servants.  The oikos’s prosperity depended in part on the farmer’s sophrosyne, 
meaning the frugality and efficiency required to free the family from scarcity and to free the 
proprietor to participate in public politics.   
 Like Hesiod’s poem, Virgil’s Georgics (29 BCE) venerated toiling farmers and the 
beauty and utility of nature’s physical forces and material resources.  Both poems’ narrative 
tension arose from nature’s frequent intractability and from economic and political insecurity 
caused by years of civil war and governments’ inability to ensure socio-economic order.  Virgil 
developed Hesiod’s less explicit analogy between farmers’ technical, though largely manual 
labor and the georgic poets’ own intellectual, literary labor.  Georgics was the second poem in a 
triad of literary genres including the pastoral and the epic called the rota Virgiliana, which 
allowed poets to hone their professional skills on subjects of increasing world-historical 
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importance.  These two poems established conventions which would persist through British 
elaborations of the form.  Thus, georgic authors practice a high, literary style by applying it to 
nominally low subjects, which arguably become ennobled in the process.  The poetry makes 
burdensome manual labor performed on fruitful soil a fit subject for the consideration of the 
upper ranks of society from whom poets sought approval and patronage.  Georgics moralize 
industry by clothing it in beautiful figures and reiterate the physical control of nature through the 
poet’s own aesthetic, intellectual control.  Their content and self-reflexive style both 
acknowledge the problem of imposing order on nature’s infinite variety of finite things.1 
 John Dryden’s (1631-1700) translation of Georgics in 1697 boosted the standing of a 
long-neglected genre.  Dryden’s famous assessment, “The best poem by the best author,” was 
supplemented by Joseph Addison’s (1672-1719) prefatory “Essay on Virgil’s Georgics,” which 
asserted that the genre’s combination of the rustic “science of husbandry” with the “beauties and 
embellishments of poetry” could reconcile and convey “Precepts of morality” better than natural 
philosophy, which “puzzles the reader with the intricacy of its notions and the multitude of its 
disputes.”2  Virgil’s discrete gestures to the emperor Octavian prefigured British authors’ 
attempts to have their works reach and resonate with an upper class whose virtuous stewardship 
of national prosperity they commended.  British georgics such as John Philips’s Cyder (1708) 
and James Dyer’s The Fleece (1757) continued to assert the comparable, moral value of 
agricultural and intellectual cultivation and ultimately suggested that wealthy landowners could 
prove their own virtue and fitness for political office by supporting land improvement and 
                                                          
1 I take the concept that, liberal government notwithstanding, the infinite variety of finite things compels 
governments to perpetually refine their own control over the socio-economic order’s infinite complexity 
in order to optimize the exploitation of resources and to minimize the risk of social crises.  Michael 
Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A political analytic of finitude (New York: Routledge, 2015), 6-8. 
2 Joseph Addison, Poems on Several Occasions (Glasgow: Robert & Andrew Foulis, 1751), 156. 
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tenant-farmers in addition to the arts and sciences.  Even if landowners only improved their 
estates through picturesque landscaping rather than following practical, agronomic manuals like 
Stephen Switzer’s (1682-1745) Ichnographia Rustica (1715-1718), eighteenth-century georgics 
acclaimed such landowners as guardians of the public good.  Both classical and eighteenth-
century georgics thus demonstrated concern for rulers’ management of the socio-economic order.  
Such concerns overlap with political economy, a scientific discipline which emerged during the 
second half of the eighteenth century in rough contemporaneity with the British georgic. 
 Georgic poems have lent themselves to many critiques addressing topics within the scope 
of political economy such as land, property rights and labor.  For example, one recent thread in 
scholarship on the British georgic useful for my study, which more narrowly focuses on 
statecraft, identifies georgics as ideological tools for justifying British imperialism.  Karen 
O’Brien exemplifies such scholarship by arguing that georgics “assumed the burden of securing 
the aesthetic and moral links between country, city, and empire.”3  O’Brien suggests that British 
georgics such as James Thomson’s (1700-1748) The Seasons (1730), a poem which I address in 
my second chapter, incorporate conventional georgic themes such as agriculture into a wider 
consideration of the nation’s domestic and international commerce.  Developing O’Brien’s 
implications, David Armitage supports readings of the imperial georgic in which they influence 
Britain’s self-definition of its national character.  This self-definition had been complicated by 
the 1707 Act of Union in which England united with Scotland and Ireland to form Great Britain.  
Armitage states that Britain “and the conceptualization of its dependencies was…a shared 
conception of the British Empire that could describe a community and provide a distinguishable 
                                                          
3 Karen O’Brien, “Imperial Georgic, 1660-1789,” in The Country and the City Revisited: England and the 
Politics of Culture, 1550-1850, ed. Gerald MacLean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
161. 
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character for it.”  A page earlier, Armitage describes this character:  “In sum, the British Empire 
was, above all and beyond all other such polities, Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.”4  
Whereas the imperial georgic may expand its scope outward from the country’s rural labor to the 
city’s commerce to the empire’s markets and colonies, we can also read in the imperialist 
pretensions of British georgics an attempt to define the values and commitments which unify and 
stabilize a nation composed of diverse cultures, religions, and modes of production.  The themes 
of commerce and liberty which often appear in georgics fall within the scope of political 
economy but also only incompletely reflect political economy’s conception of natural law and 
natural rights which are at the core of the discipline’s understanding of statecraft.  To understand 
how my study differs from the work of earlier critics requires an initial understanding of the 
origins of the discipline of political economy, political economy’s self-definition in the long 
eighteenth century, and finally the state’s role in liberal political economy. 
 
Political economy’s contexts 
 Because political economy is central to my reading of British georgics, knowing the 
philosophical domains from which political economy developed will help understand the 
interests which it shares with georgics but which georgics also may conceal or refigure.5  In An 
                                                          
4 David Armitage, The Ideological Foundations of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 9; 8. 
5 For example, by applying political terminology to natural phenomena.  Thomson describes the sun in the 
following terms: 
The vegetable world is also thine, 
Parent of Seasons! who the pomp precede 
That waits thy throne, as though thy vast domain, 
Annual, along the bright ecliptic road 
In world-rejoicing state it moves sublime. 
James Thomson, Summer, in The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), 112-
116. 
5 
 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith (1723-1790) describes 
political economy as a subsystem, “a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator” within 
the larger system of moral philosophy.6  In the centuries leading up to and including the time of 
Smith’s writing, moral philosophy was dominated by theories based on natural law.  
Philosophers of natural law believed that God created the world including its moral laws, 
physical laws, matter, and rational humans.7  Though humans have access to Scripture, natural 
law assumes that humans may recognize their moral obligations to God and to each other 
through the rational study of the physical world.  Because I primarily address natural law in 
regard to John Locke’s (1632-1704) moral philosophy, I borrow A. John Simmons summary of 
Lockean natural law:   
(1) Duties to preserve oneself (i.e., not to kill or endanger oneself) 
(2) Duties to preserve others (when this does not conflict with self-preservation) 
(3) Duties not to “take away the life” of another 
(4) Duties not to do what “tends to destroy” others (by, e.g., interfering with or 
“impairing” their “liberty, health, limb or goods”)8 
Nowhere in his writings does Locke explicitly define natural laws, but Simmons’ list 
demonstrates that they prioritize society’s proliferation and that these obligations require humans 
not simply to survive but to prosper.  Moreover, Locke complicated natural law by claiming that, 
in addition to reason, God affords humans natural rights which enable them to fulfill their 
obligations.  As I discuss in my first chapter, these natural rights include property rights over not 
                                                          
6 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics, 1976), IV.introduction.1. 
7 For example, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was natural law theorist who wrote De iure naturae et 
gentium (1672) which would influence the philosophical development of liberalism. 
8 A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 60. 
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only one’s own life, liberty, and labor but also over any objects which an individual legitimately 
appropriates.  A person appropriates an object by “mix[ing] his labor with it, and join[ing] to it 
something that is his own” which thereby establishes a private use right as well as an exclusory 
right and which prevents others from stealing, damaging, or profiting from that property.9  The 
three politico-economic philosophers central to my projects, Locke, François Quesnay (1694-
1774), and Smith, each believed that private property rights were necessary for individuals to 
best exploit their possessions.   
 Given that natural laws establish obligations which fundamentally necessitate the rational 
use of resources for the public good as well as natural rights which enable people to fulfill those 
obligations, political economy addresses the problem of how states also enable their polities to 
fulfill their obligation to prosper.  It will help to introduce some terminology relevant to political 
economy before further pursuing my argument.  I use state to refer to a sovereign, political entity 
holding a monopoly on violence and whose political power enables it to determine the form of its 
government.  Government refers to types of regimes such as monarchies and republics in which 
states invest their power.  The activity of government is statecraft.  Through statecraft, 
governments create and control a variety of state apparatuses through which states influence the 
behaviors of their subjects.  I also refer to the whole government itself as a state apparatus or 
sometimes as a piece of political technology.  I use polity and body politic interchangeably to 
describe an independent, socio-political population while the concept of the nation fuses 
population, state, and government into a single entity.   
 My discussion primarily addresses Althuserrian ideological state apparatuses (rather than 
repressive state apparatuses) which influence subject’s behavior without immediate recourse to 
                                                          
9 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), II.v.27. 
7 
 
state-sanctioned violence.10  Positive laws, a key example of a state apparatus, differ from natural 
laws for being made by humans rather than God.  In the eyes of the theorists I discuss and 
because states are subject and subservient to natural laws, states’ positive laws aspire to yet 
imperfectly reflect natural laws.  One implication of these imperfections riven through 
governments and their state apparatuses is that governments are indeed mutable, political 
technologies open to continuous refinement as well as decadence and delegitimization.  Though 
Quesnay and Smith did not strictly adhere to Locke’s theory of the social contract in which 
collectives form body politics and then states, each philosopher held that states maintained their 
moral legitimacy to the extent that they adequately helped the nation conform to natural law.  
Doing so principally meant administering the socio-economic order such that free, rational, self-
interested individuals could participate in the national economy and contribute to its collective 
prosperity.  Even though Locke, Quesnay, and Smith did not share a common set of economic 
theories, they are important to my project for being discursive founders of liberalism in their 
respective domains of political philosophy, economics, and political economy.  To clarify, 
Quesnay established the first, holistic economic theory called Physiocracy in his Tableau 
économique (1758), while Smith’s Wealth of Nations established the discipline of political 
economy.  However, all three philosophers address topics pertinent to political economy and 
ultimately participate in legitimizing liberal political economy.   
 The emergence of economy and political economy as scientific disciplines points to 
another important overlap between political economy and the georgic.  I noted that my authors, 
even those preceding the emergence of political economy as a discipline, believed that statecraft 
should encourage polities’ abidance of natural laws by using state apparatuses to reinforce 
                                                          
10 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, 
trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2014), 75-77. 
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natural rights.  Further, humans discover natural law (and the proper ends of government) by 
studying nature, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took the form of natural 
philosophy and which coincided with the scientific revolution.  This revolution was spearheaded 
by Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) empiric method and led to the heroization of Isaac Newton 
(1642-1727) who exemplified the spirit of English, intellectual progress.  Robin Valenza 
observes that natural philosophers developed increasingly specialized methods and discourses 
while the fields themselves grew increasingly distinct.  She argues that “practitioners across all 
disciplines…found the process of defining and describing their fields of study to nonexperts both 
wrenching and difficult. And most struggled to negotiate how print could help them reach 
targeted audiences of fellow experts at the same time that it could help them gain wider public 
support for their work.”11  Nevertheless, advancing life sciences, the study of inorganic matter 
and the earth’s moving parts, and social sciences such as economics continued to cross-pollinate 
and collectively contribute to philosophers’ understanding of natural law.  The genre of physico-
theology emerged as an attempt to reconcile empiric knowledge of physical nature with the 
Bible’s stories and its moral implications.  Thomas Burnet’s Telluris Theoria Sacra (1689) and 
William Derham’s Physico-theology; or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, 
from His Works of Creation (1713) are some of the more well-known examples of the form and 
H. Grant Sampson claims to identify at least one hundred examples of a literary form he refers to 
as the physico-theological epic.12  The Seasons explicitly uses the georgic mode’s depictions of 
nature to produce a physico-theological argument for the benevolence of natural law.   
                                                          
11 Robin Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in Britain, 1680-1820 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3. 
12 H. Grant Sampson, “The Physico-Theological Epic in the Later Eighteenth Century,” Man and Nature 
2 (1984): 49. 
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 Georgics highlighted and attempted to negotiate these intersecting problems of accessing 
truth, especially moral truth, in the face of fragmenting fields of knowledge which could 
themselves problematize humanity’s self-understanding.  As the eighteenth century progressed, 
several georgics displaced the standard theme of agricultural, manual labor by devoting more 
space to communicating the findings of natural philosophy.  In addition to The Seasons, I discuss 
Erasmus Darwin’s (1731-1802) poems, The Botanic Garden (1791) and The Temple of Nature 
(1803) as case studies of such georgics.  The subject of labor did not disappear in these poems; 
instead, authors diffused it throughout their subject matter.  Nature itself is described as 
performing continuous, productive, recycling labor; the natural phenomena which are its 
“works” provided material for poets to veer into aestheticized, conversable descriptions of the 
physical processes which contemporary natural philosophers understood to be taking place.13  
Relatedly, British georgics displayed a new regard for the intellectual labor of natural 
philosophers and also of entrepreneurs who exploited new, scientific and technical knowledges 
by applying them to technological innovations.14  The Botanic Garden in particular praises 
several inventors and elaborates the effects of their creations.  For example, Darwin devotes a 
passage to the canal systems of the engineer James Brindley (1716-1772). 
 We therefore see a similar tendency for organizing knowledge shared by certain georgics 
and by the natural philosophy which the poetry attempted to convey.  The expansion of georgics’ 
content with no restraining, narrative through-line beyond world-historical progress meant that 
its own, potential excesses and disjointed vignettes could only be contained by, at the level of 
                                                          
13 Thomson, Winter, 108.  Valenza distinguishes between learned discourse which marks specialization 
and professionalization and conversable discourse meant to interest and teach the fundamentals of science 
to non-professionals.  Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines, 18-19. 
14 I take this analogy a step further in my fourth chapter in which I argue that the work of beautifying 
landscape design corresponded with and validated a landowner’s participation in government. 
10 
 
style, the imposition of a unifying, literary beauty, and at the higher level of didactic 
moralization, the assertion that its depicted content is subject to immaterial natural laws.  Noel 
Jackson identifies this tension in Darwin’s “philosophical poetry” and points to the evidence of 
the poems’ layers of detailed, explanatory footnotes which dominate the poetry.15  Kurt 
Heinzelman also highlights the still-emerging divisions between literary and scientific labor by 
identifying an epistemic tension between georgics’ fictions, signifying the aesthetic pleasures of 
its literary stylistics and speculations, and facts, signifying its scientific, pragmatic, and moral 
interests: “Because of the georgic’s apparent faith in determinate knowledge as a functional 
component of its own discourse, some eighteenth-century readers were reluctant to permit 
georgic writing the dispensation necessary for imaginative or fictional discourse.”16  By 
comparison with the georgic, natural philosophy seemed to serve and legitimize natural laws; but 
as we see in the case of Darwin who was both poet and natural philosopher, fields such as his 
favored physiology seemed to discover new sources of order immanent to the material systems 
which they studied.  Such fields could give additional credibility to natural law but occasionally 
offered counternarratives that disturbed biblical authority.   
 British georgics’ turn toward science and technology has long been acknowledged by 
literary critics.  Anthony Low partially attributes the genre’s success to the period’s enthusiasm 
for discovering new methods for explaining and harnessing nature: “The result of this fruitful 
combination of poetic vision and new science was what amounts to a georgic revolution in the 
seventeenth century, a revolution that preceded and was directly responsible for the well-known 
                                                          
15 Noel Jackson, “Rhyme and Reason: Erasmus Darwin’s Romanticism,” Modern Language Quarterly 
70, no. 2 (June 2009), 171; 181. 
16 Kurt Heinzelman, “Roman Georgic in the Georgian Age: A Theory of Romantic Genre,” Texas Studies 
in Literature and Language 33, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 192. 
11 
 
Agricultural Revolution of the eighteenth.”17  Low thus asserts that the georgic’s popularity not 
only was motivated by an interest in nature’s productive potential but also could itself be 
productive.  Nascent enthusiasm for enlightened agriculture was already in evidence due to the 
Georgical Committee’s founding in 1664.  This group traded essays on and offered prizes for 
advances in the field of agronomy.  From a different perspective, philosophical poetry could be 
argued by its practitioners to itself contribute to philosophical thought; Darwin argued that 
philosophy and poetry differed only in the respective strictness or looseness of their analogies.  
Analogy could access truth because, as Devin Griffiths notes, “For Bacon (and for Darwin), 
analogy is an attribute of the world, not ascribed to it; it is not applied to nature by the scientists 
but is “of” the “things” themselves.18   
 Kevis Goodman also addresses the georgic’s connection to increasingly institutionalized 
science by calling it the poster-poem for scientific and agricultural reform and by its commitment 
to cultivating order among ideas and things.  Georgics frame disruptions and discontinuities 
caused by encounters with history or with unfamiliar aspects of nature in order to then soothe 
disturbing feelings through aesthetic mediation and the assertion of encompassing, 
philosophically-interpreted systems:19   
                                                          
17 Anthony Low, The Georgic Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 119. 
18 Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016), 72. See also Gillian Beer, “Plants, Analogy, and Perfection: Loose and 
Strict Analogies,” in Marking Time: Romanticism and Evolution, ed. Joel Faflak (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2018), 29-44. 
19 Goodman emphasizes that Locke’s An Essay concerning Human Understanding exhibited an anxiety 
commonly repeated in georgics that humans’ limited senses may receive excessive and unprocessable 
information which often arrives distorted.  Words “signify only Men’s peculiar Ideas, and that by a 
perfectly arbitrary Imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same 
Language) the same Ideas, we take them to be the Signs of…” John Locke, An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), III.ii.8. 
12 
 
Within and in part under the influence of georgic, the poetry of the long eighteenth 
century underwent a process whereby it became conscious of itself as one “sensible path” 
among others…Such verse inhabits a cultural situation in which it has to define itself not 
only against an array of prose genres, whose material it often usurps, but also in relation 
to non-written means of perception and communication, whose several mystiques it often 
courts.20 
The georgic presents itself as a literary apparatus among multiple other forms of written, more 
overtly mechanical, or even, I would argue, politico-economic technologies for teasing order out 
of complexity.  In doing so, it consciously imitates the stricter and narrower, organizing work of 
natural philosophy firstly by encompassing the subjects of various, philosophical fields within 
the poetry’s harmonizing and beautifying style.  Secondly, georgics move freely between 
examples of empiric phenomena, references to the ecological system in which given phenomena 
participate, and mostly importantly, the moral, natural laws which we can consider to be the 
meaning of that phenomena.  For example, Thomson attributes botanic growth to the “Universal 
Soul / Of heaven and earth”: 
By thee the various vegetative tribes, 
Wrapt in a filmy net and clad with leaves 
Draw the live ether and imbibe the dew. 
By thee disposed into congenial soils, 
Stands each attractive plant, and sucks, and swells 
The juicy tide, a twining mass of tubes.21 
                                                          
20 Kevis Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9. 
21 Thomson, Summer, 556; 561-566. 
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Thomson collapses God and Nature into an allegorical, all-comprehending force responsible for 
the circulation of nutrients presumed to have been drawn from the “live ether” and “the dew” 
through each plant’s “tubes” and tissues.  Several lines later, Thomson amends “Universal Soul” 
to “the soul of love [which] is sent abroad / Through the vital air.”22  Notwithstanding his 
ignorance of photosynthesis and air’s components, he attributes plants’ growth to physical 
processes which are themselves determined by a higher, poetically-figured, benevolent force.   
 In Goodman’s terms, the georgic acts as one, self-consciously tropological path for 
organizing the phenomena organized by the more rigorous path of natural philosophy 
simultaneously championed by the poetry.  Other critics have observed that georgics’ interest in 
the sciences, especially as performed by British luminaries, went together with Britain’s self-
definition as a commercial empire.  Alan Bewell observes that the concept of nature offered 
Romantic and proto-Romantic writers a productive contradiction: 
…the British came to see nature as something that stood apart from the modern 
world...—of  mobility, exchange, and transformation—at the same time as they were 
actively engaged in translating it into the very forms that would allow it to be accessed 
from a distance, marketed, exchanged, and improved, the very activities that led to its 
achieving cultural priority in British society.23 
Bewell argues that nature could be reified into a timeless ideal apposite to natural laws.  
Concurrently, nature’s physical materials were not only studied and used to produce natural-
philosophical knowledge; they also became resources which could be entered into economic 
                                                          
22 Thomson, Summer, 582-583. 
23 Alan Bewell, Natures in Translation: Romanticism and Colonial Natural History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2017), 6. 
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circuits which themselves could then be studied to discover yet new forms of order.24  As 
scholars such as John Barrell, Tim Fulford, and Blanford Parker have shown, the orderly paths 
represented in georgics helped to naturalize economic liberalism and justify capitalism as it 
emerged in Britain. 25   Their work confirms the British georgic to be a thoroughly politico-
economic genre.  
 Whereas scholars address georgics’ political economy in terms of empire or domestic 
commerce, I argue that they miss the extent to which georgics may be read as addressing 
statecraft, though they often do so in an indirect manner.  Like the georgic itself, the work of 
government offers yet another path for organizing the goods and people constituting the socio-
economic order.  However, concomitant with political and economic liberalism26, georgics 
tended to marginalize the state through their own representations of ecological and commercial 
economies and thus imply a smaller, regulatory role for the state than it had held in prior 
centuries.  I will briefly address the historical background of the mercantilist political economy 
which preceded the rise of liberalism before expanding on my argument for the two, broad 
methods by which georgic marginalized and otherwise delimited states’ functions and authority.  
                                                          
24 The work of Margaret Schabas grounds the part of my argument linking political economy’s 
commitment to economic liberalism to several, earlier natural philosophic fields: 
…until the mid-nineteenth century, economic theorists regarded the phenomena of their discourse 
as part of the same natural world studied by natural philosophers.  Not only were economic 
phenomena understood mostly by drawing analogies to natural phenomena, but they were also 
viewed as contiguous with physical nature.  Economic discourse was, in short, considered to be 
part of natural philosophy and not, as we would now deem it, a social or human science.  It did 
not then address an autonomous sphere as it does today. 
Her point reinforces the conception I attribute to Locke, Quesnay, and Smith of the state as distinct, 
political technology which functions as an external influence on the economic domain. 
Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 2. 
25 John Barrell, English Literature in History, 1730-80: An Equal, Wide Survey (London: Hutchinson & 
Co., 1983); Tim Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and Authority: Poetry, Criticism, and Politics from Thomson 
to Wordsworth (New York: Cambridge University, 1996); Blanford Parker, The Triumph of Augustan 
Poetics: English literary culture from Butler to Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
26 Political liberalism generally refers to the assertion of natural rights secured by positive laws whereas 
economic liberalism is typified by commitment to free trade. 
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To preview these methods, first, georgics identified what I consider to be alternative sources of 
order which the poems presented as contributing to socio-economic stability and often 
anticipated a science-driven progress of opulence.  Second, as I have already suggested, georgics 
often presented governments as, so to speak, political technologies susceptible to improvement, 
refinement, delegitimization, and, when necessary, abandonment.  States remain viable so long 
as they support the interests and natural rights of their subjects and by extension natural laws.  
This conception of states as subordinate to markets contrasts with mercantilist political economy 
which imagined the state as occupying a much more prominent and decisive role in 
administering the socio-economic order.  
 Mercantilism refers to the statist economic policy of European countries prior to the 
gradual adoption of economic and political liberalism.  Modern scholars agree that the term 
mercantilism reflects a shared set of main assumptions and goals in the period, but also 
uncertainty regarding the effects of policies, the definition of sources of value, or how buyers 
and sellers agree on prices.27  Under mercantilist government, states exert external pressure on a 
discrete, economic sphere comprising the aggregate activities of autonomous, self-interested 
agents.28  Mercantilism highlights a distinction between the state and the economic sphere it 
oversees; markets were viewed as means for strengthening the state as much as the body politics.  
The rise of a Lockean, natural rights discourse coincided with a reversal in which states serve the 
economic interests and so also the moral obligations of collectives.  Still, Locke’s own economic 
                                                          
27 Lars Magnusson, “Mercantilism,” in A Companion to the History of Economic Thought (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006), 46-60. 
28 Jerome B. Schneewind argues that Locke’s definitions of volition and self-interest, which I discuss in 
chapter one, tend to individuate people as accountable and so also autonomous moral agents.  Jerome B. 
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144-146. 
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theories were roughly consistent with other mercantilists who typically maintained two key 
assumptions: 
1. International trade being zero-sum, states benefit by intervening in international 
markets using protectionist policies in order to increase the inflow of bullion. 
2. Greater material wealth improves the security of both a society and the state itself by 
stabilizing social order through the prevention of food shortages and by enabling the state 
to afford traditional expenses like armies. 
Istvan Hont’s Jealousy of Trade describes this competitive approach to international markets as a 
commercial war between states which weaponize economic activity and trade policies against 
each other in order to amass resources.29  Notable English mercantilists included Edward 
Misselden (1608-1654), Thomas Mun (1571-1641), and Gerard de Malynes (1585–1641).  Their 
debates regarding the inherent value of bullion, the causes of the economic crisis of the 1620s, 
and the effect of freeing international regulations on the all-important balance of trade 
demonstrate that even policies like free-trade were not unknown or unappreciated.30  The land 
surveyor William Petty (1623-1687) also destabilizes a fixed definition or periodization of 
mercantilism.  Besides being a physician like Locke, Quesnay, and Darwin, helping found the 
Royal Society, and proposing laissez-faire state policy, Petty wrote Political Arithmetic (1690), 
which demonstrated the utility of statistical analysis for studying economic forces.  Deemed the 
                                                          
29 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 5-6. 
30 Terence Hutchison, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662-1776 (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 3-13; Lars Magnusson, “Mercantilism,” in A Companion to the History of 
Economic Thought, eds. Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle and John B. Davis (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 
51. 
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founder of political economy by David McNally, Petty foreshadows the rise of econometric 
analysis and, we may say, the gradual depoliticization of political economy.31 
 This rehearsal of mercantilism demonstrates the extent to which states were assumed to 
directly influence the economic sphere for the public good while also reinforcing their own 
power by increasing tax revenues.  By contrast, liberal political economy argued for reduced 
governmental influence and posited that a mixed government such as Britain’s would provide the 
best security for individuals’ natural rights.  As mentioned, this argument was premised on the 
belief that, given the liberty to pursue their self-interest, the collective, economic activities of a 
nation’s subjects would likely produce prosperity and achieve a measure of socio-economic 
stability.  Such prosperity helped fulfill natural laws with minimal imposition from a state 
operating on mercantilist principles and arrogating to itself the moral authority to prescribe 
economic policies.  It remained to various philosophically-inclined authors to argue for the 
natural laws and rights to which economic and political liberalism were amenable.  Of course, 
georgic authors did not write with the specific intention of justifying proto-capitalism or 
possessive individualism.  Yet, I argue that georgics, often by borrowing from natural 
philosophy, depicted several sources of order which reinforced economic and political liberalism 
and thereby undermined governments’ prerogative to interfere in the socio-economic order.  One 
example from natural philosophy and one example from the fine arts will demonstrate what I 
mean by natural, even apolitical sources of order. 
 Georgics’ references to liberty implicitly refer to state-protected natural rights which 
enable the pursuit of self-interest such as when Thomson writes, “Liberty, abroad / Walks 
unconfined even to [Happy Britannia’s] farthest cots, / And scatters plenty with unsparing 
                                                          
31 David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 35. 
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hand.”32  However, Thomson was well-versed in Locke and a clear line of influence gives us 
reason to recognize liberty not simply as a juridico-moral condition granted by God to rational 
subjects, but to think of liberty in increasingly physiological terms.  Locke’s Essay concerning 
Human Understanding describes liberty as a power to make choices based on one’s volition, 
volition itself considered as a quasi-physiological power of the mind.33  Darwin’s Temple of 
Nature also offers a physiological account of humanity’s innate hedonism and volition based on 
his theory that fibrous tissues sensitive to pleasure and pain compose all organisms.  The basic 
capacities of irritation34 and sensation lead to the higher capacities of volitional preference and 
selective association in more complex organisms.  Crucially for Darwin, the volitional capacity 
expands as humans learn new ideas, develop new skills, and harness new technologies.  In 
Darwin’s radically materialist conception of life, liberty is immanent to and nothing other than 
the extent of the volitional capacity which remains continuously interested in finding new means 
for achieving pleasure: 
[Reason] With quick Volitions unfatigued selects 
Means for some end, and causes of effects; 
All human science worth the name imparts, 
And builds on Nature's base the works of Arts.35 
                                                          
32 Thomson, Summer, 1443-1445. 
33 “We must remember, that Volition, or Willing, is an act of the Mind directing its thought to the 
production of any Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I 
would crave leave here, under the word Action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action 
proposed; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are propos'd, though mere 
forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the Will, and being often as weighty in their 
consequences, as the contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for Actions too...”  
John Locke, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1975), II.xxi.28. 
34 Irritation signifies a sensitivity to sensation which causes the different types of fibers composing all 
organisms to contract and relax. 
35 Erasmus Darwin, The Temple of Nature, ed. Martin Priestman, 
http://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/darwin_temple/, III.407-410. 
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Because organisms’ innate imitative processes allow them to synthesize new ideas and transform 
the internal and external conditions of their own existence, Darwin’s physiology naturalizes the 
mutual expansions of liberty and technological development.  Though elsewhere in the poem 
Darwin acknowledges that states may repress their subjects through various policies and 
apparatuses, an individual’s liberty does not derive from God-given rights for which states 
become responsible.  Instead liberty is coextensive with individuals’ own volitional capacities 
and the limits imposed by external conditions such as the tools and resources they can access or 
political constraints on their actions.  Like Smith, Darwin believes that liberty expands 
concurrently with the progress of opulence.  The collective progress of a society’s volitional 
capacities is reflected in its stadial mode of production which determines its socio-economic 
order.36 
 A more abstract, nominally natural order seemed discoverable in the correspondence 
between the aesthetic beauty of landscapes improved according to naturalistic design principles 
and the moral beauty and fitness to rule of the estate-owners who oversaw their improvement.  
William Mason’s (1724-1797) georgic poem The English Garden (1782) argued for the 
naturalistic aesthetic which asserted that landscapers should only seek to refine nature’s own 
beauty by harmonizing excessive irregularities or creating them when few interesting features 
exist.  This aesthetic captured by the Hogarthian principle of unity in variety or, in Mason’s 
terms, “Simplicity” contrasted with the highly formal and geometric French gardens which 
advocates of naturalism disdained for their association with not only arbitrary and unnatural taste 
                                                          
36 Darwin, like many of the authors I discuss, posited a version of stadialism, a form of conjectural history 
popular in the eighteenth century, which asserted that societies pass through predictable modes of 
subsistence usually beginning with hunting and gathering and concluding with commerce.  Stadialism is 
associated with progressive, Whig history and moral philosophy, because it tends to undermine political 
absolutism by reading aspects of the socio-economic order including government to be partly determined 
by the mode of subsistence.   
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but also arbitrary despotism.37  Rather than performing farmers’ manual labor or the aesthetic 
labor of poetry, landowners who improved their estates in the naturalistic style demonstrated a 
disinterested taste heedless of transient, French fashions or the garish excesses and grotesqueries 
associated with recently popular Chinese gardens.  Large, naturalistic landscape gardens 
conveyed their proprietors’ taste and freedom from mercenary interests.  The supposed beauty 
and coherence of their composition announced their owners right to rule.  Though naturalistic 
landscapes implicitly legitimized oligarchy, they also conveyed that fit politicians foster the 
public good by pursuing benevolent, light-handed government administration. 
 Whereas the first method by which georgics delimit states’ influence over the economy 
involves defining alternative, natural sources of socio-economic stability, the second method 
more directly addresses states’ durability and functionality.  We have already seen Locke’s claim 
that states exist at the will of polities bound by social contracts and persist to the extent that they 
adequately served the interests of their subjects as defined by natural law.  Lacking absolute 
authority, states may fall due to historical contingencies such as war but also because they lack 
moral legitimacy and deserve to be dissolved by the body politic.  The Seasons acknowledges 
this susceptibility by referring to the rise and decline of nations on the strength of their political 
leaders.  For example, “SOLON the next, who built his Common-Weal / On Equity’s wide Base; 
by tender Laws / A lively People curbing…” compares favorably with Julius Caesar whose 
excessive self-love allowed a proud, Roman republic to transform into a corrupt, vulnerable, and 
unstable empire.38  Mason too rests a nation’s stability on the virtues of its politicians which he 
demonstrates in a vignette that sees Alexander the Great grant the humble gardener Abdalonimus 
the title of king of Sidon.  States whose corruption and tyranny disenfranchise subjects, steal 
                                                          
37 William Mason, The English Garden: A Poem in Four Books (York: A. Ward, 1783), I.1. 
38 Thomson, Winter, II.446-448. 
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their liberty, and prevent labor and commerce from contributing to common prosperity 
undermine the public good and sow the seeds of their own ruin.  By contrast, political and 
economic liberalism and the ideal of liberty create a challenge for states which Quesnay and 
Smith recognized.  Smith in particular observed that states must do everything possible to ensure 
the progress of opulence up to and including indirectly influencing their behavior through 
incentivizing infrastructure and public education.  However, in attempting to support an optimal 
economy, states cannot directly intervene in the economy for fear of disrupting the natural flows 
of goods which enrich the nation and especially of infringing on subjects’ rights.  Government 
must thus be viewed as a political technology as open-ended as the progress of technology itself, 
one which requires constant elaboration and refinement in order for it to best serve the socio-
economic order. 
 My dissertation attempts to tell a part of the story of political economy’s depoliticization.  
From the perspective of philosophers addressing politico-economic topics, natural laws became 
the bases for the development of statecraft oriented toward economic and political liberalism.  
These liberalisms at once proposed that states remained legitimate to the extent that they served 
the economic interests of their polities and that doing so only required the establishment of state 
apparatuses sufficient to protect and guide rational economic behavior.  British georgics 
reinforced this post-mercantilist view of statecraft though only rarely by directly addressing 
British state apparatuses.  When they do so, they typically critique only the most egregious 
institutions needing reform such as the legalized slave trade or the penal system.  Instead, 
georgics increasingly leaned on natural philosophy and the fine arts to support the idea that, 
given adequate government oversight of liberties, not only stability but progress would ensue 
from the independent interests of the subjects comprising Britain’s vast and complex socio-
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economic order.  Reading georgics together with politico-economic treatises allows us to see that 
the georgic’s prospective, optimistic discourse of liberty, innovation, and prosperity validated the 
work of liberal statecraft which proceeded by developing more complex and subtle apparatus for 
regulating and policing the body politic. 
 My first chapter addresses Locke, whose influential revision of natural law and liberty 
threads through the remaining texts.  I argue that studies of Locke’s labor theory of property 
have given inadequate attention to volition.  Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding describes volition as a prerequisite for liberty, which also provides him with a 
mechanism for naturalizing the efficient use of resources.  Locke’s tacit assumption that 
appropriation depends on volition demonstrates that he sought a natural mechanism for justifying 
large wealth gaps and assuages his own anxiety that resources may not always be used to serve 
the public good.  I also observe that recognizing the role of volition in the labor theory 
strengthens the argument of scholars who side with the workmanship model interpretation of 
labor theory over those who side with the mixing model interpretation.  
 Locke’s understanding of natural laws and rights provides a foundation for my reading of 
Thomson’s The Seasons in my second chapter.  I argue that Thomson unfavorably compares the 
imperfect moral authority of provisional state governments with the immutable and absolute 
moral authority of natural laws.  Rather than expounding on natural laws themselves, he 
represents their force by analogizing them with the physical laws whose own force are expressed 
by their effects on a variety of natural phenomena depicted in the poem.  Thomson also 
indirectly describes natural laws by comparing them to timeless virtues which politicians must 
aspire to embody.  Whereas nature’s moral and physical laws are eternal and can be difficult to 
comprehend, he attempts to show that the work of natural philosophy coincides with humanity’s 
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continuously improving ability to provisionally harness and benefit from nature’s all-
comprehending benevolence.  Two allegorical genealogies of technological progress signify the 
gradual emergence of provisional socio-economic order and prosperity; such development 
recuperates the cycles of summer growth and winter waste which remind the reader of the 
impermanence of all natural and artificial things.  Finally, I show that Thomson applies his 
optimistic sense of gradual progress to the work of government, which he conveys to be yet 
another technology susceptible to improvement and decline.  He cites glorious empires that 
passed like the seasons, because the rulers neglected their natural law-based obligations to 
prioritize the public good by securing their peoples’ liberty.  Still, he retains hope that Britain 
remains a beacon, however imperfect, of liberty and progress. 
 My third chapter demonstrates that the disciplines of economics and political economy 
emerge already largely committed to economic liberalism.  I first introduce the fundamentals of 
Quesnay’s theory of Physiocracy.  I show that while he insisted on free trade, his economic 
theories were both politico-economic and homeostatic.  Because he identifies his economic 
science as disclosing natural laws, he insists that its maintenance requires the support of an 
absolutist, monarchic form of government he called legal despotism.  In Le despotisme de la 
Chine (1767) he proposes that China’s imperial government is the best historical expression of 
his agriculture-based political economy, which moreover requires a fixed, triadic division of 
labor between farmers, merchants and artisans, and a land-owning aristocracy. I then show that 
Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s theories of wealth-production and the division of labor produced 
a much more historically-informed theory of political economy.  While the progress of opulence 
offers boons, it also produces negative unintended consequences.  Smith reinforces the narrative 
I develop of the recognition of state’s mutable, technological character by arguing that 
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governments must develop new apparatuses for managing the consequences which arise as 
society’s enter new, stadial modes of production.  Interestingly, we find that the crucial state 
apparatuses of infrastructure and public education, which Quesnay considered key to legal 
despotism, also suit Smith’s version of modern, commercial liberalism.  However, Smith’s open-
ended political economy acknowledged that governments will need to continuously adapt and 
grow in response to new unintended consequences incurred by the progress of opulence. 
 My fourth chapter introduces the practice of naturalistic landscaping with reference to 
Horace Walpole’s (1717-1797) treatise The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening (1780).  I 
use his text to demonstrate his assertion that unity in variety is an artistic principle of beauty and 
pleasure discoverable in nature itself, but which benefits from the improving work of human 
labor.  However, this labor as well as any indication of the land’s economic utility requires 
obfuscation in order to maintain the façade of unity and order.  His text also usefully 
demonstrates that, though lower social orders could develop an appreciative taste, only those 
with the enormous wealth adequate to landscaping country estates could provide evidence for the 
virtue connoted by good taste.  Mason’s georgic, The English Garden, reaffirms each of these 
points but also makes far more explicit Walpole’s implication that naturalistic landscaping 
demonstrates a person’s fitness to rule.  I make this case with reference to two vignettes in the 
poem which depict these proprietor-politicians.  I also introduce the concept of the georgic 
garden, which emblematizes the British georgic’s decentering of toilsome, manual labor with 
alternative, pleasurable, often intellectual forms of labor.  I close by arguing that Mason uses the 
classical figure of the genius loci, which exhibits passive and active traits, to elaborate the 
passive and active aspects of both sides of the proprietor-politician.  Mason proprietor-politician 
thereby presents a rough model of both economic and political liberalism in (in)action.  
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 My fifth chapter argues that Darwin’s georgic poem, The Temple of Nature, locates order 
in the physiological model he applies to all organic life.  The model’s two principles, hedonism 
and imitation, cooperate to explain transformations as small as an organism’s integration of a 
sensation and as large as the evolution from species into another.  It also allows him to assert the 
continuity between humans’ acquisition of technical skills and their innovation of technological 
instruments.  Among these instruments, he highlights the particular utility of language for 
exchanging and developing ideas which together increase the volitional capacity of pleasure-
seeking humans.  Darwin also employs the figure of the georgic garden to signify the dominion 
of pleasure which his physiology underwrites.  Moreover, the revaluation of pleasure participates 
in his own revision of georgic poetry.  Though his proliferating footnotes strove to explain his 
poetic figures for scientific ideas, he also considered human reason inadequate to the task of 
grasping the essential truths regarding the material world.  Most importantly, comprehensive 
understanding of pleasure, which originates organic life and drives its progress, must also be 
foreclosed and so is properly represented if not mostly strictly understood by means of 
mythopoeia.  Consequently, Darwin authorizes a much larger role in the georgic garden for 
myth, which he exploits in order to anticipate a future, nigh-Edenic age made glorious by the 
flourishing of liberty and wealth. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1  Volition and Appropriation in John Locke’s Labor Theory of Property 
 
 
1.1  Something that is his own 
 My introduction identified thematic overlaps between some eighteenth-century, British, 
georgic poems and roughly contemporaneous politico-economic theory.  Among their shared 
ideas, the efficient exploitation of natural resources and human labor is particularly important, 
and poems like James Thomson’s The Seasons and Erasmus Darwin’s The Botanic Garden 
increasingly focused on the potential for natural-philosophical discoveries and technological 
innovations to improve such exploitation.  Various poets and philosophers also questioned 
pleasure’s function in regard to the socio-economic order by, for example, asking if pleasures 
could be moral ends in themselves or whether pleasure served higher purposes determined by 
God’s moral order.  Due in part to eighteenth-century Britain’s revolutionary advances in 
economic theory and the life sciences, and also due in part to its constitutional discomfort with 
absolute monarchy, georgic poets and political economists took interest in empirically observed 
forces and systems at least partially attributable to nature and which seemed to contribute to 
socio-economic stability.  The consequence of such interests and approaches was, especially in 
georgics, to examine almost any factor, whether geographic, physiological, or otherwise that   
might influence the economy while disregarding or actively seeking to establish limits on a 
government’s moral or pragmatic justifications for intervening in the nation’s economic affairs.39   
                                                          
39 For example, Erasmus Darwin’s poem The Temple of Nature attributes sympathy, sociability, and 
various forms of cultural and economic progress to physiological operations innate in complex organisms.  
Georgics fold human economies into wider ecological and moral systems characterized by order and 
harmony and which reduce the importance of political bonds and legal institutions. 
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Georgics thus reflect a native commitment to economic liberalism visible in much early, British 
politico-economic thought.  I therefore begin my project by discussing John Locke’s arguments 
for natural law and natural, property rights in order to ground my later discussions of the 
imagined importance for socio-economic stability of land, labor, and liberty in georgic poems. 
 Given these shared interests in extra-governmental sources of socio-economic order, I 
read Locke as a key voice in this depoliticization of politico-economic topics, because his labor 
theory of property in Two Treatises of Government claims that individuals in the state of nature 
can appropriate and use material goods without the consent of others by simply mixing their own 
labor with an object.  This theory has given rise to lively debates as to whether Locke makes a 
convincing, pragmatic argument or one that is coherent in the context of his other beliefs.  This is 
how he describes appropriation: 
§ 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of 
his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It 
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this 
labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this 
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right 
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common 
for others.40    
                                                          
40 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), II.v.27. 
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I am particularly interested in his use of the word “something” which appears twice.  The first 
use in the passage’s third sentence ostensibly refers to the labor that innately belongs to 
individuals and that by being “joined to” an object appropriates it.  However, the following 
sentence suggests that labor bears an additional element which “excludes the common right of 
other men” to use and benefit from the object.41  This chapter argues that supplying the concept 
of volition, which Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) defines as an act 
of willing that executes an action, fits within and strengthens a coherent interpretation of the 
labor theory of property called the workmanship model, an interpretation which I find to be more 
convincing than its main alternative, the mixing model.  Additionally, my reading contributes to 
my larger argument by providing an example of an author who marginalizes government’s 
influence over an increasingly autonomous and private, economic domain by offering 
alternative, nominally apolitical explanations for the national economy’s orderly operation.  For 
Locke, volition is a quasi-physiological attribute of humans which enables them to act in a 
rational, moral manner.  My chapter also shows that volition’s role in the labor theory exposes 
Locke’s anxiety that wealth may be misused and wasted, which forces him to justify its 
concentration in the hands of an economic elite based on the assumption that concentration 
permits its more efficient use.  Reading the labor theory of property as implying volition’s role in 
appropriation frames the hard-to-falsify nature of Locke’s theories of appropriation; one may 
own something because the act of appropriation depends on the owner’s volitional intent to 
rationally exploit it in the future.  Thus, in defending a natural, common right to appropriation 
that preempts the need for social contracts and rebuts arbitrary acts of government, Locke’s labor 
                                                          
41 Another potential reading could supply natural right for the unspecified “something.”  This would not 
change my fundamental argument that volition remains a necessary component for that natural right to be 
the “something annexed to” the object.  
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theory is a de facto, conservative justification for preserving domestic, economic power relations 
and foreign, colonial expropriation. 
 I begin by describing the labor theory of property’s nominal function as a plank in 
Locke’s rejection of absolute monarchy.  Doing so allows me to introduce the assumptions and 
justifications informing his belief that the labor theory is necessary for enabling humans to fulfill 
their obligations to the natural laws created by God.  I use natural law as a frame for establishing 
the mutual arguments for the workmanship and mixing interpretations.  I propose that the 
assumptions determining the labor theory favor a reading in which the workmanship model 
incorporates the mixing model, because the workmanship model better comports with Locke’s 
theory of natural law, while the mixing model remains useful for explaining labor’s ability carry 
and transfer volition as a necessary component in appropriation.  Locke’s Essay claims that we 
empirically know that volition helps to filter potentially wayward desires so that our actions 
conform with natural law.  Further, the dependence of natural property rights on agents’ intent to 
efficiently exploit property naturalizes calculative rationality, a concept I borrow from Max 
Weber to signify the mastering and efficient instrumentalization of all available resources; Locke 
imagined such instrumentalization served the public good as obligated by natural law.42  Volition 
therefore offers Locke a quasi-physiological lever which allows him to claim that the uneven 
                                                          
42 Max Weber, Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), 139.  John Dunn addresses calculative rationality as a means to pursue 
the moral obligation to pursue goods and moral righteousness:   
Although it is true that Locke held a broadly hedonistic theory of the will from 1676 on and that 
this led him to analyze human obligation as the rationally calculated maximization of individual 
utility, it is essential to note that he believed that rational men would spend a considerable portion 
of their time contemplating rewards and punishments of a future state.  It is true that he analyses 
the obligations to temperance or charity as instances of prudently delaying gratification, 
investments made in search of greater eventual profits.  
John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the ‘Two 
Treatises of Government’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 195. 
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distributions of wealth which universal, equitable property rights tend to cause should also 
theoretically serve society’s interests by improving material conditions for the whole nation.  
Volition’s bearing of reason into the socio-economic order offers Locke comfort in his 
assumptions that concentrated wealth optimizes prosperity, validates ownership, and satisfies 
natural laws. 
 Locke’s labor theory functions in support of Two Treatises’s broader refutation of Robert 
Filmer’s (1588-1683) defense of royal absolutism in Patriarcha (1680).  The crux of Filmer’s 
argument relevant to our discussion is that all monarchs descend from Adam and consequently 
inherit political power over their kingdoms equivalent to Adam’s absolute rule over his 
household.43  Therefore, subjects only own lands at a monarch’s pleasure and have no recourse 
against arbitrary acts of expropriation.  In addition to Locke’s counterargument that monarchs 
instead rule at the pleasure of a body politic formed by a social contract, the labor theory of 
property argues that property depends neither on a monarch’s grant nor even on an agreement 
between members of a society.  Instead, all reasonable people possess a bundle of natural rights 
which accords them certain freedoms: 
 § 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and 
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with 
any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to 
                                                          
43 Suarez proceeds, and tells us, That in Process of Time, Adam had compleat Oeconomical Power. I 
know not what this compleat Oeconomical Power is, nor how, or what it doth really and essentially differ 
from Political: If Adam did, or might exercise the same Jurisdiction, which a King doth now in a 
Commonwealth, then the Kinds of Power are not distinct; and though they may receive an Accidental 
Difference by the Amplitude, or Extent of the Bounds of the One beyond the Other; yet since the like 
Difference is also found in Political Estates, It follows that Oeconomical and Political Power, differ no 
otherwise, than a Little Commonweal differs from a Great One.  Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha; of the 
Natural Power of Kings. By the Learned Sir Robert Filmer Baronet (London: Richard Chiswell, 1680), 
II.2. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/221. 12/17/2019. 
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preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts 
of other men. (Two Treatises, II.vii.87) 
Natural rights are themselves a kind of immaterial property granted by God in part to ensure that 
people do not impose on each other’s obligated self-preservation.  Though Locke does not list 
labor in this passage, my first quote identified labor as another form of personal property over 
which a person has a natural right and which allows one to appropriate material goods necessary 
for self-preservation.  To better understand how and why Locke proposes his labor theory of 
property to functions as it does, we must first be familiar with his belief that natural rights are 
subservient to natural law. 
 
1.2  Natural law and natural rights 
 Prior to Locke, moral philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was 
dominated by natural law theories still influenced by a legalistic discourse derived from Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274).  Natural law was premised on the beliefs that by observing the world 
human reason could extrapolate God’s existence and that both humans and the moral laws which 
rule them had been made by God.44   Apropos of legalism, Samuel Pufendorf was much 
respected by Locke and preceded him in subscribing to voluntarism, the theory that God’s willful 
creation of humans juridically obliges them to follow his laws.45  In Essays on the Law of Nature 
                                                          
44 Locke asserted that reason should be able to comprehend and codify the natural laws of morality as it 
would other demonstrable sciences such as mathematics.  Natural laws should be coherent, and 
demonstrable, because, according to Locke, morals are complex, archetypal, and adequate modes which 
humans (re)create through their own reasoning.  However, Locke does not perform the demonstration 
himself and ultimately defaults to supplementing human reason with divine revelation to confirm the 
universal, natural laws which God wills.  Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From 
Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37. 
45 Voluntarists like Grotius (1583-1645) and Pufendorf were opposed to intellectualists like Leibniz 
(1646-1716) who considered reason to be more important than will.  However, reason remains crucial for 
voluntarists, because only reasonable creatures can understand and be subject to laws.  Dunn argues that 
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Locke argues that certain exertions of will can establish persistent influence over a thing or 
person: 
…obligation seems to consist in…the authority and dominion which someone has over 
another, either by natural right and the right of creation, as when all things are justly 
subject to that by which they have first been made and also are constantly preserved; or 
by the right of donation, as when God, to whom all things belong, has transferred part of 
his dominion to someone and granted the right to give orders to the first-born, for 
example, and to monarchs…46 
Locke’s quote justifies his voluntarism by referring to the concept of maker’s rights borrowed 
from Francis Bacon, which will be important for understanding volition and the workmanship 
model of appropriation.47  Maker’s rights are predicated on the Aristotelian idea that knowledge 
of an object and its powers grants its maker control over that object.  Because God creates 
humans with capacities such as reason and rights, those capacities (and humans themselves) 
necessarily exist for the purpose of fulfilling God’s ends which he defines by creating natural 
laws.  Specifically referring to human reason’s purpose in helping people conform to natural law, 
John Colman writes of Locke’s voluntarism: 
…all things are designed to fulfil some function and, as man’s distinguishing 
characteristic is his rationality, it follows that his function is to act in accordance with 
reason.  Moreover, besides positive laws which differ from society to society, we believe 
                                                          
Locke switches from intellectualism to voluntarism and Tully also sees both intellectualism (or 
“rationalism”) and voluntarism to be involved in Locke’s use of natural law.  Dunn, The Political 
Thought of John Locke, 188; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his adversaries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 41. 
46 John Locke, Locke: Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117-118. 
47 For a fuller discussion of maker’s rights, see Antonio Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science 
and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
33 
 
there are laws which have validity everywhere; these must constitute the universal law of 
nature.  That men act as if there were no law of nature or disagree as to what the law 
demands does not cast doubt on its existence, for there are many factors which can hinder 
the operation of reason in the individual.48 
Reason serves humans by helping them to decipher natural law, but even if it cannot it still must 
be employed in following and fulfilling them as best as possible by, for example, contributing to 
the commonwealth.  In light of Locke’s voluntarism, we should regard natural rights as powers 
provisionally “granted” to humans by God as means for following natural laws.49  Reviewing  
Locke’s conception of natural rights helps to explain that the right to possess property must 
depend on volition so that the material resources also granted by God can be put to their best 
uses for the common good. 
 Pufendorf can again helpfully frame our topic of liberty-granting, natural rights and 
specifically the right of appropriation.50  His key natural right (ius) of libertas establishes a 
“power over one’s own actions,” which coincides with a natural law forbidding injuring or 
restricting another person’s actions.51  According to Pufendorf, I may act freely and unhindered 
(though am obliged to not harm others) and may even use resources without others’ consent.  
However, libertas cannot create private property or prevent others from using those same 
                                                          
48 John Colman, John Lock’s Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 29. 
49 My claim that Locke subjects natural rights to natural law stakes a position in a long, critical debate as 
to whether Locke believed that God indeed grants humans natural rights so that they may fulfill the 
obligations of natural law or whether he approaches Hobbes’ position by defining natural rights in a 
manner which insulates people from social obligations and anticipates a thoroughly individualist, liberal 
autonomy. 
50 Also, because Locke’s definition of liberty takes us into the quasi-physiology of the Essay which is 
better understood in the context of volition. 
51 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 40. 
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resources.52  Regarding property in goods, Locke’s concern is to establish a justification that 
allows a person a natural use right to property and also a natural exclusory right to prevent its 
expropriation by another person.  Further, natural law obliges that appropriation must not 
infringe on others’ equivalent rights to a common pool of resources.  Locke considers this 
exclusory right vital to self-preservation, because haphazard expropriation threatens self-
preservation, so his labor theory avoids dependence on social contracts or the tacit consent of 
others.  Locke poses the stakes: “there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some 
way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man.”  Therefore, 
Lockean private property does not depend on a state’s positive laws but is instead appropriated 
by a freely executed act of labor.  As the labor theory states, “the labour of his body and the work 
of his hands, we may say, are properly his,” and are therefore already circumscribed by a natural 
right.   When mixing this labor and “something” else with a good, the person’s natural right 
encompasses the good and “excludes the common right of other men” as long as “there is 
enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Two Treatises, II.v.26).  This final phrase, 
known as the enough-and-as-good proviso, reinforces the notion consistent with voluntarism that 
natural rights operate as accessories to the fulfillment of natural laws and may be negated in part 
or whole should they fail to serve those laws.  Preventing others from surviving by hoarding 
resources represents such as failure, because there must be “enough” resources left for others to 
use.  However, the labor theory of property not only fosters self-preservation, which in any case 
is motivated by self-interest, it also compels individuals to put their property to the best possible 
use for society’s collective prosperity, a position supported by Locke’s labor theory.  
                                                          
52 This is because Pufendorf believed that private property in goods can only exist after social contracts 
have been formed. 
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 Locke raises two points in the chapter “Of Property” related by their nominal interest in 
ensuring the efficient use of property for the sake of the public good.  Locke supports his labor 
theory by claiming firstly that a persistent property right in a resource appropriated by a person’s 
labor is the best way to ensure a person’s optimal contribution to the commonwealth and 
secondly that wasting a possessed resource invalidates a person’s right to that resource.  Two 
initial quotes reflect that humans are obliged to recognize that God created the world’s resources 
for the good of all people: 
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make 
use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience.  The earth, and all that is therein, 
is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. (Two Treatises, II.v.26) 
 
§34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it to them for their benefit, 
and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be 
supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated.  He gave it to the 
use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it). (Two Treatises, 
II.v.34) 
Both quotes use superlatives emphasizing that resources should be maximally exploited by those 
who appropriate them.  “[B]est advantage of life and convenience,” “support and comfort,” and 
“greatest conveniences of life” insist that humans should not only survive but fully enjoy the 
world’s potential, material benefits by means of the “industrious and rational labor” that not only 
grants “title” but improves resources’ ability to satisfy various desires.  The words used in the 
passages’ first sentences closely parallel each other and emphasize that Locke considers that 
though natural property rights presume a proprietor’s self-serving, calculative rationality in the 
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good’s use, the labor theory of property’s higher function ensures that more wealth is produced 
so that none may be without life’s necessities.  Two Treatises does not define an exact, natural, 
circulatory mechanism by which redistribution occurs53, but Locke is satisfied to emphasize that 
labor produces such exponential improvements in the total available wealth, such that the poor 
may nevertheless benefit and account themselves better off than kings in uncivilized lands: 
…he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the 
common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, 
produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within 
compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal 
richness lying waste in common.  And therefore he that encloses land, and has a greater 
plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred 
left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind. (Two Treatises, II.v.37) 
The most important of the several points Locke makes in this passage is that land appropriated 
by rationally employed labor will significantly increase the total available wealth theoretically 
available to a community.  His reference to enclosure indicates that he had in mind an English 
upper class who had recently benefited from Acts of governments allowing them to incorporate 
                                                          
53 Popular consent to the use of money and wage-labor invalidates the as-much-and-as-good proviso, 
because proprietors can compensate for resource-scarcity by paying laborers with nonperishable money.   
Moreover, although introducing money allows agents to exchange perishable or improvable goods for 
potentially limitless sums of durable wealth, I would argue that the waste proviso retains its force for 
many goods even beyond the institution of money.  Several scholars have recognized that Locke was 
concerned for the circulatory velocity of money, or the rate at which money changes hands during trade, 
which means that slow-moving money could in some sense be wasted by inadequately facilitating the 
circulation, incorporation, and optimization of other, improvable goods.  Karen Iversen Vaughn, John 
Locke: Economist and Social Scientist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 41; Terence 
Hutchison, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662-1776 (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), 63; Tony Aspromourgos, On the Origins of Classical Economics: Distribution and 
value from William Petty to Adam Smith (New York: Routledge, 1996), 114. 
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common land into their private property and who had been privately doing so well before.54  
Among enclosure’s effects was to force impoverished people off of land and to reduce the 
opportunities of others to supplement their income by, for example, selling firewood collected 
from the commons.55   
 Locke supports theoretical appropriation in a state of nature and practical enclosures in 
seventeenth-century England by raising the specter of waste.  The passage states that 
unappropriated land is necessarily wasted, but also implies that an owner’s natural right to 
appropriated land that remains inadequately exploited may be justifiably nullified and that the 
land be expropriated.  These concerns over utility are reflected in what scholars call Locke’s 
waste or spoliation proviso:  
…whatsoever [an owner] tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, 
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the 
cattle and product was also his.  But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the 
ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up; this part of 
the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be 
the possession of any other. (Two Treatises, II.v.38) 
Locke again allows for enclosure which, given the potential for tenants to work the fields in a 
system of wages and rents, does little to limit the likelihood of massive wealth concentration.  
Moreover, the waste proviso justifies expropriation of land in the Americas from native peoples 
                                                          
54 According to Rachel Crawford, even by 1550, nearly half of English land had been enclosed.  In 
following centuries, Inclosure Acts facilitated this process which occurred in waves.  Charles I would 
undertake one such effort in the 1630s and two others would take place in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century.  Rachel Crawford, Poetry, Enclosure, and the Vernacular Landscape, 1700-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 46-48; 11.  
55 E. P. Thompson provides a useful summary of this transition in terms of the relation between common 
and positive law and the cultural and economic effects of new laws supporting enclosure.  E. P. 
Thompson, Customs in Common (Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1993), 97-138. 
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based on the argument that higher yielding, European farming techniques better satisfy the 
obligation industriously and rationally to cultivate the land.56  While Matthew H. Kramer 
critiques the labor theory of property’s philosophical validity as the optimal means for promoting 
economic efficiency, he notes that “Locke protractedly argued that refinements and 
transformations induced by toil should receive overwhelming credit for the conveniences that 
served human wants” and that such credit justified an owner’s proprietary use rights.57  Locke 
does not always differentiate between increases of wealth based on currently available 
advantages like economies of scale as opposed to innovative technologies; still, he consistently 
refers to increased utility, value, and production as outcomes of rational labor.58  The value 
added by labor represents a source of socio-economic stability, because quantitative increases of 
                                                          
56 Andrew Fitzmaurice presents a version of this position while discussing Locke’s justification for 
colonization.  Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 116.  Locke’s defends his labor theory of property in part by arguing 
that it will be improve quality of life through a body politic:   
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are 
of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature having furnished 
as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, i. e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in 
abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight ; yet, for want of improving it by 
labour, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and 
fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. (Two 
Treatises, II.v.41) 
57 Matthew H. Kramer, John Locke and the origins of private property: Philosophical Explorations of 
Individualism, Community, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 112. 
58 Locke emphasizes as much in another example:   
…for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, 
skins, or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and 
raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other provisions which our industry and 
pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath 
computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we 
enjoy in this world; and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as 
any, or, at most but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly 
to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, 
waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing. (Two Treatises, 
II.v.42) 
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a society’s aggregate wealth and improvements to its general quality of life should limit social 
unrest otherwise caused by lack of life’s necessities.  
 According to Locke’s labor theory of property, labor, which we now know grants 
property rights due in part to its potential for increasing wealth, nominally appropriates resources 
by being mixed with an object.  As mentioned, critics have argued over the premises which 
Locke imagined giving appropriative acts their efficacy.  I reiterate that supplying Locke’s 
concept of volition for the unspecific “something” that labour “annexe[s]” offers a valid reading 
of the labor theory of property and supports my claim that Locke deployed quasi-physiological 
concepts in order to dissociate socio-economic stability from dependence on the state’s authority 
or its policies.  Moreover, my reading strengthens the case that Locke considered the 
workmanship model firmer ground from which to argue than the mixing model. 
 To preview my rationale for claiming volition’s importance for appropriative labor, I 
argue that mixing remains a valid method for understanding the actual act of appropriation if we 
understand it to be nested within and operating under the voluntarist principles which accord the 
workmanship model its higher authority.  I borrow Adam S. Seagrave’s nesting model which he 
applies to the more general problem of whether theories of natural rights serve or destabilize 
natural laws.  However, he does not elaborate its potential implications for Locke’s labor theory 
of property which requires a fuller demonstration of the ways in which Lockean, natural, 
property rights serve the public good.  In Seagrave’s reading, each human is doubly-owned in a 
“nested” system of possession, because individuals “make” their own, accountable, personal 
identity through continuity of consciousness while God makes the material, natural world, its 
laws, and each human body.59  Consequently, humans possess a form of maker’s rights which 
                                                          
59 To explain more fully, Seagrave’s joint, “nested” ownership of individuals depends on the 
workmanship model’s basis in maker’s rights, which establish an apolitical, juridical obligation of object 
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weakly reflect the maker’s rights of God.  Humans’ maker’s rights allow them the right to make 
unclaimed goods their property by mixing their labor with them rather than making them, but 
keeps humans subject to God’s own claims over all of his created things.  It will be necessary to 
summarize the workmanship and mixing model’s respective claims to understand why the 
workmanship model is the more reasonable premise on which Locke to base a natural property 
right. 
 
1.3 The two models 
 The workmanship model, first argued by James Tully and usefully elaborated by Gopal 
Sreenivasan, interprets maker’s rights, which are foundational for Locke’s voluntarism, as we 
have seen, as also necessary to establish the efficacy of appropriation.60  Again, humans are 
subject to natural law because both are created through the force of God’s omnipotent will, 
which endows him with maker’s rights over his creations.  Locke refers to workmanship and 
maker’s rights in his Two Treatises: “for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order, 
and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during 
                                                          
to maker.  Nested ownership of individuals by both themselves and God supports my contention that 
volitional liberty operates in Locke’s voluntarist, political philosophy by enabling economic agency while 
correspondingly making agents accountable to natural and political laws.  Seagrave addresses the crux of 
autonomy-with-obligations by first noting that God initially creates humanity en masse which comports 
with Locke’s beliefs in divine maker’s rights and, indirectly, voluntarism.  God’s creation and consequent 
ownership over humans limit their autonomous ability to make, own, and use property including property 
in their selves, limits codified by God’s will in natural laws.  God also grants humans volitional liberty 
and reason, which are prerequisites for extending the limited rights of self-ownership to property, for 
accessing “the possibility of a demonstrative science of morality,” and to ensure a person’s accountability 
to a higher, moral authority whether it be God’s law or the state’s civil law.  S. Adam Seagrave, “Locke 
on the Law of Nature and Natural Rights,” in A Companion to Locke, ed. Matthew Stuart (West Sussex: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 386-389. 
60 Tully, A Discourse on Property, 35-8; Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 69. 
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his, not another’s pleasure…” (Two Treatises, II.ii.6).  God’s willful, ex nihilo creation of all 
things grants him final determination over the means and ends of those creations.  The means he 
creates in humans include volition, liberty, and reason, each of which Locke describes in the 
Essay’s chapter “Of Power.”  Humans also willfully exert labor, but because they lack God’s 
divine understanding and creative power such labor only grants a limited mastery over objects, 
which natural law supersedes.  For Sreenivasan, rational, willful making slides from divine 
creation to non-omniscient crafting to a mere mixing that may be achieved by acts as simple as 
gathering acorns.  He notes that Locke blurs making and mixing but argues for making’s 
preeminence by stating that Locke’s “making processes can also be identified as mixing 
processes, but not all mixing processes can be identified as making processes.”61  This reading of 
mixing as a weaker version of making is reflected in the imperfection of human reason, which 
necessarily limits the maker’s knowledge required to give humans absolute, maker’s rights over 
their property.  Crucially, human labor cannot create ex nihilo, but only, in addition to 
appropriation, use their labor to add value.  In sum, Locke’s voluntarism is supported by his 
statement that God’s will grants Him absolute maker’s rights which He exerts by imposing on 
humans the obligations set by natural laws.  Locke’s communitarian insistence that physical 
property’s primary function is to serve the public good rather than its owner’s interests 
demonstrate his at least nominal deference to natural law, a deference which comports with an 
interpretation of his labor theory of property that gives the workmanship model priority over the 
mixing model. 
 The mixing model remains important to my argument, however, because its nesting 
inside the workmanship model provided Locke with a way to describe how the labor that is 
                                                          
61 Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property, 83.  See also, Tully, A Discourse on Property, 
35-8. 
42 
 
added to a good can also add volition.  The mixing model interprets the labor of theory 
somewhat more literally than the workmanship model by arguing that mixing one’s innately 
possessed labor with unclaimed objects encompasses those objects within the domain of one’s 
natural property rights.  As my discussion of calculative rationality showed, this interpretation 
also accepts natural rights’ subjection to natural law, but generally credits labor’s ability to 
improve the use-value of resources as justification for their appropriation.  A. John Simmons 
offers a representative defense of the mixing model:   
What Locke writes about labor suggests that he thinks of labor as free, intentional, 
purposive action aimed at satisfying needs or supplying the conveniences of life.  To 
“mix” my labor with an object for Locke is simply for me to make productive use of the 
object within the scope of my labor’s purpose…. I bring (part of) nature within my 
legitimate sphere of self-government by physically imposing my plan for its useful 
employment upon it.  My plan, which is the product of my mental labor, is “mixed” with 
the object through the purposive activity that constitutes my physical labor.62 
Simmons addresses two important points in this quote.  The first suggests that labor exploits 
resources’ potential utility either through short-term consumption or by making them longer-
term factors of production.  Though Simmons attests that “it simply makes no sense to talk of 
literally mixing labor with nature,” we should not discount that we can justifiably read Locke’s 
quotes, cited earlier, as intending to mean that the application of labor to a resource often 
increases its value and is therefore, as Simmons says, productive.63  Worthier of examination is 
another point he suggests with the terms “free, intentional, purposive action aimed at satisfying 
                                                          
62 A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 262. 
63 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 261. 
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needs” and “[m]y plan for its useful employment.” Without quite using the word volition, 
Simmons’s account of the mixing model supports my argument that in being mixed with an 
object, labor, as the expression of an agent’s volition, executes and thus validates appropriation.  
He describes the mixing of labor as a willed act the intent of which does not reside only in the 
initial, willful, appropriative act, but includes a longer-term intention to exploit one’s goods.  
 Simmons’s prospective terms like “plan” and “aim” also connote something of a 
demotion of the improving labor Locke deems necessary in the initial act of appropriation.  I 
note this in order to emphasize the initial, appropriative labor’s coincident, at least as important 
function of bearing volition.  With the example of picking up an acorn, Locke minimizes the 
need for the initial, appropriative labor to add value to the good relative to the benefits derived 
from its imagined, future exploitation and particularly relative to resources like land, which 
provide owners with additional goods and rents for generations.  Little effort may go into 
gathering and consuming goods, but a person may spend an afternoon cordoning off several 
acres of unclaimed land, thereby appropriate it, and profit from it indefinitely as long, given the 
spoliation proviso, as it is efficiently exploited.  Though labor’s facilitation of exploitation, 
production, and improvement remains important for maintaining property rights, the demotion of 
improving labor required for the appropriating act connotes the importance of the volitional 
intent, which assures Locke, God, and others of a good’s optimal future use.  In the case of any 
good not more or less immediately consumed by its use, the minimal labor Locke requires for 
appropriation shows that the initial mixing of labor is more proclamatory and promissory than 
improving and thus implies that appropriative labor’s significance depends on it performing a 
message-bearing function.  The execution of appropriation in the present relies on a future 
conditional of anticipated exploitation the default of which would pose challenges for any party 
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seeking to prosecute an expropriation.64  Turning to Locke’s definition of volition, we see that it 
serves Locke’s argument for the labor theory of property by letting him presume landowners’ 
calculative rationality.  
 
1.4 Volition, calculative rationality, and liberty 
 In Locke’s view, volition would beneficially coincide with appropriative labor because he 
understands volition as a power the operation of which theoretically disciplines the desires that 
originate the volitions for agents’ free actions.  This reading of volition’s role in appropriation 
lets us see that Locke can justify a natural right of appropriation by imagining that efficiently 
exploited property necessarily serves the natural law obliging society’s preservation by its ability 
to increase the commonwealth and to promote socio-economic stability.  And again, volition’s 
ability to optimize property’s exploitation seems to provide means for Locke to assuage his 
concern that resources may be wasted due to owners’ laxity or their immoral desires.  In “Of 
Power,” Locke defines volition as a mental capacity that mediates a desire and an intentional 
action: 
We must remember, that Volition, or Willing, is an act of the Mind directing its thought 
to the production of any Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid 
multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word Action, to comprehend 
the forbearance too of any Action proposed; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when 
walking or speaking are propos’d, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the 
                                                          
64 There seems to be a parallel here with Locke’s proposed right of revolution.  The social contract 
reinforced by natural rights grants a body politic the theoretical power to dissolve a tyrannical 
government (as well as itself), but Locke sets the bar so high as to render the idea all but toothless.  On 
the other hand, having seen his country in the throes of civil war, Locke recognized a need for social 
stability, which he optimistically hinged on the moral, economic rationality of England’s landowning, 
upper class. 
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determination of the Will, and being often as weighty in their consequences, as the 
contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for Actions too:65 
It is worth emphasizing that volition itself is more active and performative than its name might 
suggest if we read it as analogous to desire or, a shade more active, intent; we can accurately 
describe volition as an act of willing necessary to execute a desired, intentional action.  Volition 
is not the physical or mental act itself but is of the act and occurs all but contemporaneously with 
actions such as laboring.  Neither is volition the pre-existing desire that volitional actions attempt 
to satisfy.  Rather, for a volitional action to occur, two other conditions must be satisfied: one 
must be at one’s liberty, which I will address shortly, and one must, as Locke terms it here, be 
able to forebear from performing the action.   
 Forbearing from executing a desired, considered act also constitutes a volitional action, 
and though it is not precisely the same as suspension, it gestures toward this additional power 
that gives volition its moral force.  Because volition’s power to incite rational, calculated actions 
depends on suspension, Locke is emphatic in presenting suspension’s importance and potential 
benefits: 
This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, which is (as I 
think improperly) call’d Free will.  For during this suspension of any desire, before the 
will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we 
have an opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going 
to do; and when, upon due Examination, we have judg’d, we have done our duty, all that 
we can or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and ’tis not our fault, but a perfection 
                                                          
65 John Locke, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), II.xxi.28. 
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of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair Examination. 
(Essay, II.xxi.47) 
I will take up liberty’s dependence on suspension shortly.  Again, to be volitional, an act must 
also be willfully forborne.  Suspension occurs between the initial period during which desire lies 
dormant and the moment when volition initiates an action.  Specifically, suspension willfully 
executes the action of forbearance, which prevents volition from following through on an active 
action, so to speak.  During the interval of suspension, reason scrutinizes the mind’s 
justifications for the initial desire and the morality of the action’s predicted outcomes.  
Suspension thereby offers agents the possibility of correcting their desires and conforming action 
and outcomes to the moral obligations predetermined by natural law.  Agents act morally and 
rationally by not transgressing natural laws and by performing, among other things, actions 
economically favorable to society.  The ability to judge and choose one’s actions exemplifies the 
obligatory use of God-given reason.66  Employing reason should cause morally accountable 
individuals to choose virtuous actions, which Locke defines as “Actions conformable to God’s 
Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only measure of Vertue, when 
Vertue is used to signifie what is in its own nature right and good.” (Essay, I.iii.18) 
 Our understanding of suspension’s ability to interrupt problematic actions should help to 
clarify why Locke would rely on volition to burnish people’s fundamental right to appropriate 
desired, unclaimed land by doing little more than proclaiming their intention to do so with a 
potentially negligible act of labor.  Locke views humans as hedonistic creatures whose wills are 
motivated by desire.  A perceived lack of pleasure, often attributable to a physical discomfort or 
                                                          
66 Shelley Weinberg notes that suspension serves understanding and desire by attuning the interests of 
individuals both to moral pleasure and also to the “true good” which essentially means reasoning one’s 
way to Heaven’s infinite Good by performing socially beneficent actions.66 
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a missing resource, registers as uneasiness that then motivates desire.67  Locke’s faith in 
empiricism and natural law inclines him to believe that humans can reason their way from 
perceptions of pleasure and pain to an understanding of Good, Evil, and their obligations to God.  
Yet the Essay registers Locke’s concerns about faulty reason and immoral desires.  The 
vicissitudes of the experiences of pleasure and pain all but ensures desire’s moral errancy.  
Namely, immediate pain causes immediate unease, but absence of the Good and its 
compensation by a train of moderate, potentially spurious pleasures, does not necessarily cause 
us the unease that would orient our desire toward the Good if we were to adequately consider the 
consequences of acting on such desires.  One should theoretically derive pleasure from 
exploiting one’s property for the public good by, for example, enclosing land, employing the 
lower ranks to help maximize harvests, and placing profits back into circulation rather than 
hoarding them.  Though some of these activities may be primarily conducive to personal 
pleasure, they nevertheless contribute to the commonwealth, and one’s ability to reflect on 
hoarding’s long-term disadvantages should reduce desire to pursue irrational and anti-social, 
economic activities.  As Locke says, “by a due consideration and examining any good proposed, 
it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its 
turn, and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued” (Essay, II.xxi.46).  
                                                          
67 “That Desire is a state of uneasiness, everyone who reflects on himself, will quickly find” (Essay, 
II.xxi.32).  Beginning with revisions in the Essay’s second edition, Locke differentiates desiring from 
willing, the latter term which he equates with volition, since individuals can will the performance of an 
action which they do not desire, and because willing is integral to any action, whereas a desire does not 
necessarily compel action.  As Stuart points out, Locke specifies in the second edition that desires are 
oriented toward things, while volitions are necessary for and part of the performance of actions.  Unease 
may motivate a desire to act in one’s self-interest, but volition is necessary for causing a willful action to 
occur and may be thought of as an intentional doing.  Matthew Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2013), 458-459.  Lowe defends Locke’s insertion of volition as a layer in too-simple, 
intentionalist philosophical accounts of agency, since intention does not convey the necessary 
contemporaneity of volition with the willed action.  E. J. Lowe. Locke: on Human Understanding 
(London, Routledge: 1995), 139-140. 
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Suspension enables agents to correct their desires prior to performing a volitional act; without the 
potential for suspension acts may neither be considered volitional nor free.  Having largely 
evacuated the need for appropriating labor to immediately exploit or improve goods and because 
“Of Property” functions as a general defense of contemporary economic conditions,68 the 
inclusion of suspension in volition, as I have noted, reassures Locke that appropriative acts are 
executed with moral intent and that present landowners persistently effect such intentions. 
 It behooves me to say more about liberty, because Locke defines it in a tellingly different 
fashion from Pufendorf’s libertas, and because liberty will be a keyword throughout my other 
chapters.  Locke’s liberty resembles Pufendorf’s libertas in its general contours by defining the 
ability to act freely and unhindered by external restrictions.  However, the first sentence of 
Locke’s definition of suspension indicates a quasi-physiological precondition, which also 
appears in his definition of liberty; Locke calls suspension “the source of all liberty” and 
liberty’s definition shows us that liberty in fact depends on volition: 
…the Idea of Liberty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular 
Action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is 
preferr’d to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be 
produced by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty, that Agent is under 
Necessity.  So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but 
there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no 
Liberty. (Essay, II.xxi.8) 
This definition shows us that volition is necessary though not sufficient for liberty.  Conversely, 
liberty requires volition, because volition involves the capacity to suspend executing an action 
                                                          
68 Two Treatises offers grounds for dissolving government and society but largely forecloses a body 
politic’s ability to justify the social and economic costs of revolution. 
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and therefore cannot itself be under necessity.  Locke placing this condition on liberty adds 
another, quasi-physiological layer to free action which, as we have seen, allows socio-economic 
stability to emerge from the often-self-interested actions of autonomous individuals.  
Additionally, those who lack liberty fundamentally lack the ability to exercise natural rights, 
while those possessing liberty are morally accountable and obligated by natural law. 
 To underscore the mixing model’s importance, it is again useful to interpret Locke’s 
theory of property rights through and against Pufendorf.  To the extent that a person possesses 
reason (“Thought”) and liberty, they are morally accountable agents with powers and rights 
granted by God for fulfilling natural law.  Therefore, volitional acts are themselves either moral 
or immoral.  As we have seen, Locke considers the optimal exploitation of resources for the good 
of the commonwealth to be a moral act.  Yet the appropriative act of labor does not necessarily 
have to improve or immediately exploit a resource; it must simply carry the volitional intention 
to do so in order to grant a natural right to exclusive use.  Whereas Pufendorf considered 
personal, natural rights in terms of libertas, he differentiated rights such as the right to property 
which depend on the social contract as belonging to one’s dominion (dominium).  Locke also 
refers to a person’s dominion but describes it in terms of the bundle of natural rights that can be 
extended to include physical property.69  Given that labor is required for appropriation, I thus 
highlight Steven Buckle’s argument for the workmanship model: 
…Locke’s theory does not require, and even can be better stated, without resorting to this 
(mixing) metaphor.  The reason is this: although the idea of extending the suum 
encourages thinking of it as a kind of physical realm, as some sort of special substance, it 
                                                          
69 “And hence, subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together.” (Two 
Treatises, II.v.35). 
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is in fact a moral realm: that realm which cannot be encroached upon by others without 
doing an injury.70   
First, the term suum, derived from natural law philosopher Hugo Grotius, influences Locke’s 
notion of dominion as a sphere or “realm” that includes an individual’s belongings such as their 
person, their rights, and their property.  Appropriative labor functions to the extent that the 
volition executing it expresses the moral desire to exploit the good.  Even though the initial 
appropriative act seems of little significance as an improving act, we can surmise why Locke 
would not want to separate appropriation from improvement; his provisos guard against abuses 
of an otherwise largely free right of appropriation.  Other acts not involving directly applied 
labor might announce a moral intent for a resource’s use, but the mixing of labor serves the 
practical function of establishing one’s prospective intentions by means of a definite act, often 
proximate to the act of consumption where applicable, and reasonably expressive of the actual 
future work required for improvement.  The workmanship model incorporates and even requires 
appropriation to involve labor’s mixing with goods, because labor imbues the good with 
volition’s moral valence and thus nominally assures Locke’s readers that England’s wealth rests 
in the hands of those who will put it to best use rather than use their power to immiserate the 
lower orders. 
 I have reserved discussing Locke’s relation to political economy for two related reasons.  
Firstly, a self-conscious, disciplinary discourse of political economy did not appear until about 
three-quarters of a century after Locke published his major texts; a reasonably coherent 
economic science only emerges around 1760s with the French Physiocrats, whom I discuss in 
                                                          
70 Steven Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), 174. 
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my third chapter.  In Locke’s time, though some thinkers had given thought to free trade and 
constitutional monarchy’s checks on the crown were considered favorably, mercantilist thought 
remained a powerful influence for justifying various government interventions into foreign and 
domestic markets for the sake of increasing national prosperity and state revenues.  Locke’s 
theories in the Two Treatises, among which the labor theory of property is exemplary, were 
foundational for later thinkers attempting to justify economic and political liberalism.  Reading 
the labor theory of property in conjunction with his descriptions of volition and liberty in An 
Essay on Human Understanding offers insight into the quasi-physiological bases on which 
Locke could argue that rational, economic behavior tended to satisfy both proprietor’s self-
interest while also benefitting society by increasing the nation’s collective prosperity.  Further, 
while the labor theory of property applies to an all-but-fictional state of nature, natural laws 
remain in force for national governments and their subjects.  Consequently, states tend to govern 
best largely by codifying and protecting God-granted natural rights which allow people to thrive 
and which Locke claims people formed social contracts and governments to protect in the first 
place: 
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the 
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, 
for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure 
enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This 
any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as 
they were in the liberty of the state of nature. (Two Treatises, II.viii.95) 
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This quote as well as any demonstrates Locke’s preference for an equitable, communitarian 
version of liberal government based on his sense that simply allowing rational agents to pursue 
their economic interests with little fear for interference or injury will foster the public good. 
 Locke imagines that natural laws determine acceptable forms of socio-economic and 
socio-political order and that the labor theory serves natural law by facilitating both individual 
self-preservation and the expansion of collective pools of wealth.  My next chapter discusses The 
Seasons, a physico-theological, georgic poem similarly interested in the relation between natural 
law and socio-economic development.  Emblematic of the poem’s physico-theology, Thomson 
expresses enthusiasm for the study of nature’s physical laws by natural philosophy which 
benefits humans by enabling innovative, technological methods for harnessing nature.  
Consequently, The Seasons places greater emphasis on intellectual labor and scientific discovery 
than do other, contemporary georgics.  Thomson compares nature’s material recycling with the 
human capacity for remaking which allows humans to not simply accumulate wealth, but drive 
gradual, world-historical, technological progress.  Thomson’s emphasis on the mutability of 
things created by both “Nature’s swift and secret-working hand” and humans distinguishes such 
objects from nature’s immutable laws both physical and moral.71  Ultimately, Thomson uses his 
physico-theological distinction between eternal, unchanging laws and material, transient things 
to critique the state and its apparatuses.  In his poem, governments become one refinable 
technology among the many which contribute to their nation’s socio-economic stability.  Thus, 
state apparatuses merge with and participate in the wider, technological progress optimistically 
envisioned by Thomson, or undermine the industrious efforts of its subjects and sow chaos.  But 
                                                          
71 James Thomson, Spring, in The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 97. 
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they can never embody the perfection of natural laws and so remain open-ended and perpetually 
susceptible to refinement. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Natural Law, Economy, and the State in James Thomson’s The Seasons 
What cannot active government perform, / New-moulding man? 
-James Thomson, The Seasons 
 
2.1 The Seasons: Background and the argument 
 James Thomson’s georgic poem, The Seasons (1730), prefigures an imminent trend in 
British politico-economic treatises like Smith’s Wealth of Nations by regarding states and their 
apparatuses as mutable, historically contingent formations suited to protecting natural, 
proprietary rights and promoting the commonwealth. Thomson performs this revision in part by 
hybridizing the georgic with physico-theology in order to frame humanity’s gradually improving 
understanding and utilization of its environment with respect to the moral authority of natural 
laws.72  Much recent scholarship on The Seasons considers the text’s attention to natural 
philosophy, commerce, and empire, each relevant to my analysis of maturating, British theories 
of the state’s role in political economy.73  These critics read the poem’s representation of nature’s 
                                                          
72 Useful work including still valuable, older material on The Seasons and natural philosophy includes 
Alan Dugald McKillop, The Background of Thomson’s Seasons (Hamden: Archon Books, 1961), 1-88; 
Ralph Cohen, The Unfolding of The Seasons (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); Anthony Low, 
The Georgic Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 117-153; Kevis Goodman, 
Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-66; Frans De Bruyn, “From Georgic Poetry to Statistics and 
Graphs: Eighteenth-Century Representations and the “State” of British Society,” The Yale Journal of 
Criticism 17, no. 1 (2004): 118; Heather Keenleyside, “Personification for the People: On James 
Thomson’s “The Seasons”,”  ELH 76, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 447-472. 
73 Richard Braverman, Tim Fulford, and Blanford Parker read the poem’s praises for the fruitful industry 
and inventive ambition of individuals as laying an ideological foundation for Whiggish capitalism.  Suvir 
Kaul, Karen O’Brien, and Tara Ghoshal Wallace more closely address the state by illuminating 
Thomson’s sometimes shaky commitment to the violent expansion of Britain’s commercial empire.  
Richard Braverman, Plots and Counterplots: Sexual politics and the body politic in English life, 1660-
1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 271-304; Tim Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and 
Authority: Poetry, Criticism, and Politics from Thomson to Wordsworth (New York: Cambridge 
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physical transformations as I do as an allegory for the poem’s political economy which 
comprises its understanding of the relation between human economies and the state apparatuses 
which affect them.  For example, Tim Fulford states that Thomson “encourage[d] readers to 
approve of legislation to end the man-made oppression of extortion and torture in prison.  In this 
respect Thomson shows himself a reforming Whig, keen to oppose injustices which…he believes 
to be remediable.”74  I build on these critics but part ways with them by first arguing that the 
poem distinguishes between the juridico-moral authority of absolute, natural laws on the one 
hand and the weaker authority of states and state apparatuses on the other hand.75  The latter 
section of my chapter argues that the poem claims that states coordinate with and are akin to 
other, more overtly technological apparatuses participating in a disembedded economy.76  I 
borrow the idea of the disembedded economy from Karly Polanyi and use it to signify the 
emerging idea in the eighteenth century that the economy is not an isolated domain within social 
life; rather, the economy comprises and is influenced by all aspects of social life such that 
distinct institutions like governments are understood in term of their subordination to and ability 
ideally to strengthen the socio-economic order. Thomson indicates this shared capacity for the 
synergistic improvement of the commonwealth and government when he admires those “who 
                                                          
University, 1996), 18-37; Blanford Parker, The Triumph of Augustan Poetics: English literary culture 
from Butler to Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-172; Suvir Kaul, Poems of 
Nation, Anthems of Empire: English Verse in the Long Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 2000), 131-167; Karen O’Brien, “Imperial georgic, 1660-1789,” in The Country and 
the City Revisited: England and the Politics of Culture, 1550-1850, eds. Donna Landry, Gerald MacLean, 
Joseph P. Ward (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 160-169; Tara Ghoshal Wallace, 
Imperial Characters: Home and Periphery in Eighteenth-Century Literature (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2010), 53-65. 
74 Fulford, Landscape, liberty and authority, 25-26. 
75 I will generally use natural laws to refer to moral laws and laws of nature with modifiers like material 
or physical to refer to the laws governing material phenomena studied by natural philosophers. 
76 I find persuasive Karl Polanyi’s idea of a disembedded economy, meaning the belief that the economy 
is not one, largely isolated sector of social life but instead encompasses and mutually influences all other 
domains of life.  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 71-75. 
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toiled / Through long successive ages to build up / A labouring plan of state” (Winter, 960-62).77  
Throughout, I show that The Seasons uses the georgic mode to liken the imperfection and 
provisionality of state apparatuses such as positive laws not only to other products of human 
labor but also to the transient, natural phenomena Thomson often calls works.  In terms of the 
state’s role in the intellectual history of theories of political economy, the poem curtails the 
moral authority of states and refigures them as imperfect, refinable apparatuses for supporting 
science-driven, economic prosperity. 
 Thomson’s progressive education and his desire for literary recognition informed his use 
of a georgic mode whose own popularity had been on the rise for nearly three decades.78  John 
Dryden’s celebrated translation of Virgil’s Georgics (1697) was supplemented by Joseph 
Addison’s appended “Essay on the Georgics” and preceded John Philips’s Cyder (1708), 
Stephen Duck’s grimmer “The Thresher’s Labour” (1730), and James Dyer’s The Fleece (1757).  
These latter poems each address a single, English, rural industry; though the poems depict 
contemporary forms of work and even, as The Fleece does with the textile trade, reconcile 
themselves to the benefits of industries that would reshape England’s land and economy, they 
                                                          
77 All references to Thomson’s The Seasons are taken from James Thomson, The Seasons, ed. James 
Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). 
78 A brief glance at Thomson’s educational background in natural and moral philosophy contextualizes 
The Seasons’ physico-theological argument that humans must leverage imperfect knowledge to better 
understand and cooperate with nature’s moral laws.  Reflecting the Scottish Enlightenment’s influence on 
the University of Edinburgh’s progressive Arts curriculum, Thomson would have read Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, likely read an early version of stadial history in Pufendorf’s De iure 
naturae et gentium (1672) and encountered Newtonian natural philosophy in Robert Stewart’s fourth-year 
course, Natural Philosophy and Ethics.  From the perspective of moral philosophy, such texts exposed 
Thomson to a liberal version of natural law more invested in natural, proprietary rights different from 
earlier natural law theories, which were more invested in social obligations.  For Pufendorf’s influence on 
the Scottish Enlightenment, see Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish whig historians and the 
creation of an Anglo-British identity, 1689-c. 1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 110-
111; Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society: Enlightenment Conjectural History and Modern 
Social Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 27-29.  For Robert Stewart’s 
progressivism and curriculum see James Sambrook, James Thomson 1700-1748: A Life (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), 12-14. 
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exhibit nostalgia and do not take as broad and optimistic account as The Seasons does of the 
various scientific discoveries and technological improvements which Thomson valorizes.  The 
Seasons therefore reduces agriculture’s conventional prominence in georgic poetry and presents 
a more capacious view of the philosophical influences and material objects affecting Britain’s 
political economy.  Thomson insists that “the gift of Industry” provides “whatever / Exalts, 
embellishes, and renders life / Delightful” (Autumn, 141-143).  He particularly attributes 
Britain’s prosperity to the intellectual work of natural philosophy as a preliminary to 
technological innovation.  I show that The Seasons expands the georgic’s scope by folding 
admiration for the work that drives scientific discovery into its claim that the public good 
depends on innovative exploitation of resources by a government-supported, economic sector.   
 The Seasons uses physico-theological argumentation to distinguish the absolute and 
immutable moral authority of natural law from the imperfect moral authority of states and their 
apparatuses which the poem implicitly compares, as it does with the transient works of humans, 
with its own mutable, physical works.  From this premise, the poem argues that studying the 
fixed, physical laws of nature which regulate phenomena can help lead moral philosophers to 
better grasp the similarly fixed, natural laws which regulate morality.79  Physico-theology sets 
the poem’s moral table with regard to political economy by establishing that nature’s moral laws 
are reflected in its physical laws, that physical laws determine nature’s diverse, material 
economies, and finally, that statecraft should support the rational instrumentalization of those 
material economies by free and happy individuals.  For example, Thomson presents a long 
                                                          
79 Describing physico-theology, Jonathan Israel states that “regularity, purposeful intricacy, and 
coherence of the universe, held Newton, are in themselves proof of supernatural agency in its design” and 
thus also seemed to illuminate the moral, benevolent character of that design.  Jonathan Israel, 
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670 – 1752 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 207. 
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passage on the sun and its productive influence on a variety of systems including the “planetary 
train,” “[t]he vegetable world,” “the surface of the enlivened earth,” and the “unfruitful rock” 
(Summer, 104; 112; 130; 140).  The passage merges the georgic themes of nature and the sun’s 
own potential to remake physical nature.  It announces its physico-theological significance by 
claiming that in the sun “Shines out thy Maker” and concludes with the physico-theological 
commonplace that the natural world provides evidence of God’s existence: “To me be Nature’s 
volume broad displayed, / And to peruse its all-instructing page” (Summer, 192-193).  The 
Seasons’ hybridization of georgic poetry with physico-theology makes the poem a case study for 
my larger story of the British georgic’s mediation of nascent, politico-economic ideas which 
include a liberalist statecraft predicated on natural, proprietary rights and a disembedded 
economy served by rather than serving a sacrosanct state. 
 I first show that the poem represents natural law’s absolute, moral authority by means of 
two heuristics.  In the first heuristic, Thomson distinguishes absolute, natural law from its 
provisional expressions in phenomena, actions, or institutions first by indirectly describing 
morality in terms of timeless virtues and secondly by analogizing the universal force of moral 
laws to the force of physical laws.  Thomson favors the virtue love, which he uses to convey 
natural law’s absolute righteousness and to deny the existence of disorder.  He owes his portrayal 
of love in part to the optimistic, moral philosophy of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713).  Shaftesbury’s sense of the world’s “moral beauty” uses the rhetoric of 
aesthetics to reflect the virtuous order, consistency, and continuity of nature’s laws.  The 
Seasons’ shares his confidence that God’s infusive love harmonizes nature’s transient particulars 
into a perfect whole.80  For Thomson, love epitomizes the benevolence of Creation’s natural 
                                                          
80 The generous Ashley thine, the friend of man, 
Who scanned his nature with a brother’s eye, 
59 
 
laws, invokes without defining the blurry relation between moral laws and phenomena like 
gravity, and can characterize individual acts of sensibility or sociability.  Shifting to the second 
heuristic, I show the poem using physical laws to represent the moral authority of natural laws.  
The Seasons represents the universal force of both types of fixed law by dressing world-spanning 
examples of physical phenomena with signifiers of imperial authority and power. Imagery 
relating seasonal weather patterns to distant, extreme climates conveys not only the sublime 
force of physical and moral laws, but also their preeminence over any of humanity’s transient 
works. 
 In the chapter’s second section, I show that The Seasons expands the georgic’s esteem for 
labor to include the intellectual work which supports commerce and technological innovation 
before addressing government itself as a mutable, political technology. This shift reinforces the 
poem’s claim that a body politic’s moral well-being is indexed by the dynamism of its economy 
rather than being a function of the state’s irreproachability.  The poem sketches natural material 
works which are at once the source of and analogize human discoveries and innovations.  Two 
genealogies of technology in the poem promote the moral and material benefits of mixing 
scientific progress, industrious labor, and sociable commerce.  In this context, state apparatuses 
are themselves refinable, politico-economic technologies meant to help individuals fulfill the 
natural law which we saw Locke describe as obliging the community’s collective thriving.81  
Finally, the poem’s account of failed polities show that states are not discrete, transcendent 
                                                          
His weakness prompt to shade, to raise his aim, 
To touch the finer movements of the mind, 
And with the moral beauty charm the heart. (Summer, 1555) 
81 “God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to 
the best advantage of life and convenience.  The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the 
support and comfort of their being.”  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning 
Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), II.v.26. 
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entities, but are themselves composite apparatuses capable of dysfunction, delegitimization, and 
replacement.  Thomson cites Britain’s slavery and jail systems as institutions presently afflicting 
the moral standing of government.  Yet he remains optimistic that a Britain made to flourish by 
the synergy of its scientists, industries, and government will be able to amend these severe, 
socio-political defects.  
 
2.2 Physico-theology and the gap between nature’s laws and human knowledge 
 Following some unremarkable juvenilia submitted to the Edinburgh Miscellany, 
Thomson published Winter (1726), the poem that would lead to The Seasons, one year after 
moving to London.  A financially secure group of local Scots Whigs supported Thomson with 
positive literary reviews and with recommendations for tutoring positions.  David Mallet (1705-
1765), a soon to be popular Scottish poet and dramatist, arranged the selling of Winter to John 
Millan for three pounds.82  In a letter to his friend William Cranstoun, Thomson says that a 
poem, now lost, by Reverend Robert Riccaltoun “first put the design (for Winter) into my 
head.”83  Thomson envisions Cranstoun as a penseroso figure, “wandering, philosophical, and 
pensive…while deep, divine Contemplation, the genius of the place, prompts each swelling 
awfull thought.”84  Winter’s blank verse is less obviously georgic than other sections; though 
optimistic, its tone is closer to Duck’s resignation than to Philips’s exuberant, convivial swains 
and so may reflect a struggling artist’s uncertainty and homesickness.85  James Sambrook states 
                                                          
82 Sambrook, James Thomson, 37. 
83 Sambrook, James Thomson, 17. 
84 James Thomson, James Thomson, 1700-1748. Letters and Documents, ed. Alan Dugald McKillop 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958) 16. 
85 McKillop shows that Thomson’s argument shares ground not only with other contemporary approaches 
to physico-theology but also builds its optimistic theodicy on other well-known intertexts such as The 
Book of Job and Paradise Lost.  McKillop, The Background of Thomson’s Seasons, 7-9. 
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that Winter “foreshadows Thomson’s later concern with political issues, but Winter as a whole is 
mostly in keeping with its devotional conclusion.  Its logic is summed up in one of its 
invocations.” 86  Sambrook then quotes Thomson: 
Nature! great Parent! whose directing Hand 
Rolls round the Seasons of the changeful Year, 
How mighty! how majestic are thy Works! 
With what a pleasing Dread they swell the Soul, 
That sees, astonish’d! and, astonish’d sings! (Winter, 106-110) 
These lines evoke physico-theology’s faith in Creation’s benevolence signified by nature’s 
“majestic” sublimity.87  A calm rationalization of winter’s value as a cleansing precursor to 
nature’s bountiful renewal sets an optimistic tone that reached new heights in Thomson’s 
subsequent writing of Summer, Spring, and Autumn.  The completed cycle, fully revised and 
published under subscription in 1730, runs from Spring to Winter and concludes with A Hymn.    
 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, physico-theological texts deriving from the 
natural law tradition of moral philosophy presumed to reconcile Christianity’s biblically 
revealed, moral principles with knowledge derived from empiric, experimental, natural 
philosophy.  Stephen Gaukroger calls physico-theology an innovative, yet rear-guard formation 
that responded to rising regard for English, philosophic heroes in Francis Bacon, John Locke, 
                                                          
86 Sambrook, James Thomson, 36. 
87 Whereas Sambrook notes that conventional georgic imagery and themes related to rural labor emerged 
in later-written seasons, Juan Christian Pellicer argues that the georgic genre which so well served 
materialist, physico-theological ponderings was central as early as the 1726 Winter.  Sambrook, James 
Thomson, 72; Juan Christian Pellicer, “Georgic and Pastoral,” in The Oxford History of Classical 
Reception in English Literature: Volume 3 (1660-1790), ed. David Hopkins and Charles Martindale 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 312. 
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and Isaac Newton.88  Crucially for my argument, The Seasons recognizes physico-theology’s 
distinction between Creation’s immutable laws and the imperfect knowledge systems describing 
the natural phenomena determined by those laws.  The difference is highlighted in comparing 
God’s perfect, creative logos to humans’ limited abilities: 
This infancy of being, cannot prove 
The final issue of the works of God,  
By boundless love and perfect wisdom formed, 
And ever rising with the rising mind. (Summer, 1802-1804)   
“Boundless love,” “perfect wisdom,” and “ever rising” signify the gap between the absolute 
potency of the moral and physical laws produced by God’s will and the human incapacity to 
comprehend, act, or create in full accord with those laws.  “This infancy of being, cannot prove” 
describes philosophy’s ignorance of the laws which give Creation its perfect, ineffable harmony. 
 Key to physico-theology, natural philosophy’s discoveries were thought to imperfectly 
reach across the gap between empiric experience and moral laws by reading the former as proof 
of the latter’s perfect, enduring righteousness.  Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746), a Newtonian 
professor at the University of Glasgow, stated that “natural philosophy, is subservient to 
purposes of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural 
religion and moral philosophy, by leading us, in a satisfactory manner, to the knowledge of the 
author and governor of the universe.”89  Thomas Burnet’s early example of physico-theology, 
Telluris Theoria Sacra, attempted to reconcile contemporary geology with biblical history.  
William Derham published his 1711 and 1712 Boyle Lectures as Physico-theology; or, A 
                                                          
88 Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity, 1680-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 1-7. 
89 Qtd. In Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 201.   
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Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from His Works of Creation (1713).  He tells 
readers that “nothing tended more to cultivate Religion and Piety in a Man’s Mind, than a 
thorough Skill in Philosophy.90  H. Grant Sampson classifies a set of literary texts from the 
eighteenth century which share such assumptions and methods as physico-theological epics.  
Like contemporary georgics, “they are moral and didactic” and present observed patterns of 
phenomena and bountiful, renewing resources as evidence of nature’s benevolent, ordering 
principles.91 As an example, Alexander Pope’s An Essay on Man (1733-1734) urges, “Go, 
wondrous creature! Mount where science guides.”  Stating his goal to be “vindicat[ing] the ways 
of God to man,” Pope accords with The Seasons by accepting Creation’s absolute righteousness 
and assigning perceptions of disorder and evil to the limits of human reason.92  A 1743 letter 
from Thomson to his beloved Elizabeth Young suggests that despite incomplete knowledge, 
observers of nature can sense the perfect order which God instills in Creation: 
 But what ought to settle our Hearts into perfect Peace, and joyful Serenity, is, the 
Consideration that Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, who made and rules all, does [and 
deleted] cannot but do every Thing for the best.  His Works are continually going on 
from Excellence to Excellence, from Bliss to Bliss, and will thro’ eternal Ages ever be 
disclosing new Scenes of inexhaustible Wisdom and Goodness.  There is no real Evil in 
the whole general System of Things; it is only our Ignorance that makes it appear so.93 
                                                          
90 Wiliam Derham, Physico-theology; or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from His 
Works of Creation (London: Printed for W. and J. Innys, at the Prince’s-Arms the West End of St. Paul’s, 
1714), 4. 
91 H. Grant Sampson. “The Physico-Theological Epic in the Later Eighteenth Century,” Man and Nature 
(1984): 50; 51.  
92 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, ed. Maynard Mack (London: Methuen, 1950), II.19; I.16. 
93 Thomson, Letters and Documents, 170. 
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“Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, who made and rules all” insists that God invests his perfect 
benevolence not only in natural laws, but also in physical laws and phenomena.  Nature proves 
its inherent morality by offering renewing bounties and rewarding communal, georgic industry 
with prosperity.  Though humans may be “astonish’d” and befuddled by empiric phenomena, 
natural philosophy can reinforce the surmise that nature’s complexity and affordances depend on 
a fixed system of orderly rules wrought by an omnipotent, benevolent God. 
 Autumn and Winter trust that laws regulate nature and admit the difficulty humans face 
attempting to understand those laws.  In Autumn, Thomson apostrophizes: “O Nature! All-
sufficient! over all / Enrich me with the knowledge of thy works; … Show me; their motions, 
periods, and their laws” (Autumn, 1352-1353; 1356-1357).  Earlier, he describes the poem’s 
broader, philosophical program:  
   …I solitary court 
The inspiring breeze, and meditate the book 
Of Nature, ever open, aiming thence 
Warm from the heart to learn the moral song. (Autumn, 669-672) 
Nature’s material, didactic book offers fragments of knowledge for refinement into more 
complex, contingent theories.  Thomson presumes that this practice, which Courtney Weiss 
Smith calls empiricist devotion, instills moral sensibility even in those who simply contemplate 
nature’s harmonious elements and thereby perform an alternative, georgic, intellectual labor.  
Winter expands on this personal thought process, which first uses empiric knowledge to 
extrapolate the existence of physical laws, before making an analogical leap to supreme, moral 
laws:94   
                                                          
94 According to Smith, the eighteenth-century georgic frames the discovery of order and regularity in 
nature as a basis for analogizing physical and moral laws, which supports my argument for the poem’s 
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Hence larger Prospects of the beauteous Whole 
Would, gradual, open on our opening Minds; 
And each diffusive Harmony unite, 
In full Perfection, to th’ astonish’d Eye. 
Then would we try to scan the moral World, 
Which, tho’ to us it seems embroil’d, moves on  
In higher Order; fitted, and impell’d 
By WISDOM’s finest Hand, and issuing all 
In general Good. (Winter, 579-587) 
The “scan [of] the moral World” suggests that natural law’s contours can be discerned by 
observing natural phenomena, while “WISDOM’s finest Hand,” which “issu[es] all / In general 
Good,” grants those laws determinative power over nature’s physical laws.  In Thomson’s 
transition from phenomena to morality, the credulous impression of a theoretical “Whole” 
compensates the limited utility of vision with a more vague and diffuse moral harmony 
attributable to the Whole’s subjection to moral laws.  Reflecting philosophy’s uncertainties, 
“each diffusive Harmony unite” leans on an aesthetic ideal of holism to convey that moral laws 
reconcile seemingly haphazard or disorderly phenomena.   
 
2.3 The virtue of love 
 Rather than engaging in theological niceties or rigorous, moral philosophy, one of the 
two ways the poem conveys the absolute, moral authority of natural laws is to present them as 
                                                          
distinction between the moral authority of fixed laws and the contingent, imperfect morality of transient 
works.  Courtney Weiss Smith, Empiricist Devotions: Science, Religion, and Poetry in Early Eighteenth-
Century England (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017), 187-188. 
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evocative, gnomic virtues.  The Seasons principally describes its sense of nature’s consistent, 
moral orderliness in terms of the world-infusing virtue of love.  For example, “the soul of love is 
sent abroad / Warm through the vital air, and on the heart / Harmonious seizes” (Spring, 582-
584).95  Moral laws precipitate God’s originary love throughout the poem’s georgic array of 
mutable, material works.  Thus, love operates in the poem as a subjective affect capable of 
guiding perception and action as well as, more speculatively, an intrinsic quality instilled in 
things by God which gives them purpose and order.  That order depends on physical laws 
reflecting and serving natural law.  Looking ahead to Thomson’s second heuristic for 
representing natural law, he often uses an allegorized version of love to liken morality’s juridical 
authority to the world-shaping force of physical laws.  Love supports the comparison by 
presenting God’s love not only as the archetypal virtue, but also as the first principle dictating 
Creation’s physical laws that regulate phenomena.96  The poem’s closing Hymn summarizes each 
season; referring to God, it states that “Forth in the pleasing Spring / Thy beauty walks, thy 
tenderness and love” (Hymn, 3-4).   As we will see, the line recalls Shaftesbury’s idea that 
spring’s characteristic creativity pleases us, because its harmonic beauty can be recognized as 
indicating the galvanizing, moral beauty of God’s benevolence.  It also echoes an earlier, more 
majestic passage on the relation between ordering principles and empiricist devotions: 
Hail, Source of Being! Universal Soul 
                                                          
95 McKillop makes the point, which I address at greater length below, that the poem represents its 
physico-theology less in terms of philosophical arguments than in presenting poetically mediated, visual 
phenomena.  I highlight that Thomson’s correlation of nature’s subjective beauty with the virtue instilled 
in it by the act of Creation shows aesthetic holism to be a sign of moral beauty and, further, the 
determinative force of nature’s moral laws.  McKillop, The Background of Thomson’s Seasons, 70. 
96 Thomson also refers to the supreme and absolute perfection of love with passages such as the 
following: “Perfect esteem enlivened by desire / Ineffable and sympathy of soul…”; “…matchless joys of 
virtuous love…”; “…gentle spirits fly / To scenes where love and bliss immortal reign…” (Spring, 1121-
1122; 1165; 1176). 
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Of heaven and earth! Essential Presence, hail! 
To thee I bend the knee; to thee my thoughts 
Continual climb, who with a master-hand 
Hast the great whole into perfection touched. (Spring, 556-560) 
The Miltonic “Essential Presence” suggests that God’s “master-hand” infuses Creation with his 
perfect, moral laws, which reiterates Thomson’s sense of God as the originary, georgic maker.  
The gap between the humble subject’s climbing thought (“ever rising with the rising mind”) and 
the infinite, eternal Source reinforces the omnipotence of God whose harmonizing “perfection” 
can only be imperfectly manifested in isolated works of nature or humans.  Since physico-
theology must reconcile the limitations of natural philosophy with the certain existence of 
Christianity’s moral norms, the robust trope of love betokens natural law’s righteous authority.  
Even during Winter, the poem’s season of deformation, loss, and death, “Virtue sole survives-- / 
Immortal, never failing friend of man, / His guide to happiness on high” (Winter, 1039-1041).  
Love emblematizes the poem’s faith that God’s benevolence determines a natural order and, by 
extension, the material goods which support creaturely life.  Humans manifest and recirculate 
love by performing virtuous actions that tend to improve the commonwealth.  
 God’s love funds an affective economy of pleasure in which people who do not directly 
benefit from nature’s abundance may still appreciate that natural law’s moral consistency and 
coherence transcend confusing, sometimes painful experience.  Thomson claims that properly 
contemplating Creation confers a calm, humbling gratification by affectively attuning subjects to 
the existence of nature’s benevolent, moral order:  
What is this mighty breath, ye curious, say, 
That in a powerful language, felt, not heard, 
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Instructs the fowls of heaven, and through their breast 
These arts of love diffuses? What, but God? 
Inspiring God! Who boundless spirit all 
And unremitting energy, pervades, 
Adjusts, sustains, and agitates the whole. 
He ceaseless works alone, and yet alone 
Seems not to work; with such perfection framed 
Is this complex, stupendous scheme of things. 
But, though concealed, to every pure eye 
The informing Author in his works appears: 
Chief, lovely Spring, in thee and thy soft scenes 
The smiling God is seen—while water, earth, 
And air attest his bounty, which exalts 
The brute-creation to this finer thought, 
And annual melts their undesigning hearts 
Profusely thus in tenderness and joy. (Spring, 849-866) 
The ineffably large and small scales of natural phenomena obstruct vision and intellection, which 
means that nature’s intrinsic, absolute virtue must be intuited or extrapolated, and part of the 
ideological work performed by Thomson’s poem is to rationalize the experiences of pain and 
difficult work as serving natural law’s higher, benevolent ends.97  The example of birds shows 
                                                          
97 Kevis Goodman’s superb reading of The Seasons addresses the uses and limits of subjective 
observation and natural philosophy.  From the perspective of political economy (and the deformed record 
of lost polities recycled by the earth), subjects register encounters with material history as an affective 
disturbance.  Dimly aware of the predation, exploitation, and violence mingled with civilization, history 
requires aesthetic mediation, namely the work of many georgic poems, that depict civilizing labor as 
beneficially mixed with or even an extension of natural forces.  Analogizing history with natural 
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even non-rational creatures taking pleasure in a sense of having been put in their right place by 
the “informing Author.”  Patricia Meyer Spacks’s observation that Thomson’s “Retreat from 
Vision” in his later poem The Castle of Indolence (1748) bears on The Seasons, because, for lack 
of rigorous understanding, morality is often perceived through sensibility and expressed through 
personal industry.98  While moralizing labor and innovation remain central to the poem’s 
argument, the idyllic, loco-descriptive scenes in which Thomson personally appears model a 
comparatively passive, contemplative, mental activity.  Humans may appreciate nature’s material 
bounty, but the passage also indicates that God’s love may be pleasurably recognized in and as a 
vague sense of ecological harmony which a familiarity with natural philosophy can deepen.  By 
contrast with effortful, enterprising virtue, a disinterested appreciation for the moral beauty of 
nature’s harmony can demonstrate a person’s liberal benevolence and subjection to nature’s 
benign jurisdiction.   
 The poem supports its use of virtuous love to analogize the link between abstruse, moral 
laws with pleasurable experience by citing Shaftesbury, whose Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times (1711) Thomson ordered in 1737.  Shaftesbury’s optimistic, moral philosophy 
claimed that polite and sensible enjoyment of agreeable discourse and well-formed objects 
reflects an instinctive, though educable experience of moral beauty.  Thomson’s invocation of 
Shaftesbury reinforces my point that the poem substitutes the harmonizing virtues of love and 
                                                          
philosophy, Goodman shows that Thomson adopted Locke’s claim that God limits humans’ senses in 
order to suit them to productively interacting with their environment.  Supposing that more powerful 
eyesight, for example, would produce an unpleasant, debilitating overload of informational noise, 
Thomson argues that the limits God sets on human knowledge demonstrate how God’s moral 
benevolence comprehensively determines human experience.  Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British 
Romanticism, 3-9; 55-56. 
98 Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Poetry of Vision: Five Eighteenth-Century Poets (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), 48.  Personal industry in a Lockean sense meaning those voluntary actions for 
which an individual can be held morally responsible. 
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benevolence for explications of God’s moral laws.99  Thomson’s advice to appreciate lived 
experience despite incompletely understanding that experience softens morality’s rigid, legalistic 
force; love and optimism do the ideological work of attempting to console bereft individuals who 
face pain, hardship, and loss with a dim sense that all things happen for reasons determined by 
God.  The pleasures of consensus and formal harmony derive from the intrinsic, moral beauty of 
the concord and benevolence God “diffuses” into nature through its moral and physical laws.100  
Aesthetic appreciation for people and things sparks affective warmth, greater sociability, and 
ultimately leads to a more intricate and stable economy of love: 
The generous Ashley thine, the friend of man, 
Who scanned his nature with a brother’s eye, 
His weakness prompt to shade, to raise his aim, 
To touch the finer movements of the mind, 
And with the moral beauty charm the heart. ( Summer, 1551-1555) 
The “finer movements of the mind” let individuals express their latent sociability and neighborly 
care through their actions.  Love, nature’s highest virtue and the essence of natural law itself, 
informs not only physical laws and nature’s fecundity, but also the moral beauty in acts and 
works contributing to intellectual refinement, creativity, and social harmony.  With respect to 
                                                          
99 Robert Inglesfield notes Shaftesbury’s influence on the poem’s argument that the contemplation of 
nature elicits feelings of social sympathy and benevolence, which influence social exchange, self-
improvement, collective gain.  People cultivate an internal moral harmony, which encourages them to 
work toward bettering the socio-political order.  Robert Inglesfield, “Thomson and Shaftesbury,” in 
James Thomson: Essays for the Tercentenary, ed. Richard Terry (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2000), 87.  Shaftesbury’s essay An Inquiry Concerning Virtue “argued that goodness and virtue had real 
foundations in the nature of the human self and in its relation to a morally designed universe and that 
virtue was its own reward since its practice conduced to human happiness.” “Introduction,” in Anthony 
Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. 
Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), x.   
100 “…the beautiful, the fair, the comely, were never in the matter but in the art and design, never in the 
body itself but in the form or forming power.” Shaftesbury, The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody, in 
Characteristics, 322. 
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political economy, Shaftesbury’s ideal, virtuous politician possesses a disinterested, benevolent 
desire for the public good.  Such a politician mixes agreeable sociability, a disinterested desire 
for the common good, and oversees the benefits of a Whig history in which agents can pursue 
pleasure without fearing government oppression.  Philip Connell sees the poem reinforcing its 
Shaftesburian strain by emphatically embracing Newtonian physico-theology.  Connell states, 
“the whig principles of limited monarchy and ministerial government were increasingly 
amenable to justification in terms derived from the language of popular Newtonianism.”101  
Newton’s work had been embraced by and could seem to support the Hanoverian succession and 
the Court Whigs, the latter from which Thomson increasingly tried to distance himself by 
revisions that celebrated the virtue of long, aristocratic land tenures.  Creation’s morality lacks a 
positive, oppositional evil, but instead entails a slow, civilizing progress, which for Thomson 
includes the advance of philosophical knowledge and the growth of prosperous, body politics 
supported by inexact but nonetheless well-meaning statecraft.   
 
2.4 Physical laws analogized with natural laws 
 The second heuristic Thomson uses to signify the absolute authority of nature’s moral 
laws involves comparing their jurisdiction to the universal force of physical laws.  Jonathan 
Israel notes Newton’s assertion that gravity, one of The Seasons’ examples of a physical force, 
and the laws of motion prove the existence of a “general providence” in which God’s constant, 
compassionate, intervention keeps the universe from collapsing into chaos.102  The example of 
gravity demonstrates that just as the poem is neither willing nor able to define moral laws, The 
                                                          
101 Philip Connell, Secular Chains: Poetry and the Politics of Religion from Milton to Pope (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 191. 
102 Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 212. 
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Seasons also does not define physical laws.  Instead, it indirectly affirms the power of physical 
laws over phenomena by attaching figurative, political motifs to those laws.  To avoid confusion, 
though I argue that the poem presents politico-economic apparatuses as mutable, transient, and 
imperfect, it uses the rhetoric of sovereignty to underline the moral distinction between those 
apparatuses and natural law’s absolute and enduring jurisdiction.  Physical laws’ causative 
relation over phenomena also implies that physical and moral laws share a similarly immutable 
power.  While Spring emphasizes the moral principle of love by emphasizing various kinds of 
intercourse, exchange, and creativity, Summer and Winter exemplify the force and even the 
violence of physical laws which can deform and destroy transient things.  Further, though spring 
and fall are the planting and harvesting seasons, the complete, seasonal cycle signals the shift 
from the Golden Age’s relative stasis and easy virtue into fluid time, history, and political and 
socio-economic change.   
 Thomson uses political motifs like dominion, command, power, and violence to describe 
the material effects caused by physical laws and so also, indirectly, moral laws.  The heat and 
light from the remote, sublime, and magisterial sun instantiates the world-shaping power of 
physical laws.  However, we should again note that Thomson explicitly attributes the sun’s 
physical eminence to God’s moral design.  The lines “O Sun! / Soul of surrounding worlds! In 
whom best seen / Shines out thy Maker” repeat the soul motif which Spring also associated with 
love (Summer, 94-96).  Here, “soul” provides the metaphorical vehicle for the sun’s material 
presence, because its enlivening powers more or less directly determine the form of all things.  
The sun plays an able scion to its own Creator by not only superintending earthly developments 
but also by stabilizing the solar system “with a chain indissoluble bound” (Summer, 98).  In 
terms of specific, physical laws, the sun’s “chain” represents the “secret, strong, attractive force” 
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of gravity, the quintessential force, visible in its effects, that seemed to philosophers like Newton 
and physico-theological poets like Thomson to prove God’s existence.  While gravity literally 
holds bodies in proximity, “attractive” also connotes God’s foundational love, which organizes 
and harmonizes each new thing appearing on earth through fixed physical laws.  Thus, “secret, 
strong, attractive force” also seems to prefigure other causal, physical chains in which the sun’s 
heat and light influence phenomena.   
 In an epic catalogue of precious stones103, Thomson imagines that “the unfruitful rock, 
impregned by thee, / In dark retirement forms the lucid stone” via light’s penetration and 
infusion of the earth (Summer, 140-141).  At the time, natural philosophers pondered whether 
minerals’ growth indicated shared organic characteristics with vegetative growth.  The 
mineralogy passage uses the central figure of the sun to expand the georgic mode’s topical range 
into natural philosophy as well as socio-economics.  Thomson poetically describes stones to 
engage readers then seeks to deepen their appreciation with contextualizing reference to 
Newtonian colorimetry; having preceded the catalogue with a claim for the benefits of mining, 
wealth, and trade, the passage recasts pragmatic, commercial topics in the light of aesthetic, 
disinterested appreciation for physical forces’ mysterious formation of material phenomena.  
Though the passage instructs, it also frames the reader’s uncertainty in the face of the ineffable 
complexity of both geology and commerce, which serves Thomson by inclining readers to adopt 
his tranquil optimism regarding history’s progress. 
 The following apostrophe reinforces life’s dependence on the sun:  
 Informer of the planetary train! 
Without whose quickening glance their cumbrous orbs 
                                                          
103 Thomson, Summer, 140-159. 
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Were brute, unlovely mass, inert and dead, 
And not, as now, the green abodes of life! 
How many forms of being wait on thee,  
Inhaling spirit, from the unfettered mind, 
By thee sublimed down to the daily race, 
The mixing myriads of the setting beam! (Summer, 104-111) 
Again, Thomson emphasizes the capacity of the sun’s heat and light to give form and beauty to 
an otherwise chaotic mix of elements.  Moreover, the following passage uses overtly political 
language to characterize the sun: 
 The vegetable world is also thine, 
Parent of Seasons! who the pomp precede 
That waits thy throne, as though thy vast domain, 
Annual, along the bright ecliptic road 
In world-rejoicing state it moves sublime. 
Meantime the expecting nations, circled gay 
With all the various tribes of foodful earth, 
Implore thy bounty, or send grateful up 
A common hymn… (Summer, 112-120) 
Thomson represents the sun’s manifestation of physical laws through heat and light as the 
generosity of a benevolent despot while also conveying the world’s dependence on and 
supplication to its power.  Time and space blur as he reconfigures the successive year as the 
“vast domain” upon which the sun enjoys a constant, imperious triumph.  Elsewhere, Summer 
portrays the death and destruction due to solar or human empire, but motifs of exchange and 
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communion predominate here.  Consistent with his extensive personification throughout the 
poem, Thomson uses “nations” and “tribes” for most any category of living beings, which 
emphasizes their common animation, transience, and dependence on the sun.104  The “gay” and 
“grateful” beings also highlight the sun’s starring role in engineering the aforementioned 
economy of pleasure.  Indeed, “world-rejoicing state” serves as a concise vision statement for 
righteous politico-economic institutions.  The sun’s “state” trades on the physico-theological idea 
and georgic aspiration of world order by fusing the images of an omnipotent, benevolent autocrat 
with the material goods that proliferate due to the physical effects of the sun’s presence.  In 
short, the “boundless majesty” of the “powerful king of day” epitomizes the universal force of 
physical and so also moral laws by enabling and regulating various, natural and nature-adjacent 
economies (Summer, 87; 81). 
 Thomson’s fantasias on extreme temperatures develop his sun-as-benevolent-despot trope 
by incorporating the sun’s capacity for violence alongside its generosity.  The Seasons’ closing 
Hymn indicates that the sun correlates with love and creativity in Spring and with material 
bounty in Autumn.  Whereas sunny growing and harvesting seasons seem to provide 
straightforward evidence of a natural order based on God’s bountiful love, harsh, destructive 
weather, as well as other catastrophic phenomena, might temporarily challenge his physio-
theological optimism.  At Summer’s start, spring gives way to the sun’s “hot dominion” where he 
“mounts his throne” each morning to subject common Creation to its “All-conquering heat.” 
                                                          
104 Heather Keenleyside’s study of Thomson’s use of personification and other metaphorically enlivening 
language makes the claim that his participles and descriptives blur persons and things.  Keenleyside 
argues that extensive personification “associate(s) the instability of persons or things with issues of 
agency or animation.”  Her work supports my own by highlighting the extent to which Thomson presents 
all phenomena to be, in my terms, mutable, in flux, and part of contingently harmonic economies.  
Moreover, and where my emphasis differs from Keenleyside’s, these commonalities distinguish the 
mutability of personified things and multiply-determined, human subjects from the fixed, natural laws 
that are the direct products of God’s love.  Keenleyside, “Personification for the People,” 448. 
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(Summer, 8; 639).  The motif of the sun’s sovereignty over varied phenomena and places 
signifies the consistency of physical laws which are themselves attributable to the higher order of 
benevolent, moral laws.  Thus, Thomson states that “far as the ranging eye / Can sweep, a 
dazzling deluge reigns; and all / From pole to pole is undistinguished blaze” (Summer, 434-436).  
Summer’s sun compels recognition of the power God exerts through nature’s physical forces: 
…glory in the Summer-month, 
With light and heat refulgent.  Then thy sun 
Shoots full perfection through the swelling year: 
And oft thy voice in dreadful thunder speaks… (Hymn, 8-11) 
In practice, “glory” can amount to punishing heat which withers plants, parches landscapes, and 
forces those who can to seek shade.105  Though Thomson optimistically observes that the sun 
lends Creation its own “perfection,” empiric experience shows that the lavish heat and light of  
high summer in Britain can reach destructive extremes.  While the heat may cause temporary 
discomfort or even poor harvests for local farmers, Thomson invokes Africa to signify sublime, 
even horrific excesses.  Only the Nile can invigorate the “life-deserted sand” of the “joyless 
desert” (Summer, 818; 819).  Yet even then, the sun’s intensity strips African peoples of their 
virtue, since fertile areas produce without effort and encourage luxury without discipline:  
 The parent Sun himself 
Seems over this world of slaves to tyrannize… 
 Love dwells not there… 
The very brute creation there 
[The sun’s] rage partakes, and burns with horrid fire.  (Summer, 890-898)   
                                                          
105 Scenes of refuge from hot or cold weather often become for those so-sheltered compensatory 
opportunities for contemplating the relationship between phenomena and nature’s ordering principles. 
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Rather than signifying God’s neglect, absent Love here reflects a collective fault of Africa’s 
inhabitants.   Thomson seems to argue that, though they need not labor for their daily bread made 
“wasteful” by its own excess, neither do they cultivate discipline or stem the corruption of their 
moral sensibility by bending their labor toward any civilizing works.  Despite and sometimes 
even because of Africa’s overwhelming richness in resources, its nations fail to manage their 
wealth through private industriousness or with the aid of wise government.  Such misuse justifies 
African wealth’s appropriation by nations more capable of exploiting its potential benefits.106    
 Whereas summer’s heat benefits living things until it reaches challenging extremes, 
Thomson defines Winter as the season of deformation, erasure, and uncertainty.  The Seasons’ 
revisions of the 1726 Winter keep its somber tone and remind readers of mortality and 
transience.  More so than Summer, Winter foregrounds images of entropy to figure the georgic 
themes of uncertainty and constant, needful remaking as characteristic of both natural and human 
works.107   For Thomson, winter’s elemental chaos ultimately signifies the earth’s annual 
repotentialization and the possibility of gradual, if inconsistent, socio-economic progress.  On the 
other hand, and more imminently, harsh weather threatens catastrophic losses which must be 
endured with resignation and optimism. 
 Thomson represents winter’s landscape-deforming power a bit more diffusely by 
focusing on the effects of meteorological conditions as opposed to directly attributing them to an 
                                                          
106 Several critics have argued for the imperialistic inclinations of British georgics.  For example, Jill H. 
Casid describes a material and linguistic process of georgic colonization: “The idea of colony as 
plantation and the plantation as farm mythicized empire as anticonquest by making empire as rooted and 
natural as rural England was supposed to be.”  Georgic literature therefore serves as a supplementary 
technology for justifying violent resource extraction.  Jill H. Casid, Sowing Empire: Landscape and 
Colonization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 14. 
107 Ronald Paulson argues that georgics present artifice as a necessary, constant, compensatory work 
which attempts to heal the sorrow incited by the natural world’s cycles of loss.  Ronald Paulson, Breaking 
and Remaking: Aesthetic Practice in England, 1700-1820 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1989), 55-60. 
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emblematic, sovereign sun as Summer does.  Ralph Cohen’s landmark study, The Unfolding of 
the Seasons, identifies deformation, Winter’s central motif, as prerequisite to Spring’s renewal 
and creativity.108  Above all, Thomson’s images of cold-induced congelation signify the 
deformation and reversion of matter into a state susceptible to remaking and reuse.  When “the 
whitening shower descends” and snows blanket all things in a common “winter-robe of purest 
white,” field labor ceases and animals only unwillingly venture out of shelter for food (Winter, 
229; 233).  Still, metaphors for political power persist and allude to physical laws’ authority in 
scenes where phenomena are transformed into undiscernible wholes: 
  Nature’s King, who oft 
Amid tempestuous darkness dwells alone, 
And on the wings of the careening wind 
Walks dreadfully serene, commands a calm; 
Then straight air, sea, and earth are hushed at once. (Winter, 197-201) 
The passage is organized around the motif of a sole patriarch capable of sovereign decision-
making.  By bringing together “air, sea, and earth” in euphonic stillness, it also exemplifies 
Winter’s motifs of de- and reformation which often involve the merging, condensation, or 
binding of previously more distinct phenomena or objects.  Most obviously, condensation occurs 
in the freezing of water into snow or ice, but as Thomson develops his weather imagery, 
snowstorms cover landscapes, reduce the mobility and productivity of persons and things, and 
produce a broad, visual uniformity that challenges analytic comprehension.  The work of 
physical laws during Winter figuratively underscores the gap between those laws and 
interpretation of the phenomena they regulate. 
                                                          
108 Ralph Cohen, The Unfolding of the Seasons (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 262-4. 
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 Though Thomson also describes winter storms in violent terms, the canto’s figures for 
violence are often more subdued than in Summer.  Instead, Thomson focuses on winter’s threats 
to life as continuous with its threats to acts of interpretation and use.  However, he also uses 
Winter to show that its deformations and dangers are recuperated by dependable, seasonal cycles 
of growth.  Winter’s own exigencies can be hard to see past, which makes Thomson’s reassuring, 
physico-theological poem all the more necessary for drawing people through the hard times to 
the good ones he insists will follow.  Here again, natural processes analogize politico-economic 
cycles of decline which are recuperated in a general, science-driven trajectory of progress.  He 
observes that the cold seems to impose a general tranquility on all things despite describing 
conditions which can easily become lethal for exposed, living beings.  Thus, like extreme heat, 
images of extreme cold summon the thought of common mortality and the transience of all 
things.   
 The snow’s monochromatic unity becomes Winter’s main, visual metaphor for 
deformation first in its effect of blurring earth and sky while falling and then in its ability to 
smoothen and hide terrain.  Whereas Thomson speaks of the summer sun’s rage and glory, 
winter’s blizzards present a softer though no less oppressive violence.  He signals this oppression 
with motifs of restraint and bondage applicable to freezing weather.  For example, “clouds, / 
Slow-meeting, mingle into solid gloom” (Winter, 203-203).  In its “capacious womb / A vapoury 
deluge lies, to snow congealed” prior to the “gathered storm” (Winter, 225-226; 228).  Running 
waters are “by the breath of heaven / Cemented firm; till, seized from shore to shore, / The whole 
imprisoned river growls below,” an image prefiguring the problem of carceral oppression which 
he addresses elsewhere in the poem in terms of tyrannous state apparatuses  (Winter, 729-731).  
After a snowfall, Thomson emphasizes the landscape’s uniformity and inutility: “Earth’s 
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universal face, deep-hid and chill, / Is one wild dazzling waste, that buries wide, / The works of 
man” (Winter, 238-240).  Though we might think of destructive violence in terms of the 
rendering of a whole into parts, Winter also conveys violence as the merging of previously 
fashioned, distinguishable parts into a weakly differentiated mass due to the power of nature’s 
physical laws.  Thomson insists that we view such troublesome masses as matrices which enable 
future growth.  Again, he uses nature’s work to figure the potential for georgic remaking which 
underwrites his physico-theological optimism. 
 Thomson uses winter, perhaps the least characteristically georgic season, to represent the 
conventionally georgic themes of uncertainty, transience, and mutability in order to direct our 
attention to the moral priority of natural laws over our own flawed perceptions and plans.  
Though these themes are present in Virgil’s Georgics, The Seasons repurposes them in part to 
advance public conversability in natural philosophy, though at the very least to provoke wonder 
and admiration for nature’s physical laws within the poem’s physico-theological context.  The 
Hymn reminds us that Winter’s snowscapes imply that subjection to nature’s laws will always 
supersede understanding them.  He addresses the “varied God” in nature to frame an 
incomprehensible magnitude: 
In Winter awful thou! with clouds and storms 
Around thee thrown, tempest o’er tempest rolled, 
Majestic darkness! On the whirlwind’s wing 
Riding sublime, thou bidst the world adore, 
And humblest nature with the northern blast. (Hymn, 16-20) 
This précis of winter highlights matter’s violent and tempestuous mixing rather than the resulting 
“trackless plain” or “formless wild,” but “awful,” “darkness,” and “sublime” underline the 
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poverty of our comprehension in the face of nature’s physical power (Winter, 281; 283).  The 
ensuing parable of the frozen man expresses the poem’s broader physico-theological reasoning 
with regards to ineffable nature.  In short, a blizzard entraps a swain travelling home from work.  
It renders his surroundings increasing unfamiliar, slows his pace, and ultimately incorporates him 
into the landscape by freezing him to death, a “bleaching” and “stiffened corse” (Winter, 321, 
320).  Summer contains an analogous parable in which lightning suddenly and seemingly 
purposelessly yields an innocent maiden into a “blackened corse” while her lover’s “marble” 
astonishment mimics her immobility (Summer, 1216; 1220).  Both stories didactically present 
faith in the higher, all-reconciling order of natural law as the resolution to stories that foreground 
uncertainty and loss.  Particularly in the frozen man’s story, physical nature poses itself as an 
intractable enigma whose incomprehensibility is replicated by the reader’s desire to reconcile the 
man’s apparently arbitrary death with a satisfying, natural order.  The story upholds classic, 
georgic values, including accepting uncertainty, subjecting one’s self to nature’s fixed laws, and 
recognizing, in contrast with those laws, the transience of all earthly things as one struggles to 
exploit them through one’s labor.  The following sections demonstrate that Thomson leverages 
the georgic theme of remaking to recuperate and capitalize on mutability and transience.  Having 
seen that the deformations caused by winter constitute a dependable prelude to the warmer 
seasons, Thomson presents the imperfection of philosophical knowledge and refinable 
technologies as justifications for their gradual progress and exploitation in the service of natural 
laws.  Similarly, because state apparatuses are also the work of human artifice, they too are 
susceptible to improvement, a process which Thomson describes in terms of matching their 
operations to the moral ideals established by great, classical politicians. 
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2.5 Human labor and technological progress 
 Natural law’s consistency alleviates Winter’s seemingly bleak chaos by assuring readers 
that all things adhere to a well-regulated order.  Spring must follow winter, but within the context 
of Winter itself the mutability and instability of phenomena represented by snowscapes also 
signify restored potential and opportunity for improvement.  Thomson revalues mutability with 
reference to three domains whose respective susceptibilities to remaking give him grounds for 
optimism: seasonal cycles and recurring bounties, labor and technological progress, and 
statecraft. I have dealt with the first of these above in terms of nature’s de- and reformations.  
Snow refashions the landscape into what Thomson repeatedly refers to as “waste,” by which he 
means potentially arable land that is presently uncultivated.  Winter frames the wisdom in 
recognizing that snow-covered fields imply the possibility of future crops and bespeaks largely 
stable growing, human-assisted cycles. In this and the following subsection, I take up the second 
and third of these domains which reinforce the poem’s position distinguishing the weaker moral 
authority of states and state apparatuses from the true and absolute moral authority of nature’s 
laws. 
 Regarding the second domain of labor and technological progress, Thomson signals the 
potential for innovation by analogizing the annual, creative work of Nature’s Hand with not only 
the manual but also the intellectual labor of humans.  He builds on the georgic’s convention of 
framing itself as an emblematic work of intellectual labor capable of bearing a didactic message 
proclaiming the value of intellectual labor in general.  Poetry promotes natural philosophy by 
aestheticizing and disseminating its ideas to cultivate its audience’s appreciation for and interest 
in science’s potential benefits.  In this case the georgic uses physico-theology to promote and 
limn the moral value of natural philosophy: “Tutored by thee, hence Poetry exalts / Her voice to 
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ages; and informs the page / With music, image, sentiment, and thought” (Summer, 1753-1755).  
Thomson closes Summer by celebrating philosophy’s value as a tool for the mutual development 
of technology and the public good: “With thee, serene Philosophy, with thee, / And thy bright 
garland, let me crown my song!”  (Summer, 1730-1731).  Even more explicitly, philosophy “The 
height of science and virtue gains” (Summer, 1741).  He then asserts the practical benefits of 
philosophy with a few elementary examples of technological progress: 
Without thee, what were unenlightened man? 
A savage, roaming through the woods and wilds 
In quest of prey; and with the unfashioned fur 
Rough-clad; devoid of every finer art 
And elegance of life.  Nor happiness 
Domestic, mixed of tenderness and care, 
Nor moral excellence, nor social bliss, 
Nor guardian law were his; nor various skill 
To turn the furrow, or to guide the tool 
Mechanic; nor the heaven-conducted prow 
Of Navigation bold, that fearless braves 
The burning line or dares the wintry pole, 
Mother severe of infinite delights. (Summer, 1758-1772) 
Of note, Thomson places positive, “guardian law” between the list of moral virtues and the list of 
technical, instrument-mediated practices whose presentation in terms of their lack (“nor”) almost 
suggests that they wait in the wings to be called forth by human creativity.  I will shortly address 
positive laws and statecraft at greater length, but here Thomson presents them as a security 
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system which removes people from the state of nature and opens to them civilizing society’s 
potential, material benefits.  Plowing nods to the poem’s georgic heritage while the prow is an 
insistently forward-looking and imperializing image which connotes economic growth and the 
expansion of territory, markets, and political power.  Though the poem elsewhere admits some 
ambivalence toward Britain’s militaristic empire, its description of celestial navigation 
optimistically connotes that innovation and commerce aid a general trajectory of world-historical 
progress. 
 The accumulating fruits of manual and intellectual labor are emphasized in another, far 
more elaborate, though again allegorical genealogy of technological innovation.  Instead of 
“serene Philosophy,” the more virtue-tinged theme of Industry organizes the following passages: 
These are thy blessings, Industry, rough power! 
Whom labour still attends, and sweat and pain; 
Yet the kind source of every gentle art 
And all the soft civility of life … (Autumn, 43-64)  
“Industry” enfolds the ideas that labor can express personal virtue and that it contributes to the 
public good by accumulating wealth and transforming modes of production.  Thomson’s allegory 
again begins with a dire state of nature wherein humanity’s capacity for industry remains 
unavailing without the state’s security apparatuses.  Nature forecasts the gifts humans give 
themselves through their hard work; natural laws oblige industry in part by confronting humans 
with material challenges such as scarcity to initially compel survival-driven, human labor and 
which gradually inculcates an appreciation for the moral and material benefits of creative, 
manual and intellectual efforts.  Thomson stresses human labor’s world-transforming potential 
by expounding on the unpleasantness of the state of nature: 
85 
 
Raiser of human kind! by Nature cast 
Naked and helpless out amid the woods 
And wilds to rude inclement elements; 
With various seeds of art deep in the mind 
Implanted, and profusely poured around 
Materials infinite; but idle all, 
Still unexerted, in the unconscious breast 
Slept the lethargic powers: 
…. 
   and thus his days 
Rolled heavy, dark, and unenjoyed along— 
A waste of time! till Industry approached, 
And roused him from his miserable sloth; 
His faculties unfolded; pointed out 
Where lavish Nature the directing hand 
Of Art demanded… (Autumn, 47-54; 70-76) 
The passage continues to destabilize the distinction between natural phenomena which prefigure 
and prompt human labor and that labor’s creative, yet artificial productions.  Whereas 
personification figures nature as capable of artifice and technological creativity, “seeds of art 
deep in the mind / Implanted” uses agricultural language to paint humans, themselves having 
been “cast” like seed, as an extension of nature (Autumn, 50-51; 47).  Though Thomson 
correlates natural and human works based on their common transience and mutability, only 
humans (and God) truly possess the potential for innovation and the ability to significantly alter 
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the conditions of their own, collective existence.  Industry, as positive laws and agriculture had 
done in the previous passage, divides the period Thomson describes as “waste,” a spatially-
inflected term denoting untapped potential, from the period when humans can substantively 
change their socio-economic forms of life.  By contrasting industry with “sloth,” Thomson 
emphasizes that humans’ considered, intentional labor “unfold[s]” latent skills and apparatuses 
the innate virtues of which are proven by their ability to increase quality of life. 
 In the passage’s following lines, Thomson most clearly argues his politico-economic 
vision of a fruitful, orderly community.  He first lists an emblematic series of early, technological 
innovations beginning with “chip[ping] the wood, and hew[ing] the stone” (Autumn, 82).  
“[G]lossy silk” and “the generous glass” precede civilizing societies “advancing bolder…to 
pomp, to pleasure, elegance, grace” (Autumn, 86; 88; 91-92).  Following these signifiers of “high 
ambition” via creative artifice, Thomson devotes a stanza to the emergence of the “public,” 
meaning a legislated body politic, then “Society,” meaning civic life, and then “Commerce” 
(Autumn, 97; 113; 118).  This allegorical chronology imagines adequate, positive laws, here 
idealized as “holy guardian laws,” to be a precondition for the socio-economic health attested to 
by urban growth and modern commodities (Autumn, 101).109 
                                                          
109 In a third example of civilizational progress, Thomson admires Peter the Great’s ability to make 
statecraft secondary and subservient to the modernity and prosperity of Russia’s economy: 
…behold the matchless prince! 
Who left his native throne, where reigned till then 
A mighty shadow of unreal power; 
Who greatly spurned the slothful pomp of courts; 
And roaming every land, in every port 
His sceptre laid aside, with glorious hand 
Unwearied plying the mechanic tool, 
Gathered the seeds of trade, of useful arts, 
Of civil wisdom, and of martial skill. (Winter, 963-971) 
Thomson freely diagnoses the illegitimacy of the Russian state, which had become “unreal” by devolving 
into tyranny and “slothful” corruption, a potential dislocated critique of Court Whigs.  Peter models the 
benefits not only of governments prioritizing domestic commerce, but also of Britain’s maritime 
imperialism.  He embodies in his person the state’s capacity to use its resources and institutions to 
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2.6 Statecraft 
 Within the third domain of statecraft, the Season’s broad scope for mutable works 
includes socio-political entities and institutions such as the state, its governmental regime, and 
state apparatuses.  Thomson’s georgic theme of mutability applies to these entities insofar as 
they vary in their ability to serve their function of supporting the public good and can be 
perpetually remade and refined.  The poem proposes that a state composed of state apparatuses 
and institutions can serve a moral function by meshing with and supporting its body politic’s 
material and moral commonwealth.  For example, the questions of what positive laws can and 
should do overlap with the problem intrinsic to natural law of knowing how best to fulfill moral 
obligations.  A gap will necessarily exist between natural law’s ideals and state apparatuses’ 
ability to facilitate a body politic’s fulfillment of those ideals.  This gap potentially impairs 
states’ moral authority.  In theory, states whose institutions allow tyranny or despoil their 
subjects become illegitimate and, according to Locke, may be dissolved and reformed.110  In 
practice, though, many factors, environmental and otherwise, can help or harm a body politic, 
The Seasons shows that weak institutions can lead to insupportable conditions that invite civil 
war, revolution, rioting, and other forms of social turmoil.  Conversely, Thomson cites Britain as 
                                                          
facilitate the importation of foreign, raw goods, techniques, and technologies.  Given its foundation of a 
uniquely stable, liberty-vaunting, mixed government, Britain flourishes and satisfies natural laws by 
absorbing the best, global affordances which are otherwise not being optimized, as in the case of Africa’s 
seemingly wasted wealth. 
110 There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the 
legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust: 
First, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the 
property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or 
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.  John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 
II.xix.226. 
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an example showing that reasonable laws and an industrious, thriving polity mutually reinforce 
each other.  Thomson alludes to this agreeable, contemporary condition in his allegorical 
example when, laws having “Unit(ed) all, / Society grew numerous, high, polite, / And happy” 
(Autumn, 111-113). 
 Thomson predicates a body politic’s economic vitality and long-term viability on the 
ability of state apparatuses to function to proper, moral effect.  Instead of presenting a 
philosophical theory of the state, The Seasons invokes moral ideals which state apparatuses 
should aspire to embody.  Winter’s harsh weather inclines him to the indoor work of 
contemplating these ideals in light of classical philosopher-politicians who seem to originate and 
emblematize them.  Some, like “happy, mild, and firm” Timoleon, model personal virtues, but 
others like “Just” Aristides typify moral ideals to be enshrined in positive laws. 111  Summer 
compares English “statesmen” and “patriots” to their Greek and Roman progenitors (Summer, 
1487-1488).  Solon is the most important Greek in this series of parallel lives which conceives 
Britain’s mixed government to be the modern champion of republican ideals:  
Solon the next, who built his commonweal 
On equity’s wide base; by tender laws 
A lively people curbing; yet undamped 
Preserving still that quick, peculiar fire, 
Whence in the laurelled field of finer arts, 
                                                          
111 The poverty or incorruptibility of Cimon, Agis, Fabricius, and Cincinnatus show that moderation and 
personal economy befit politicians.  The emphasis condemns Robert Walpole’s self-dealing, Whig 
administration from the perspective of an opposing faction of dutiful, patriotic Country Whigs.  
Moreover, though Thomson expresses a measure of pride in Britain’s global sphere of influence, 
Timoleon, for example, defended Greek liberty against the encroachments of the Persian Empire.  
Elsewhere in the poem Thomson exhibits anxiety regarding the violence Britain exports around the world 
in the form of warfare and slavery. 
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And of bold freedom, they unequalled shone, 
The pride of smiling Greece and human-kind. (Winter, 446-452) 
Looking ahead to a comparable Roman we see “Servius, the king who laid the solid base / On 
which o’er the earth the vast republic spread” (Winter, 504-505).  In both cases, Thomson 
presents moral laws as the foundation or “wide base” for a flourishing body politic.  Values such 
as justice frame states’ proper functions of protecting its subjects from various injuries; the 
“equity” of such laws unify and help direct the creative energies of a free people who share the 
material benefits of their collective, philosophic and commercial collaboration.  The “finer arts” 
signify the multiple forms of culture-refining, intellectual work which ornament leisure and 
luxury while “laurelled” again points back to poetry, an emblematic art which reflexively 
promotes the value of such intellectual work.  In this respect, poems such as The Seasons are not 
state apparatuses, yet they do serve as political instruments for being able to reflect on the 
universal ideals and specific socio-political and socio-economic conditions.  The Seasons 
critiques state-sanctioned institutions, but these are largely overwhelmed by Thomson’s 
assurances to his readers that the country’s enlightened industry and centers of knowledge 
production indicate happy prospects for the future of “Britannia’s weal” (Spring, 930). 
 Again, Thomson’s account of positive laws enmeshes the state’s securitizing apparatuses 
and the economy in part by asserting that morally deficient laws which fail to protect common 
interests destabilize a body politic while well-crafted, well-enforced laws can promote 
innovation and prosperity.  Thomson’s admiration for incorruptible Greeks acknowledges the 
threats of venality and expropriation, essentially two forms of state-sponsored thievery, as 
hallmarks of tyrannous government.  His repeated phrase “guardian laws” in Summer and 
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Autumn indicates the paramount function of positive laws to protect persons and property.  A 
stanza acclaiming British liberty identifies property rights as a fundamental object of laws: 
Happy Britannia! where the Queen of Arts, 
Inspiring vigour, Liberty, abroad 
Walks unconfined even to thy farthest cots, 
And scatters plenty with unsparing hand. 
…. 
Thy country teems with wealth; 
And Property assures it to the swain, 
Pleased and unwearied in his guarded toil. (Summer, 1442-1445; 1454-1456) 
The poem invokes liberty and freedom in a variety of figurative, ecological contexts112, but this 
passage’s politico-economic context clearly argues that common prosperity depends on legally 
securing private property from unjust and arbitrary appropriation.  Thus, “guarded toil” echoes 
the essential function and purpose of “guardian laws.”  Laws guard property by protecting both 
the negative right of a freedom from injury in one’s property and the positive right of freedom to 
make use of one’s property according to one’s will.  The latter, positive right ensures individuals 
can enjoy rewards derived from their own industry; freedom of property facilitates its 
commercial circulation and distribution.  “Teems” connotes that, beyond immediate, personal 
consumption, goods fed into markets may yield greater benefits for society through their 
circulation and redistribution rather than simply being wasted in satisfying the vices of oligarchs. 
 Liberty is one of the poem’s many flexible words for drawing associations among 
ecological and political economies.  Thomson uses a variety of natural phenomena such as birds, 
                                                          
112 For example, “By Nature’s swift and secret-working hand, / The garden glows, and fills the liberal air / 
With lavish fragrance” (Spring, 97-99). 
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bees, rivers, and wind to figure liberty and freely circulating things such as the contrapuntal 
images of people and goods passing into and through cities.  These economic flows are the 
desired outcome of the “guardian laws” formed by the “patriot-council” who “by thousands 
drew, / From twining woody haunts…aspiring sons” to the city to merge their works in “the 
general good” (Autumn, 101; 99; 115-117; 97).  Autumn’s stanza on commerce cites the “groves 
of masts” on the Thames to signify economic flows and exchanges that yield the “busy 
merchant” and the “big warehouse” (Autumn, 124; 119).  States which adequately protect their 
subjects’ economic interests with laws girding natural property rights and preventing corruption 
are rewarded with happy and prosperous populaces. 
 
2.7 State apparatuses and the life spans of polities 
 Thomson reinforces the notion that governments are complex, imperfect, but improvable 
political technologies by providing examples of nations that lived and died on the strength of 
their state apparatuses.  The slow advance of civilization through technological progress involves 
contributions from innumerable societies that have completed their own life cycles.  Continuing 
the passage quoted earlier on the progress of the “general Good,” Thomson predicates polities’ 
sustainability on the moral quality of their political institutions: 
   The sage Historic Muse 
Should next conduct us thro’ the Deeps of Time: 
Show us how Empire grew, declin’d, and fell, 
In scatter’d States; what makes the Nations smile, 
Improves their soil, and gives them double Suns; 
And why they pine beneath the brightest Skies, 
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In Nature’s richest Lap. (Winter, 587-509) 
The Seasons adapts the opening lines of Virgil’s Georgics announcing his theme to be the 
agricultural techniques and technologies which enable collective prosperity.113  Thomson takes a 
wider view of the intellectual work which causes modern polities to enjoy liberty and wealth.  
The sun, sky, and soil imply the informed, efficient use of natural resources, but the poem’s 
references to empires here and elsewhere reiterate that their socio-economic stability depend on 
the moral quality of their statecraft.  Thomson claims Rome’s decline to have begun when its 
dictatorial phase displaced its republican values and institutions.  He offers ambivalent 
admiration for the “awful virtue” displayed by Brutus in defending the nation against caesarism 
(Winter, 525). 
 Closer to home Thomson reflects on British, socio-political institutions both stabilizing 
and faulty.  He diffuses disapproval of Prime Minister Robert Walpole and the Court Whig party 
throughout the poem.  For example, Tim Fulford notes that later editions of the poem added 
dedications to anti-Walpolean statesmen like George Bubb Dodington (1691-1762).  The poem 
leverages the georgics’ conventional reverence for land and property rights into a partisan 
preference for long-established, landholding families over persons raised by commercial success 
which constitutes a tension with his poem’s more progressive inclinations.114  He represents his 
own patrons as disinterested, uncorruptible stewards of the nation’s land.  Indeed, their 
improvement, aesthetic or practical, of their estates and their employment of tenants demonstrate 
their competence for statecraft.  John Barrell notes that The Seasons’ implicit political economy 
continued the ennobling of republican, civic humanism which in Thomson’s time was based on 
                                                          
113 “What tickles the corn to laugh out loud, and by what star / to steer the plough, and how to train the 
vine to elms, / Good management of flocks and herds…”  Virgil, Georgics, trans. Peter Fallon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-2. 
114 Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and Authority, 29-31. 
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aristocratic virtue and right to rule on land ownership, a topic which I take up in my fourth 
chapter on landscaping: “The owner of fixed property, even when conscious (according to some 
theorists) of consulting only his own interests, would also necessarily be consulting the true, the 
permanent interests of the country in which his family had a permanent stake.” 115  Owning an 
estate justifies proprietors holding state offices which allow them to shape laws capable of 
protecting land, virtue, and the nation’s economic prospects. 
 Thomson reserves his strongest criticism for Britain’s slavery and jail systems, which 
exemplify tyrannous state apparatuses in need of reform.  Slavery being the grosser outrage, 
these immoral institutions both hold people in bondage and so, as Locke would say, injure their 
natural rights to liberty.  Whereas Spring couches the concept of slavery in images of caged birds 
“by tyrant man / Inhuman caught,” Summer’s slave ships, which draw the “direful shark” by 
their gruesome, “rank” conditions, are meant to scandalize and elicit sympathy from the reader 
(Spring, 703-704; Summer, 1015; 1016).116  Thomson paints the shark as nature’s avenging tool 
when it in “one death involves / Tyrants and slaves” on the Middle Passage (Summer, 1022-
1023; 1017). 
 The jail reform passage’s closing lines underscore my argument that Thomson presents 
positive laws as political technologies that vary in their adherence to natural law’s absolute, 
moral authority:   
   …in this rank age, 
Much is the patriot’s weeding hand required. 
                                                          
115 John Barrell, The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992), 51. 
116 Fulford expresses skepticism at Thomson’s pathetic scenes.  He uses the example of Winter’s frozen 
man to argue that Thomson exploits images of suffering less to inspire empathy and social change than to 
recommend reliance on benevolent social systems and Providence.  Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and 
Authority, 26-27. 
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The toils of law—what dark insidious men 
Have cumbrous added to perplex the truth 
And lengthen simple justice into trade— 
How glorious were the day that saw these broke, 
And every man within the reach of right! (Winter, 382-388) 
The first two lines use the conceit of the farmer-politician to portray the state, the purported 
sanctuary of moral “truth,” as an inadequately maintained and overgrown plot.  The “cumbrous” 
laws imply chains consistent with the passage’s bondage theme.  Preceding lines establish that 
the carceral apparatus exemplifies injustice and immorality by describing its imposition by “little 
tyrants.”  State officials who unjustly steal from, torture, and kill the imprisoned show the “land 
of liberty” to be a distant ideal due to its present oppression of its citizens (Winter, 367; 365).  
Thomson indicates that Britain’s jail system is tarnished by, among other outrages, permitting 
the use of arbitrary force in punishments.  Like slavery, jails mistreat individuals by committing 
immoral, disproportionate injuries against their persons not only by means of inordinate prison 
terms, but in the use of corporal punishment and other tortures.  Though Britain’s government 
and the intellectual and commercial industry of its people remain sources of pride for Thomson, 
motifs of tyranny, oppression, burdens, and bondage signify misguided state apparatuses which 
fail by far to meet natural law’s standards and weaken the state’s moral legitimacy. 
 Thomson’s politico-economic ideas must be understood within a physico-theological 
context that finds the poem less interested in specific state apparatuses than in the need for a 
variety of interweaving, human and non-human economies to operate in accord with nature’s 
moral laws.  Such economies exemplify various contributors to socio-economic order 
irrespective of states’ political powers.  The study of natural phenomena by natural philosophers 
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also thickens our understanding of moral philosophy, the field of thought from which political 
economy developed, and so also our understanding of the proper ends of state apparatuses.  
Moreover, natural philosophy enables innovation in the largely private, socio-economic sphere 
the security of which eighteenth-century political economists increasingly identified as the 
primary object of positive laws.  The state protects industry and commerce by ensuring that its 
own apparatuses aspire to immutable, moral ideals like justice and all-important liberty, 
necessities for collective prosperity.  The Seasons also represents state institutions and positive 
law as only imperfectly capable of embodying economy-adjacent, moral ideals and cites 
historical polities that failed partly due to inadequately moral statecraft.  Ultimately, The Seasons 
denies states the possibility of having absolute, moral authority while granting, even anticipating, 
the perpetual refinement of their apparatuses.  Beyond protecting property rights and other, 
vaguer liberties, Thomson gives few impressions of what state apparatuses should look like and 
instead offers counterexamples which figure tyranny.  Yet emphasizing positive laws’ 
securitizing function and tying them to the community’s economic health opens the door for 
expanding state powers in the name of the public good.  This chapter has thus read Thomson as 
anticipating political economists in the following decades who also found in ostensibly natural 
systems justifications for economic liberalism.  They too viewed the state to be subservient to the 
national economy but therefore also required the state to expand its power by developing new 
apparatuses responsive to and capable of subtly influencing an increasingly complex socio-
economic order.    
 My next chapter reads texts by François Quesnay and Adam Smith, two early political 
economists whose respective thought exhibit varying degrees of materialism by arguing that the 
operations of a society’s economic system precede and determine the form of its government.  
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Quesnay attempts to reconcile his transhistorical, sociological model of agricultural production 
and circulation with French monarchical absolutism.  Smith writes in part to correct Quesnay and 
to advance political economy as a historically sensitive subsystem for studying government 
within his larger, comprehensive project on moral philosophy.  Though he argues that specific 
state apparatuses emerge in response to concomitant modes of subsistence, he agrees with 
Quesnay in justifying a state whose securitizing and economy-supporting functions entail not 
only its continuous refinement, but also its expanded potential for subjectivizing a body politic. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Repetition and Difference: Adam Smith’s Historicizing Revision of 
 François Quesnay’s Political Economy 
 
3.1 Economic Laws and political economy 
 James Thomson’s The Seasons decentered the georgic mode’s focus on agriculture in 
favor of alternative forms of labor such as the work of natural philosophy.  Natural philosophy’s 
study of nature helps society understand and instrumentalize nature, the latter achieved in part by 
developing new means for controlling and harvesting nature’s goods.  The Seasons presents 
technical and technological innovation as almost natural extensions of nature’s own creative 
potential.  Yet the poem also conceals the role of state apparatuses that support and direct 
individuals who may otherwise seem autonomously productive, creative, and self-organizing.    
This chapter on the intellectual history of political economy informs my larger discussion of 
representations of the state and statecraft in British georgic poetry.  Foundational treatises on 
political economy by François Quesnay, the founder of the first, economic science known as 
Physiocracy, and Adam Smith (1723-1790) show that Smith rejected Quesnay’s earlier argument 
that a nation’s economic health solely depends on its consistency with an ideal, timeless, 
economic model.  Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s core, economic concepts guided his own 
historical analysis of economic development.  I argue that while Smith retained Quesnay’s point 
that a state must expand and refine its power in order to support its national economy, his 
reinterpretations of Quesnay’s theories of wealth creation and of the division of labor caused 
Smith both to redefine the origins of state apparatuses and to justify their indirect, though still 
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great influence over the socio-economic lives and liberties of its subjects.117  Unpacking this 
claim requires an initial understanding of one area of agreement and one area of disagreement 
between the authors.   
 Both writers depicted social systems in which a socio-economic base gives rise to a 
superstructural government capable of and obliged to support the base’s economic productivity.  
That is, a responsible state serves its body politic in part by overseeing material prosperity by 
means of various state apparatuses.  A key distinction between Quesnay and Smith bears on their 
ideas about the sources of modern nations’ wealth and that wealth’s relation to innovations in 
subsistence modes and statecraft.118  For Quesnay, fixed natural laws prescribe an agriculture-
based, free market economy that must be governed by a centralized, absolutist regime called 
legal despotism.  David McNally argues that in Quesnay’s political economy, “the fundamental 
precondition of stable economic reproduction…is that the state establish social arrangements 
                                                          
117 To review some relevant terms, I use state to refer to a sovereign, political entity holding a monopoly 
on violence and whose political power enables it to determine its nation’s form of government.  
Government refers to types of regimes such as monarchies and republics in which state power is invested.  
The activity of government is statecraft.  Through statecraft, governments create and control a variety of 
state apparatuses through which states exert their political power to influence the behaviors of their 
subjects.  I also refer to the whole government itself as a state apparatus or sometimes as a piece of 
political technology.  I use polity and body politic interchangeably to describe an independent, socio-
political population while the idea of the nation fuses population and government into a single entity.  My 
discussion almost solely addresses Althuserrian ideological state apparatuses, (rather than repressive state 
apparatuses) which influence subjects’ behavior without immediate recourse to state-sanctioned violence.  
The state apparatuses that I most frequently refer to in this chapter include positive laws, physical 
infrastructure, and public education systems.  Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2014), 75-77. 
118 Though Quesnay and Smith are both sensitive to economic history, except where noted, my 
discussions of their analyses and recommendations for state apparatuses address a European modernity 
largely characterized by international commerce, which allows nations to avoid relying solely on food 
produced internally.  My discussion of stadialism below further explains modernity as a function of 
subsistence modes.  Moreover, with regard to Smith in particular, the georgic poems I discuss participate 
in a self-consciously modern, nationalist, and progressivist discourse in which the British state enshrines 
the liberty which enables private innovation and economic prosperity.  
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which specifically favour a capitalist organization of agriculture.”119  Quesnay attributed modern, 
socio-economic stability to a natural and immutable social composition of three groups defined 
by their types of labor.  He believed that only harvesting the earth creates wealth, and he 
distinguished productive farmers from the other two groups whom he deemed sterile non-
producers.120  The first sterile group comprised artisans who merely altered goods and merchants 
who aided economic circulation.  The second sterile group were landowners who collected rents 
and filled bureaucratic roles.  Fundamentally, Quesnay described a fixed division of labor 
without naming it as such.  By contrast, Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations redefined wealth creation to include manufacturing and trade.121  Expanded 
opportunities for wealth production effected his revision of the division of labor, which he 
understood to be an open-ended process of technical and technological122 innovation capable of 
gradually changing a nation’s mode of subsistence, its primary sources of wealth, and enabled 
more flexibility in government.  In short, Quesnay’s division of labor secures a largely 
unchanging socio-economic order, whereas Smith’s division of labor enables complex, 
synergistic forms of politico-economic growth and innovation. Not only did Smith surpass 
Quesnay’s narrow, economic analysis, but he tried to make his political economy accountable to 
a wider and more historically-informed range of human experience.   
                                                          
119 David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 120. 
120 Quesnay considered mining and other forms of resource extraction to also be productive but also that 
their returns were negligible compared to agriculture. 
121 Where Wealth of Nations addresses the history of political economy, his only other, published work, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) argues that interpersonal sympathy influences our theories of 
justice and morality.  Hereafter, WN and TMS. 
122 I use technical to describe practices whereas technological describes apparatuses that enable or support 
practices.  
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 The arguments of Smith and Quesnay are important to my study of British georgics for 
asserting that socio-economic stability and the potential for progress derive from apparently 
natural, self-interested processes of production and circulation, an assertion which georgics like 
The Seasons and Darwin’s Temple of Nature reiterate by describing ecological and physiological 
economies.  Smith and Quesnay influentially regarded the economy as an autonomous domain of 
social practice which governments support rather than exploit as part of their stewardship of their 
nations’ collective interests.   
 For some initial context on Smith’s relationship with Quesnay, Smith traveled in France 
during the 1760s, met leading philosophes and politicians, and was so impressed by Quesnay’s 
innovative theories as to intend WN’s dedication for him.  Most importantly, WN’s Book IV, 
Chapter IX, “Of the agricultural Systems, or of those Systems of political Oeconomy, which 
represent the Produce of Land, as either the sole or the principal Source of the Revenue and 
Wealth of every Country,” describes and responds to Quesnay’s economic analysis.  Quesnay’s 
influence on Smith has been noted in work by Donald Winch, Istvan Hont, Tony Aspromorgous, 
and Laurent Dobuzinskis, but, with some notable exceptions, their work mainly focuses on 
Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s economic analysis rather than on those revisions’ effect on 
Smith’s correlative revisions of political economy.123  Donald Winch reads Smith as a 
                                                          
123 For example, Donald Winch and Laurent Dobuzinskis both address Smith’s development of Quesnay’s 
belief in the variable productivity of different forms of labor.  Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An 
intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 78; Laurent Dobunzinskis, “Adam Smith and French Political Economy: Parallels and 
Differences,” in Propriety and Prosperity: New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith, eds. David F. 
Hardwick and Leslie Marsh (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 60-61; 64-65.  Tony 
Aspromorgous observes a similarity in Quesnay’s and Smith’s theories of wealth.   “The key substantive 
point in relation to the conceptualization of political economy is that Quesnay, like Smith, centres the new 
economic science on the growth of ‘wealth’ in the sense of the flow of annual or national product.”  
Though Aspromorgous questions whether Quesnay or even Smith have left behind mercantilism or 
whether Smith is truly liberal, he highlights the increased significance which Quesnay and then Smith 
attribute to circulation, or more precisely velocity, as a factor in producing wealth.  Tony Aspromourgos, 
The Science of Wealth: Adam Smith and the framing of political economy (London: Routledge, 2009), 41. 
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continuation of Lockean “liberal individualism” and argues that Smith’s theories on morality and 
jurisprudence cohere with Smith’s other writings: 
As the upholder of a system of natural liberty within which individuals possess certain 
natural rights and pursue selfish ends of an economic character, Smith occupies a crucial 
role in this tradition.  He is the first major economic spokesman for an emerging capitalist 
order within which a distinctive set of economic or property relationships – mediated by 
impersonal market mechanisms – was becoming firmly established.124 
The phrase “emerging capitalist order” includes the state apparatuses that enable and stabilize the 
socio-economic order by securing “economic or property relationship(s)” and which I explicate 
below. In Jealousy of Trade, Hont makes the useful point that Smith followed Quesnay in 
thinking that national economies benefit from state-regulated, free trade, but then went beyond 
Quesnay to argue that long-term, urban-driven prosperity led to the expansion of liberty in 
Europe.  Hont emphasizes that Smith imagined  that “[a]n ill-considered economic reform in 
favor of restructuring European agriculture could damage not only the urban economy but with it 
Europe’s hard-earned liberty as well.”125  I expand on Hont’s point by showing, for example, that 
in Smith’s political economy property rights do not derive from timeless natural law, as John 
Locke and Quesnay believed, but instead are historically contingent, state apparatuses which 
only come into being as positive laws when prerequisite levels of economic progress are reached.  
 Therefore, I also follow scholarship addressing Smith’s analysis of governments 
developing new state apparatuses in response to shifting, stadial conditions.126  For example, in 
                                                          
124 Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 13-14. 
125 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005), 109. 
126 Following the appearance of the Glasgow Edition of Smith’s works in 1976, Ronald Meek published 
an essay emphasizing Smith’s stadial theory of history that leaned toward economic determinism and 
102 
 
Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law, 
Ethics, and Culture Jerry Evensky says, “in the opening pages of the WN, Smith is making 
explicit that essential connection in his simultaneous, evolving system: the constitution of social 
and political institutions, the progress of opulence, and the human prospect are 
interdependent.”127  Smith’s key concept of the progress of opulence refers to gradual, socio-
economic developments and even stadial shifts caused by the division of labor’s accumulating, 
positive, economic effects.  Evensky highlights Smith’s belief that analyzing historical examples 
of waxing and waning nations illuminates trends that show predictable, cooperative development 
between nations’ economies and their governments.  Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s theories 
regarding wealth creation and divisions of labor led him to justify an ostensibly more liberal 
government than Quesnay’s legal despotism.  However, Smith’s revisions also led him to reason 
that governments must support economic development by crafting new, more complex and 
powerful apparatuses to nominally expand liberty and free enterprise, but which also increase the 
state’s influence over the body politic.128 
                                                          
Meek’s own materialist historiography.  Notably, the concepts of property and property laws have no 
operative meaning or use prior to a culture’s development of pasturage.  Ronald L. Meek, Smith, Marx, & 
After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought (London: Chapman & Hall, 1977), 18-32.  
Frank Palmeri usefully reviews European precedents for the Scottish Enlightenment’s reception of stadial 
theory in Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society: Enlightenment Conjectural History and 
Modern Social Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 27-58. 
127 Jerry Evensky, Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on 
Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112. 
128 As my Introduction mentioned, my thinking on the relation between the progress of opulence and the 
open-ended expansion and refinement of state apparatuses has been informed by the work of Michael 
Dillon.  In his elaboration of Walter Benjamin’ theory of sovereignty, he argues that the world presents 
itself to sovereigns as an infinite number of finite things which require an infinitely large and interminable 
effort of government to prevent their entropic descent into disorder.  In our slightly modified terms, 
political economists recognize the existence of the world’s various, material economies as capable of 
being instrumentalized by humans’ commercial economy.  While liberal states must avoid direct, socio-
economic regulation, Quesnay’s and especially Smith’s require that modern, liberal governments create 
and continuously refine state apparatuses in order to administer and optimize the commercial economy.  
Doing so reflects the state’s need to continuously expand its power and influence to answer the challenge 
posed by the simple existence of infinite, not-yet-optimized, thingly resources including humans.  
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 I begin discussing Quesnay by contextualizing his analytical method with reference to his 
medical training.  I refer to his most famous text, the Tableau économique to present his key, 
economic theories and to set up a reading of Le Despotisme de la Chine, a text which presents 
China as the nearest, historical expression of his model of political economy.  Quesnay’s 
political economy, unlike Smith’s, devalued entrepreneurial innovation, while promoting 
stability via personal industriousness and, above all, encouraging the productive, agricultural 
sector.  Le Despotisme de la Chine shows that Quesnay’s prescriptive, economic principles 
which seemed to disclose natural laws also seemed to justify legal despotism’s paternalist 
statecraft.  The text’s examples of Chinese statecraft demonstrate the characteristic inflexibility 
of Quesnay’s political economy in which the attributed nature of wealth creation and the division 
of labor do not drive progress but instead predetermine subjects’ functions within a fixed socio-
economic order.  His laudatory analysis of China’s bureaucracy, its infrastructure, and its public 
education system help frame the similarities and differences between Quesnay’s and Smith’s 
approaches to modern statecraft.  Specifically, each author favors state apparatuses oriented 
toward economic liberalism, but Smith’s economic analysis justifies a far more open-ended 
statecraft that allows states’ more sophisticated means for influencing subjects’ lives. 
 I then argue that Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s political economy led him to propose 
that governments develop positive laws and other state apparatuses concurrently with the 
progress of opulence while rejecting Quesnay’s statecraft based on his narrower, economic 
analysis of natural law.  However, Smith and Quesnay agreed on several socio-economic or 
economy-adjacent domains which modern governments should indirectly regulate.  Therefore, a 
                                                          
Michael Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A political analytic of finitude (New York: Routledge, 2015) 6-
16. 
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study of Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s economic theories followed by an analysis of those 
revisions’ effects on Smith’s theory of statecraft show him favoring greater regulatory creep 
within purportedly liberal governments.  I start by defining key economic concepts in WN that 
differ from their precursors in Quesnay’s economic model.  First, WN rejects Quesnay’s claim 
that only farmers harvesting land produce wealth; instead, it argues that the labor of artisans and 
merchants can also increase the value of wealth and thereby have greater influence on a nation’s 
prosperity.129  Second, I show that Smith’s definition of the division of labor offers new and 
alternative ways for nations to produce wealth, which underscores my main distinction between 
Quesnay’s fixed socio-economic order and Smith’s open-ended version.130  Smith’s division of 
labor also justified expanded state administration by problematizing laborers as complicated 
agents rather than fungible parts of a timeless socio-economic order.  Workers seemed more 
complicated not only due to their more dynamic labor, but also for being susceptible to the 
division of labor’s unintended, negative effects; these effects include injuries to workers’ 
rationality through enforced deskilling or weakening their socialization-based, moral sympathy.  
Unintended consequences were important to Smith, because while entrepreneurs divide labor to 
increase profits, the cumulative effects of individuals attempting to improve their stock can also 
unintentionally transform broad economic and political conditions.  Thus, the progress of 
opulence and the expansion of liberty-securing state apparatuses seemed to proceed as 
                                                          
129 Both Quesnay and Smith hold essentially materialist perspectives on wealth, but we will see that 
Smith’s labor-command theory of value shifts away from Quesnay’s simpler belief that wealth’s value is 
a simple reflection of material quantities and towards the belief that value is determined by its cost of 
production itself measured as in labors hours standardized against the cost of corn.  Laurent 
Dobunzinskis, “Adam Smith and French Political Economy,” 64-65. 
130 This distinction is replicated between more conventional British georgics such as John Dyer’s The 
Fleece which focuses on a single, rural industry and more innovative georgics like Thomson’s The 
Seasons, which directly cites the intellectual labor of natural philosophy for supporting new, 
technological means for instrumentalizing nature. 
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predictable, but unintended consequences of the division of labor.  Having shown that the 
division of labor and the progress of opulence epitomize the historical sensitivity of Smith’s 
economic analysis, I conclude by showing that these revisions color his understanding of 
infrastructure and education, two public works previewed in Le Despotisme de la Chine.  Such 
state apparatuses compensate for the open-ended, unintended consequences of the progress of 
opulence.  
 These contemporary, politico-economic texts which reduce the significance of states to 
support systems for national economies reflect and justify British georgics’ own tendency to 
disregard all but the most flagrantly oppressive example of statecraft and state apparatuses in 
these poems’ otherwise wide range of topics.  Georgics valorize capable, skillful agents who 
remain blurrily responsible to and influenced by various physical and moral systems beyond the 
scope of human comprehension.  Both georgics and economically liberal political economy 
ultimately obfuscate state apparatuses’ influence on the socio-economic order.131  We may even 
say that georgics aspire to see the world like the modern, liberal state recommended by Smith, 
since georgics encourage their publics to perceive human and non-human economies to be freely, 
creatively mingling rather than frame this complexity as a carefully administered liberty.  
Quesnay’s and Smith’s political economies addressed how nations can protect subjects’ liberties, 
foster their industry and virtue, and help them and their communities prosper.  In sum, reading 
politico-economic texts illuminates poets’ direct or indirect participation in debates regarding 
                                                          
131 The discovery of economic analysis and the economy’s eventual disembedding concurrent with the 
rise of political and economic liberalism tended to marginalize the influence of the state and disavow its 
extensive, regulatory functions.  As Bernard Harcourt states, “the naturalness of the market depoliticizes 
the distributional outcomes…” and “[t]he idea of natural order, in effect, masks the state’s role…”   
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), 32.  For disembedding as the subjection of all social, cultural, and 
political systems to market rationality, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 75. 
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statecraft; meanwhile, georgics remind us that much of the useful, economic innovation and 
liberties praised by WN depend on understanding and engaging with the broader, ecological 
systems that the poems exuberantly represent. 
 
3.2 Quesnay’s agrarian economy and his vision of Chinese statecraft 
 I begin with Quesnay’s economic analysis, because its revision in WN forms Smith’s 
basis for his own theories of statecraft.  Quesnay paved the way for Smith’s more elastic and 
historically-informed political economy by introducing the first, holistic model of economic 
production and circulation in his famous Tableau économique. A brief review of the Tableau’s 
concepts of wealth production and the division of labor will demonstrate the key point that 
Quesnay, and to a lesser extent Smith, believed that economic theory illuminates natural law and 
so also determines the socio-economic order and the functions of government.  Further, many 
scholars have noted a core contradiction in Physiocracy, essentially a tension in Quesnay’s 
attempt to use a truly avant-garde, if misguided theory of liberal economics as a basis for a 
feudal socio-political system.132  To put it another way, Quesnay’s political ideology of 
centralized paternalism is incompatible with and drags on the potentially progressive, dynamic 
aspects of his liberal, economic policy.   
                                                          
132 For example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese’s major study observes that Quesnay’s economic liberalism was 
incompatible with his feudal, socio-political structure, because the former insisted on individualism and 
the pursuit of self-interest while the latter’s system of rights and obligations restrained individual desires 
by prioritizing the collective’s specific organization and perpetuation.  Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The 
Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1976), 57; 244. 
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 I advance criticism on Quesnay by tying together three threads in the scholarship: the 
ability of materialist133, economic analysis to express fixed, natural laws; the requisite, triadic 
division of labor that defines the socio-economic order; and specific examples of state 
apparatuses. These three threads showcase the prescriptive rigidity of Quesnay’s political 
economy as a foundation for my ensuing discussion of Smith’s more flexible, nuanced 
version.134  I place particular emphasis on the point, largely neglected by scholars, that 
Quesnay’s social triad informed Smith’s own, crucial theory of the division of labor and its 
subsequent importance in his theory of statecraft.  For Quesnay, natural laws defined the fixed 
division of labor and so also the specific state apparatuses that promote industrious workers, free 
trade, and the socio-economic order’s reproduction.  Then, Le Despotisme de la Chine 
                                                          
133 Here I mean that Quesnay thinks of economies both commercial and ecological in physical terms.  It is 
also the case, as I mentioned earlier, that Quesnay understands the socio-economic order (base) to precede 
and determine a society’s government (superstructure). 
134 Margaret Schabas and Lorraine Daston have been crucial for my understanding of the relation between 
eighteenth-century economic analysis and natural law.  Schabas’s work describes how early, economic 
theorists including the Physiocrats understood economic production and circulation in physical, 
materialist terms as opposed to the abstract, numerical models in current use among economists.  
Analyses like Quesnay’s were often developed by association with other, ecological systems that natural 
philosophers contemporaneously explored with new fervor and depth.  Physiocracy especially 
demonstrates how such interpretations could derive apparent lessons from natural economies that seemed 
to justify socio-economic homeostasis.  Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2005), 2-4.  Lorraine Daston’s work addresses the point made in my last 
chapter that the study of physical nature by natural philosophers could produce physical laws of nature 
that could successively inform moral philosophers’ knowledge of moral, natural laws.  Daston observes 
that jurisprudential language migrated from Roman and ecclesiastical, canon law to provide a grammar 
for organizing knowledge of the order discovered in physical systems which manifested the moral order 
of the universe.  Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, “Introduction: Nature, Law and Natural Law in 
Early Modern Europe,” in Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, 
Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 20080, 2-3, 12.  Regarding the socio-economic order, Liana Vardi has produced the most 
complete and informative account of the intersecting and at times conflicting philosophical contexts that 
led Quesnay to mix relatively conservative, ancien régime political philosophy with an innovative, 
economic science that arrived at an abstract, circulation model from materialist, agrarian premises.  Liana 
Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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exemplifies the proper, state apparatuses of legal despotism, a regime justified by the natural 
laws disclosed by the Tableau’s economic analysis.   
 Quesnay’s thought both borrows and departs from contemporary ideas about economic 
topics and political philosophy.  As my Introduction discussed, eighteenth-century French 
political economy operated on mercantilist principles.  Mercantilists generally thought that a 
state should support its nation’s commonwealth by means of domestic interventions such as price 
regulation and international protectionism in order to amass material wealth, ideally in precious 
metals, in the zero-sum balance of international trade.135  Direct government regulation of the 
national economy comported with French political philosophy which, as McNally points out, 
recognized the nation as the king’s household.136  Before Quesnay, Jean Bodin’s Six livres de la 
république (1576) and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s Politique tirée de l'Écriture sainte (1709) had 
both influentially defended royal absolutism.  Nominal restraints of the crown by councilors, by 
the 13 parlements137, and by the Church did not fuel the same politico-philosophical reckoning 
as had England’s mixed government in terms of rights, obligations, and checks and balances.  
Seventeenth-century France’s overlapping legacies of mercantilism and monarchical absolutism 
led to decades of government interventions in the national economy that regularly produced food 
crises and would lead to the scapegoating of Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-
1683).  Colbert’s many successful policies would nevertheless be decried as excessively 
                                                          
135 For a recent account of the complex and often conflicting ideas grouped under the name mercantilism, 
see Lars Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism (London: Routledge, 2015). 
136 Referring to Quesnay description of the Tableau a book of household accounts, McNally states that 
“[w]ith this expression, Quesnay indicates that, for all his analytic innovations, his enterprise remains 
curiously within the traditional discourse of political economy which conceptualized the economy from 
the standpoint of—and as an extension of—the royal household.”  McNally, Political Economy and the 
Rise of Capitalism, 115-116. 
137 Provincial courts possessing the right to remonstrate against the king’s decrees. 
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protectionist by Quesnay and others favoring comparatively laissez-faire policies.138  
Additionally, Bourbon monarchs entered several wars which they supported by the short-sighted, 
venal selling of inheritable, annuity-bearing offices and thus monstrously expanded the national 
debt.  Lewis Gwynne observes that the crown eventually sold away much of its political 
power.139  Quesnay feared that these activities fed limited, partisan interests and hurt the 
commonwealth; unenlightened kings, tax-farmers, and licensed, corporate monopolies 
collectively choked the net produit140 and state revenues.  Quesnay sought to mitigate these 
prosperity-sapping practices by prioritizing free, domestic and international circulation of goods 
over balance of trade, which would additionally weaken the balance of trade’s legitimization of 
expensive, colony-protecting wars.141 
 Quesnay’s initial success as a physician led him to eventually head an influential group 
known either as the Économistes or the Physiocrats (meaning rule of nature) who shared his 
politico-economic beliefs.  Living at Versailles as the king’s physician, he was a favorite of 
Louis XV’s mistress, Madame de Pompadour and convinced other influential nobles and 
administrators to spread and implement his ideas.  One of his closest adherents, Victor de 
Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789) promoted physiocratic ideas in the popular L'ami des 
hommes : ou, Traité de la population (1759).  Perhaps most notably, Anne Robert Jacques 
Turgot (1727-1781) became Controller-General of Finances from 1774 to 1776 and was able to 
partially deregulate the grain trade before a series of bad harvests and criticism from Ferdinando 
                                                          
138 Max Beer, An Inquiry into Physiocracy (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), 39-45.   
139 Gwynne, Lewis, France 1715-1804: Power and the People (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), 15. 
140 Essentially the net, domestic product, the exact, annual reproduction of which crucially enables the 
reproduction of the socio-economic order.  Its perfect reproduction is one of the primary objects of 
Quesnay’s political economy.   
141 Istvan Hont uses the term jealousy of trade to describe the mercantilist pursuit of national self-interest 
via international, zero-sum commercial competition as a continuation of war by other means.  Hont, 
Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective, 5-6. 
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Galiani (1728-1787) and the statesman Jacques Necker (1732-1804) effectively ended popular 
engagement with physiocratic thought.  In addition to the Tableau, Quesnay left several texts 
attempting to explain his economic and socio-political theories, including four articles written for 
the Encyclopédie. 
 His article “Evidence” usefully demonstrates that not only physiocratic, political 
economy’s materialism but also its holism and inflexibility derived in part from Quesnay’s 
medical training.  “Evidence” reflects a fundamentally Lockean epistemology; for example, it 
distinguishes objective, primary qualities from subjective, secondary qualities as Locke defines 
them in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.142  “Evidence” rejects entirely deductive, 
system-based thought in favor of a mix of Lockean empiricism and educated hypothesizing, 
though Smith nevertheless criticized Quesnay as a dogmatic “man of system.”143  Quesnay’s 
background in iatrophysical medicine guided his wish to minimize the use of analogy and 
imagination for understanding any set of complex, enmeshed systems; it informed his general 
research method, which proposed that measurable, empiric experiments should enable the 
theorization of larger systems susceptible to abstraction, numerical modelling, and ultimately 
predictability and fixed principles.144  Empiric study should then also be capable of arriving at a 
                                                          
142 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), II.viii.9-10. 
143 “The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so 
enamoured with the supposed beauty of his ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest 
deviation from any part of it.  He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard 
either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it.”  Adam Smith, The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984), VI.ii.2.17.  
Deborah Redman observes that Locke’s “historical, plain method” for implementing political economy 
derives its empiricism-based pragmatism from his own background in medicine.  Deborah Redman, The 
Rise of Political Economy as a Science: Methodology and the Classical Economists (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1997), 67. 
144 Iatrophyical medicine understood physiology in mechanical, physics-based terms.  “L'évidence résulte 
nécessairement de l'observation intime de nos propres sensations…Ainsi j'entens par évidence, une 
certitude à laquelle il nous est aussi impossible de nous refuser, qu'il nous est impossible d'ignorer nos 
sensations actuelles.” (Evidence necessarily results from the close observation of our own 
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holistic, political economy that, like a human body, reacts with reasonable predictability to 
regulative interventions ranging from slight and corrective to injuriously heavy-handed.  
Supporting my view that “Evidence” validates the connection between Quesnay’s medical 
training and his political economy, Jessica Rifkin, Margaret Schabas, and Liana Vardi each note 
that Quesnay’s materialist conception of bodily health determined his emphasis on the 
(re)production and circulation of wealth through the body politic.  For example, Schabas states 
that “[h]is discernment of the circulation of goods between three sectors—the landowners, the 
artisans, and the farmers—was directly inspired by his knowledge of human physiology.”145  
“Evidence” ultimately argues for translating empiric information into operable knowledge of 
nature and its physical laws, a method extensible to economic analysis and policy-making.  The 
article’s empiric epistemology grounded in his medical training helps us see that later texts like 
the Tableau and Le Despotisme de la Chine would rely on methods described in “Evidence” to 
elevate to the status of natural law their claims regarding wealth’s physicality, the socio-
economic triad, and the necessity of legal despotism.    
 Following methods described in “Evidence,” Quesnay presented his innovative, 
economic theories in three, increasingly annotated editions of his Tableau économique; the text’s 
                                                          
sensations…Thus I mean by evidence, a certain which is as impossible for us to refuse as it is to ignore 
our immediate sensations.)  “EVIDENCE,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des 
arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert eds. Robert Morrissey and 
Glenn Roe (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2017 Edition)), 
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.  Regarding the Tableau, Philippe Steiner calls Quesnay’s extrapolation 
from bits of hard evidence to an ideal, national system “quantitative empiricism.”  Philippe Steiner, 
“Physiocracy and French Pre-Classical Political Economy,” in A Companion to the History of Economic 
Thought, eds. Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle, and John B. Davis (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 68. Vardi 
notes the importance for Quesnay and for Enlightenment political economists more broadly to discover 
regularities in socio-economic systems that allow governments to eliminate uncertainty and chance when 
implementing policies.   Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 57. 
145 Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 46-47.  Jessica Riskin “The ‘Spirit of System’ 
and the Fortunes of Physiocracy,” in Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, ed. Margaret Schabas and Neil 
De Marchi (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 43; Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the 
Enlightenment, 29-39. 
112 
 
centerpiece, zig-zagging chart represents the annual circulation of France’s wealth through the 
social triad.  Despite its notorious complexity, he insisted that any reasonable person studying his 
ideas would reach an epiphany, discover their self-evidentiary truth, and acknowledge 
Physiocracy as the expression of natural laws.  According to Yves Charbit, the chart mixed the 
empirical and the ideal: 
On the one hand, in keeping with his contemporaries' enthusiasm for agriculture, and like 
the thinkers of the agronomic school, he bases his analysis on solid empirical evidence 
supplied by a network of correspondents.  On the other hand, the diagram of the Tableau 
économique contains purely theoretical numbers, which purport to illustrate the annual 
flows of exchanges between social groups.146   
In addition to explaining farming’s reproduction of wealth and the socio-economic triad, the text 
insists on certain, progressive policies perhaps the most crucial of which was the need for free 
trade among French counties and ideally with other nations.  While the idea of free trade did not 
originate with Physiocracy, Quesnay and Smith gave it firmer theoretical ground than it had had 
from less systematic, mercantilist thinkers.147  In Quesnay’s opinion, free trade ensured that 
grain, the most vital commodity, would approach the bon prix, a point of equilibrium reflecting 
the balanced interests of buyers and sellers and thus the grain’s true value.  Ideally grain would 
be both abundant and maintain a high enough price that people would be fed, and enough money 
                                                          
146 Yves Charbit and Arundhati Virmani, “The Political Failure of an Economic Theory: Physiocracy,” 
Population 57, no. 6 (2002): 862. 
147 For example, Terence Hutchison highlights Charles Davenant (1656-1714) as an early economic 
theorist who advocated domestic, free trade and even prefigured Adam Smith’s argument that a nation 
benefits by granting its subjects liberty to pursue self-interested, economic practices.  Terence Hutchison, 
Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662-1776 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 
49-51. 
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would eventually circulate back to the farmers for them to afford the next year’s supplies.148  
Free trade would also prevent individuals from hoarding grain during low-price periods, allow 
surpluses to be sold to grain-poor regions, and generally discourage selling practices that might 
have immediate, self-serving benefits but would have cascading, negative consequences for 
farmers’ supplies of money and seed in following years.  The Tableau’s progressive, free-market 
model of domestic circulation nevertheless betrays its conservative tendencies, because this 
system, attributed to fixed, natural laws, works to annually reproduce the socio-economic triad 
by also reproducing the same amount of consumable resources year to year.  In addition to 
Quesnay’s almost fanatically conservative fixation on land as not only the source of wealth but 
also of political power, we should note that he presented even the progressive aspects of his 
economic analysis as natural laws which justify his fundamentally conservative argument for 
maintaining the socio-economic order and absolutist government.    
 Quesnay’s innovative, circulatory model originates in his conservative theories of wealth 
production and labor’s division into the three socio-economic groups.149  Given that each group 
must consume a fixed amount of resources to reproduce itself, Quesnay claimed that only 
nature’s productive powers can replace consumed wealth.  His Encyclopédie article “Fermiers” 
defines the productive group:  
[Fermiers] sont ceux qui afferment & font valoir les biens des campagnes, & qui 
procurent les richesses & les ressources les plus essentielles pour le soûtien de l'état ; 
                                                          
148 Foucault provides an example of Physiocracy proposing a new state apparatus in the form of a law 
prohibiting hoarding.  The law nominally fosters an ostensibly liberal, free market that will produce the 
desired mix of high abundance and high prices.  The law epitomizes the paradox of regulated freedom.  
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 37. 
149 His definition of wealth retains mercantilism’s, material-based, almost empiric commitment to 
physical goods, though he regarded bullion as valuable to the extent that it facilitates circulation rather 
than being worth stockpiling for its own sake. 
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ainsi l'emploi du fermier est un objet très-important dans le royaume, & mérite une 
grande attention de la part-du gouvernement. 150    
([Farmers] are those who lease and make yield the goods of the fields and who procure 
the most essential riches and resources for the support of the state; thus, the farmer’s 
employment is a very important subject in the kingdom and deserves much of the 
government’s attention.)  
However, Physiocracy gave multiple reasons for proscribing improvements to farmers’ financial 
situations.  Most importantly, farmers must turn over the entire net produit to the landowners 
from whom they rent land.  One of the Tableau’s objects was ensuring that each year’s optimal, 
net produit reaches landowners who can then guide adequate avances annuelles (annual costs) 
back into the farmer’s hands at the beginning of the circulatory process.  Additionally, Quesnay 
accounted for France’s middling agricultural output, aimed for exact reproduction, and largely 
ignored potential increases in efficiency or production arising from technological innovation.151 
 A glimpse at the sterile group of artisans and merchants underscores how Quesnay’s 
definition of wealth creation justified his fixed, labor-based socio-economic order.  Quesnay 
insisted that applying labor to pre-existing resources does not increase their value regardless of 
time or effort spent.  He thus implied that, strictly understood, labor neither creates wealth nor 
adds value, though it can cause the earth to produce wealth in greater quantities.  Yet artisans and 
merchants remain necessary, because artisans furnish the means of production while merchants 
                                                          
150 “Fermiers,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds. 
Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert eds. Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (University of 
Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2017 Edition)), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. 
151 Quesnay’s neglect of technological progress reasonably reflected the recent history of French 
agriculture; lacking England’s Agricultural Revolution, the traditional open-field system of two fields 
planted and one left fallow remained largely unchanged from the early modern period until the nineteenth 
century.  For a summary of the French agrarian culture of the period, see William Beik, A Social and 
Cultural History of Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43-63. 
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who circulate goods enable markets to achieve the bon prix.  However, due in part to their 
proximity to luxury goods and merchants’ tendency to impede the economy by hoarding, 
overcharging, and otherwise bleeding the net produit, Quesnay considered them to be a 
persistent threat to the economy’s smooth operation. 
 Quesnay argued that natural laws disclosed by his economic analysis justify sterile 
landowners’ economic and political powers.  By assigning his economic theories the status of 
natural laws, he gave a new, enlightened sheen to an ultimately conservative respect for 
landownership concomitant with ancien régime feudalism.  Fox-Genovese makes a similar point 
by asserting that Physiocracy posed itself as a unitary, social science, but was ultimately 
grounded in Quesnay’s respect for private property.152  His economic justifications laundered a 
feudal ideology granting a landowning aristocracy perpetual right to rule.  He asserted that 
proprietors retain absolute power over both the net produit and state offices, because their 
families had provided the avances primitives, the initial, financial outlays, which allowed farms 
to be established in the first place.  As sole owners of France’s capital, proprietors bear almost 
the whole tax burden and initiate the yearly reproduction cycle by redistributing the avances 
annuelles to the other two groups.  Quesnay’s outsize esteem for the ruling class is exemplified 
by the simple fact that the avances primitives, no matter their size, cannot countenance absolute 
and permanent control over their capital and the entire net produit of others’ labor.  His desire to 
maintain a traditional, aristocratic class that uniquely enjoys a variety of material luxuries and 
political privileges is a symptom of his politico-economic conservatism. 
 Recognizing the importance Quesnay attributed to property rights as an aspect of land 
ownership brings us closer to understanding the determinative relationship between his 
                                                          
152 Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 47. 
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innovative, economic analysis and his preference for legal despotism as a positive, political 
support system for natural law.  Though Quesnay’s opinion of land ownership diverged from 
Locke’s labor theory of property, Quesnay shared Locke’s belief that exclusionary property 
rights are a key natural right deriving from and serving the natural law that societies should 
prosper.153  Physiocracy fulfills natural law by encouraging the optimal exploitation of stock 
which means that, as Catherine Larrère summarizes in L'Invention de l'économie au XVIIIe 
siècle: du droit naturel à la physiocratie, states must secure landowners’ property rights as a 
prerequisite to individuals pursuing their economic self-interest.154  Property rights permit 
owners the free and rational use of their wealth which the Tableau conveniently models.  Given 
that state apparatuses must secure the rights necessary for economic production and distribution, 
they also must avoid impeding these flows by, for example, fixing prices and thereby meddling 
with the bon prix and net produit.  Again, on one hand, Quesnay’s economic analysis defended 
progressive, even liberalist positions such as free trade and strong property rights.  On the other 
hand, these natural rights belong solely to an economically and politically empowered minority 
whose high social standing derived from a feudal social order which Quesnay refashioned as 
enlightened Physiocracy.  He wrote Le Despotisme de la Chine as proof of physiocratic, political 
                                                          
153 As my Introduction addresses, exclusionary property rights exclude others from injuring individuals 
with respect to their possessions.  Locke’s labor theory of property asserts that mixing one’s labor with 
unclaimed resources appropriates and grants one property rights to those resources irrespective of the pre-
existence of a social contract.  
154 “L’optimisation de la jouissance se réalise dans la relation qui situe l’individu dans l’ordre naturel, qui 
est relation, d’intérêt commun, entre l’un et le tout ; le droit naturel, droit à la jouissance, s’y développe et 
s’y renforce sous la forme de la propriété… Mais, en se faisant de la sorte science de la jouissance, la 
physiocratie entretient un rapport problématique avec l’objectif politique de la modernité, la sûreté.”  (The 
optimization of pleasure occurs in the relation which locates the individual in the natural order, in the 
relation of the common interest between the one and the whole; the natural right, the right to pleasure, 
develops and strengthens in the form of property… But in making itself a kind of science of pleasure, 
Physiocracy maintains a problematic relation with the political goal of modernity, security.)  Catherine 
Larrère, L'Invention de l'économie au XVIIIe siècle : du droit naturel à la physiocratie (Paris : Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1992), 13. 
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economy’s real-world viability and to provide specific examples of statecraft carrying out legal 
despotism with reasonable accuracy.  The durability and continuity of China’s agrarian economy 
and absolutist government seemed to him to validate his claim that his economic analysis had 
indeed disclosed natural laws which China had implemented through its state-sanctioned system 
of moral philosophy. 
 My study of Le Despotisme de la Chine benefits from recent, critical interest in the text 
as an example of non-European influence on Enlightenment thought.155  My claim that the text 
usefully demonstrates a homeostatic, socio-economic order sustained by legal despotism is 
supported by Stefan Jacobsen Gaarsmand’s observation that “Quesnay’s Chinese ideal contained 
an economic equilibrium that secures the stability of agricultural production as well as a 
perpetual and stable order of government.”156  My analysis differs from scholars who focus on 
Quesnay’s uncertain absorption of Eastern ideas by instead using Le Despotisme de la Chine to 
identify specific state apparatuses required to stabilize the socio-economic order based on a fixed 
division of labor and ordained by natural laws.157  Though Quesnay participates in a wider 
European process of orientalization, and though he invokes China in the service of his own 
arguments, he demonstrates a largely tolerant understanding of Chinese political economy by 
                                                          
155 Important studies that specifically address China include John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of 
Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and David E. Mungello, The Great 
Encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800 (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 
156 Stefan Gaarsmand Jacobsen, “Physiocracy and the Chinese model: Enlightened lessons from China’s 
political economy?,” in Thoughts on economic development in China, eds. Ma Ying and Hans-Michael 
Trautwein (New York: Routledge, 2013), 28. 
157 Hobson outlines examples of Quesnay’s ideas which China’s historical and philosophical precedents 
seemed to support:  
The significance of his ideas, derived from China, was at least twofold: first, he saw in agriculture 
a crucial source of wealth (which became an important idea in the British agricultural revolution).  
Secondly, and more importantly, he believed that agriculture could only be fully exploited when 
producers where freed from the arbitrary interventions of the state.  Only then could the ‘natural 
laws’ of the market prevail (as the Chinese had long realized).   
Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, 196. 
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accommodating and accepting Confucianism as an alternative moral philosophy capable of 
cultivating proper, socio-economic order. 
 Quesnay published Le Despotisme de la Chine in Ephémérides du citoyen (1767–72, 
1774–76), a physiocratic journal Joseph A. Schumpeter deems both “the first genuine history of 
economics” and filled with propaganda.158  Despotisme recalls other statecraft manuals such as 
Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (1531) and François Fenelon’s Les aventures de Télémaque 
(1699), which use history and legend to convey political philosophy and policies.  Quesnay’s text 
relied on often second-hand reports by Christian missionaries to produce a synthetic, quasi-
historical account of Chinese political economy.  He can be critical of his sources, speculating on 
the conditions, limitations, and prejudices that would cause missionaries and merchants to 
produce uncharitable accounts.  Quesnay devotes many pages to correcting Montesquieu (1689-
1755) whose writing, according to Hyobom B. Pak, symptomatized increasing Sinophobia in the 
European Enlightenment and not only “misrepresented the philosophical foundations of Chinese 
government, but also conveniently selected many sources of dubious origin to vilify the whole 
fabric of the Chinese body politic as a prototype of despotism.”159  Quesnay was more sanguine 
than many philosophes and perceived that China’s apparently successful, agrarian economy 
headed by an absolute monarch harmonized with and verified his own beliefs in the universality 
of the natural laws he had identified.    
                                                          
158 Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 219.  The 
scholarly edition of La Despotisme de la Chine read here is compiled from two manuscripts and differs in 
the ordering of certain chapters from the published version.  As elsewhere, translations are my own. 
159 Hyobom B. Pak, China and the West: Myths and Realities in History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 57.  
European impressions of Chinese political economy produced a wide spectrum of approval and 
disapproval.  The East could be at once a scapegoat for Western cultural anxieties and a compelling, 
commodity market.  Western explorers transmitted records of experiences and ideas which would 
influence natural history and comparative ethnography and thereby provide a resonant antitype against 
which Europe’s supposedly more virtuous and just societies could be measured.  
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 Quesnay’s approval of Chinese political economy rested on his sense that the country’s 
philosophers had come reasonably close to discovering universal, moral principles consistent 
with fixed, natural laws.  These principles originated with Confucius (551 - 479 BCE), whose 
ideas China’s educational system transformed into dogma that would inform its social order for 
centuries.  An unpublished chapter on Confucius’s life all but attributes two millenia of Chinese 
achievements to his moral philosophy.160  Introducing the section “Maxims,” Quesnay stresses 
that Confucianism’s consistency with natural law enabled China’s well-regulated political 
economy.  He states that “[o]n verra par là que la raison est de tous les tems de tous les pais” 
(Quesnay, 1067; We will thereby see that reason applies at all times and in all countries).  Both 
Confucian, moral philosophy and Quesnay’s economic analysis called for paternalist 
governments with enough influence to harmonize the socio-economic order with natural law, an 
influence channeled through the educational systems I discuss below.  Rather than directly 
prescribing China’s economy, the maxims assert that the poorest citizen may possess princely 
virtue and insist on industriousness, humility, and the subjection of all people to paternalist 
Confucianism.   
 Though a plowman may be as virtuous as the emperor, national stability depends on all 
state officials embodying the Confucian virtues consistent with natural law.  Though natural laws 
reign supreme, in practice and like all legal despots, China’s emperor concentrates sovereign 
legal power in his or her person as the political analogue to a paternal head of household.  By 
                                                          
160 “Il a pourtant l’avantage sur eux que sa gloire n’a fait qu’augmenter avec le nombre des années, et 
qu’elle subsiste encore en entire dans le plus grand empire du monde qui lui attribute sa durée et sa 
splendeur.”  (However, he has the edge over [Greek philosophers] that his glory only increased with the 
number of years and that it survives whole in the world’s greatest empire which credits him with its 
duration and its prosperity.)  All further references are taken from François Quesnay, Œuvres 
économiques complètes de François Quesnay et autres textes, eds. Christine Théré, Loïc Charles and 
Jean-Claude Perrot (Paris : Institut national d’études démographiques, 2005), 1062. 
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educating and advising the emperor, mandarins check absolute, imperial power in part by 
fostering compassion and responsibility for China’s people; emperors too must be subject to 
natural law to avoid arbitrary despotism.  Thus, the reciprocal bonds of paternal care and familial 
esteem on a national scale should foment ideological consensus regarding the public good.161 
 While sovereignty belongs solely to the emperor, the Chinese state’s political power 
diffuses through its bureaucracy of fourteen thousand mandarins who administer national 
stability.  A series of competitive exams open to all men tests rote knowledge of Confucianism 
and distributes high scorers throughout the bureaucratic and court systems.  Again, this system 
reflects Quesnay’s preference for meticulously reproducing a nation’s socio-economic 
composition.  This supposedly meritocratic system answers France’s own problem of monarchs 
funding expensive, often unavailing wars by selling titles, annuities, and state offices to, worst of 
all, nouveau riche merchants.  Such people bleed France by contributing to the national debt, by 
tax-farming, and by keeping more qualified people out of office.  Instead, mandarins seemed to 
epitomize morality and Quesnay lengthily details the internal oversight designed to minimize 
corruption and ensure their accountability to natural laws.  Each must be impartial and fungible.  
For example, mandarins must move away from their home provinces and recuse themselves from 
working with or on cases involving family members.  Aggrieved parties may appeal up the 
command chain to the emperor, and abuses of offices are publicized and punished. 
 The mandarinate’s internal rigor authorizes them to enforce the positive laws that protect 
the nation and let it prosper.  “Maxims” establishes that Chinese culture is founded on moral 
                                                          
161 Deriving political paternalism from an apparently timeless household paternalism allowed Quesnay to 
naturalize both by describing both as reflecting natural laws and to consequently reject the social contract.  
Smith similarly conjectured that the first governments arose more or less organically by patterning 
themselves on the paternal family structure.  Thus, he too dismissed the idea of government-originating, 
social contracts. 
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principles demanding deference to authority.  The section “Positive Legislation” clarifies that 
this morality of subjection and submission directly informed China’s codified laws: 
Pour ce qui est des lois, elles sont toutes fondées sur les principes de morale que l’on a 
vus ; car, comme on l’a déjà dit, la morale et la politique ne forment à la Chine qu’une 
même science, et dans cet empire, toutes les lois positives ne tendent qu’à maintenir la 
forme du gouvernement … (Quesnay, 1083) 
(Regarding laws, they are all based on the moral principles that we saw; because, as we 
already said, morality and policy form but one science in China, and in this empire, all 
positive laws only aim to preserve the government’s form … ) 
The text’s “Introduction” states that a nation’s positive laws must not contradict natural laws nor 
impede the economy’s natural productivity and circulation (Quesnay, 1015-1017).  Predictably, 
positive laws protecting natural, property rights are especially important.162  Property laws 
exemplify Quesnay’s and Smith’s desire for commutative justice, an approach to jurisprudence 
based on fair contracts and exchange and one which provides for exclusionary ownership rights 
that ban expropriation of, injury to, or other parties profiting from another person’s possessions.  
By contrast with commutative justice, distributive justice seeks specific, socio-economic 
outcomes, invites direct, state intervention in the economy, and may redistribute wealth.  By 
minimizing state-directed economic intervention and redistribution, China’s quasi-liberal 
positive laws based on commutative justice help perpetuate an economic and political status quo.  
 Though Quesnay does not seem to want positive laws to endlessly proliferate, states’ 
responsibility for the public good require them to subjectivize their polities.163  This key point is 
                                                          
162 “La propriété des biens est très assurée à la Chine…”   (Quesnay, 1078; The property of goods is very 
secure in China…). 
163 I adapt my use of subjectivization from Jacques Ranciere’s essay, “Politics, Identification, and 
Subjectivization,” which states that “subjectivization is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the 
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supported by Larrère’s argument that Physiocracy created an interminable balancing act by 
desiring to maximize subjects’ natural right to pursue their self-interest (and thus maximize net 
productivity) while minimizing the regulatory, state apparatuses needed for securing their ability 
to do so.164  Positive laws and other state apparatuses proliferate due to liberal governments’ 
interminable need to more effectively shunt economic flows into their optimal, supposedy 
natural channels.  As “Evidence” shows, Quesnay preferred predictable, often simple policies 
and institutions.  For example, he proposed a single flat tax on the landowners’ net produit to rid 
France of its complex, corrupt tax system.165  Still, Quesnay and Smith recognized that 
commutative justice-based laws alone cannot induce a nation’s economic agents to perform to 
the Tableau’s standards.  Le Despotisme de la Chine’s discussion of infrastructure demonstrates 
that states can continuously reshape physical, public space to optimize socio-economic behavior. 
 Quesnay valued infrastructure that incentivizes efficient production and circulation.  In 
concert with public education, infrastructure can continuously encourage people to be rational, 
productive subjects.  Maintaining and improving a nation’s physical environment requires 
significant public spending to endlessly refine the city-walls, roads, canals, and bridges that 
                                                          
relation of a self to an other.”  Ranciere means for subjectivization to be an emancipatory process wherein 
a state’s marginalized, unequal people force themselves to be recognized by the state as equal, 
participatory subjects.  I somewhat perversely adopt the Physiocratic and/or liberal state’s point of view 
by using subjectivization to mean a state’s attempts to use its power to close the gap between excluded 
selves and the other.  In this case, each “self” is a member of the population and the “other” is the ideal, 
national subject who embodies natural laws by recognizing and pursuing their economic self-interest with 
exactitude.  Incidentally, these self-interested actions also serve the nation’s presumed, collective, self-
interest in its own reproduction.  Subjectivizing state apparatuses proliferate, because this gap between 
real selves and ideal subjects can never be closed.  Jacques Ranciere, “Politics, Identification, and 
Subjectivization,” October 61 (Summer 1992), 60. 
164 Charles Gide and Charles Rist note Physiocracy’s related contradiction that maximizing the polity’s 
rights simultaneously required maximizing state power by granting despots absolute, political authority.  
Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines: From the Time of the Physiocrats to the 
Present Day (London: Charles G Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1961), 52. 
165 Hutchison identifies the single tax and laissez-faire trade as “the two overriding policy doctrines of 
Quesnay and the physiocrats…”  Hutchison, Before Adam Smith, 280. 
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determine ease of access and transport, incentivize self-serving uses of public space, and add to 
the commonwealth.166  Infrastructure creates material conditions that do not compel but 
subjectivize individuals by incentivizing, disincentivizing, and thus indirectly guiding their 
economic activities.  Le Despotisme de la Chine gives several, admiring examples of Chinese 
infrastructure.  For example, terracing increases the space available for farming.  For commercial 
traffic, Quesnay approves China’s grand highways and artificial canals.  Deemed more efficient 
than roads, canals simplify transport and aid irrigation.167  Proper infrastructure eases the 
circulation of goods between town and country and within market towns.  Foucault supports my 
point that the physiocratic state purports to maximize liberty and the pursuit of self-interest by 
minimizing state apparatuses that intrude on socio-economic life while expanding its influence 
over the environments in which this collective activity takes place: “the market town became the 
model of state intervention in men’s lives” and connotes the body-level discipline of physical 
space that subjects individuals to a common, state-sanctioned, and (according to Quesnay) 
natural, market rationality.168  In Quesnay’s telling, urban markets provide a communal space 
where free, self-interested individuals produce the economic equilibrium of the bon prix.  
However, free trade between the town and the country ultimately maintains a fixed division of 
labor between each sector’s workers.  Because only the country creates wealth, farmers must stay 
                                                          
166 Mirabeau refers to “l’entretien et l’amélioration, qui ne peuvent jamais être trop forts, & dont les 
dépenses peuvent être immenses…”  (…upkeep and improvement, which can never be too great and 
whose costs can be immense…)  Qtd. in Yves Citton, Portrait de l'économiste en physiocrate : critique 
littéraire de l'économie politique (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2000), 292.  Brian Larkin confirms my point that 
infrastructure exerts state power over individuals by influencing their economic desires and behavior.  For 
example, “[roads and railways] form us as subjects not just on a technopolitical level but also through this 
mobilization of affect and the senses of desire, pride, and frustration, feelings which can be deeply 
political.” Larkin, Brian, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” The Annual Review of Anthropology 
Review of Anthropology 42. (2013): 331-3. 
167 Schabas argues that Quesnay’s economic ideas relied on medical analogies such as fluid circulation 
indicating a body politic’s economic health.  Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 45-
46. 
168 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 338. 
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on the farms and continuously produce without profiting while their harvests must be able to 
reach the two sterile, urban groups.169  Circulatory infrastructure epitomizes the distinction 
between Quesnay’s homeostatic political economy and Smith’s more historically literate analysis 
that recognizes value in urbanization.  As we will see, Smith appreciates circulatory 
infrastructure, because trade between town and country expands net prosperity and drives the 
progress of opulence rather than simply transferring wealth from one area to another. 
 Le Despotisme de la Chine’s detailing of the relation between China’s Confucian 
morality and state apparatuses demonstrates Quesnay’s belief that states must habituate their 
subjects to following natural laws.  A life-long educational system and positive laws enforced by 
an intensively internally-regulated bureaucracy offer a state powerful, refinable apparatuses for 
maintaining the socio-economic order.  Once a nation discovers natural laws and the triadic, 
socio-economic order, political economy’s burden shifts to continuously refining these state 
apparatuses to best manage and reproduce the polity.  A final example of public works shows 
public education to be a particularly powerful apparatus for offering states strong, persistent 
influence over subjects’ economic interests and behaviors. 
 Whereas law enforcement is largely a post hoc solution to already broken laws, public 
education precludes transgressions by pre-conditioning and guiding individuals’ behavior.  
Public education ideally enables states to train individuals to pursue the public good by 
recognizing its identity with their own interests.  Quesnay initially highlights the importance of 
despots’ education, because they hold absolute, political power, and nations’ welfare depends on 
their rulers’ commitment to natural laws.  Though positive laws do not bind Chinese emperors, 
                                                          
169 Because farmers give the entire, net produit to the landowning class at the end of the annual cycle.  
Quesnay views any private enterprise on the part of farmer to be so minimally profitable as to have a 
negligible effect on the socio-economic order and in any case is likely to be sterile.  
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they still must subject themselves to a Confucian morality of submission and humility before 
nature’s higher law.170  Mandarins prevent China from slipping into arbitrary despotism by 
conducting each emperor’s early education then counselling him during adulthood.  Beyond the 
emperor, Quesnay approves of all Chinese cities and towns having mandarin teachers available 
to instruct children in basic literacy before introducing them to Confucian texts.  The most 
successful students, often those whose families can afford private tutors, may advance to the 
colleges and attempt the qualifying tests for government service.  To ensure the polity’s 
ideological conformity, public education relies on repetition and memorization of a curriculum 
standardized and disseminated from the capital in Peking.  Though the education of China’s 
lower, social orders rarely advances to the intensive study required of applicants to the 
mandarinate, all adults continue to receive regular indoctrination in moral principles and positive 
laws.  Communities convene to hear mandarins reiterate Confucian values in semi-monthly, 
state-sanctioned, public speeches.  Peking also distributes a similarly themed, national gazette.  
In addition to expounding virtues and vices, the gazette summarizes recent, governmental 
activity such as new legislation and cites mandarins discharged for corruption.  
 
3.3 Adam Smith and the open-ended power of liberal states 
 Smith’s rethinking of wealth creation and the division of labor led Smith to reject legal 
despotism while retaining some of Physiocracy’s progressive aspects such as property rights, 
free trade, and minimal, direct state intervention in the national economy.  Smith agreed that 
states must develop apparatuses to secure subjects’ liberties while granting that these apparatuses 
                                                          
170 The second maxim states that ”[u]n Prince est sans conseils lorsqu’il a trop d’esprit et qu’il dit son 
sentiment le premier.”  (A Prince is without councilors when he has too much spirit and says his first 
opinion.) Italics in original.  Quesnay, Œuvres économiques complètes, 1068. 
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must gradually increase their influence over subjects’ lives in response to the progress of 
opulence’s negative, unintended consequences.  The progress of opulence, a concept indicative 
of Smith’s historicizing political economy, established an alternative rationale for his materialist 
point of agreement with Quesnay that a nation’s economy determines the functions of its state 
apparatuses.  For Quesnay, natural laws prescribe an agricultural economy supported by legal 
despotism.  Smith’s study of the progress of opulence, an idea reliant on his innovative theories 
of wealth creation and the division of labor, led him to argue that many state apparatuses, 
including many rights, only emerge under specific, contingent economic circumstances.  Two 
consequences of Smith’s revisions of political economy for the relationship between liberty and 
statecraft are significant.  First, unlike Quesnay, Smith considered many rights and liberties to 
entirely depend on innovations first in the economic sector and then in statecraft.  Second, not 
only does the progress of opulence validate a variety of valid regimes, but his analysis of 
unintended consequences led him to argue that the state apparatuses within those regimes must 
be dynamic and adaptable to nations’ economic needs.  Therefore, my discussion of Smith’s 
revision of Quesnay lets us see that when a georgic poet like James Thomson refers to British 
liberty, liberty demands contextualization both in terms of extant, subjectivizing technologies of 
government and even more fundamentally on the processual division of labor driving economic 
innovation and the progress of opulence. 
  For us to understand Smith’s revision of the concept of wealth creation, we must 
remember that Quesnay had defined wealth in radically materialist terms as a resource originally 
produced by nature and which humans simply husband into being.  To the extent that Quesnay 
considered wealth in terms of value, he thought of wealth’s value somewhat circularly in terms 
of its costs of production.  That is, he accounted for wealth’s value as the amount of wealth 
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necessary to replace that which is consumed by laborers in the course of its annual reproduction.  
Smith rejected Quesnay’s premise that only agriculture creates wealth:  Smith states as much 
when he says of Physiocracy that the “capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its 
representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, as altogether barren and 
unproductive.” 171  Instead, Smith proposes that Quesnay’s sterile laborers do indeed create 
wealth, because their labor time has inherent value which can be added to goods to increase their 
value.  Book I, Chapter 5 of WN explains Smith’s labor-command theory of value:  
The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it…is equal to the 
quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command.  Labour, therefore, is 
the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities…What everything is 
really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it 
for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can 
impose upon other people…[Commodities] contain the value of a certain quantity of 
labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an 
equal quantity. (Smith, I.v.1-2) 
Smith deduces the existence of this additional form of wealth-creating value, meaning labor, by 
using an elementary version of supply and demand to show that objects’ prices can vary 
principally due to labor inputs but also because of buyers’ interests; still, mutatis mutandis, an 
object’s price reflects the value of the labor time invested in other objects which the initial object 
can purchase in exchange.172  Thus, WN rejects Quesnay’s purely material concept of wealth and 
                                                          
171 All further references taken from Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, eds. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), IV.ix.29.  Laurent 
Dobuzinskis refers to this as a cost of production model.  Laurent Dobuzinskis, “Adam Smith and French 
Political Economy,” 65. 
172 Dobuzinskis notes that Smith considered that, given free markets, corn would be the most likely 
commodity to remain near its true value and thus could most consistently measure the value of labor time.  
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instead defines it in terms of the effect of multiple types of labor on its variable value.  Smith’s 
labor-command theory of value means that “after the division of labour has once thoroughly 
taken place” individuals are less likely to be able to satisfy their needs and wants by their own 
work; in fact, the labor-command theory’s premise that any labor can increase wealth’s value 
enables the division of labor to not only to increase the gross national product but also to drive 
the progress of opulence which allows individuals to access more goods and services than they 
could themselves produce (Smith, I.v.1). 
 Though he did not name it as such, Quesnay’s political economy depends on a fixed 
division of labor among the groups of the socio-economic triad.173  He denied that any modern, 
technical or technological innovation among sterile or non-sterile workers could significantly 
affect wealth production or alter the socio-economic order or the need for legal despotism.  For 
Smith, the division of labor instead refers to breaking a single, complex task into multiple, 
simpler tasks.174  This change of production methods answers an entrepreneur’s desire to 
                                                          
This assertion by Smith may reflect lingering materialism in his conception of wealth.  Dobuzinskis, 
“Adam Smith and French Political Economy,” 64.  Schabas supports this point by arguing that Smith 
holds in tension his labor command theory with the sense of embodied wealth, which Schabas attributes 
to Smith’s tendency, symptomatic of his age, to still think of commercial economy through analogies with 
physical, ecological economies.  Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 83-88. 
173 The triad itself reflects the broad division.  We can further divide the less favored, sterile group into 
merchants and artisans and then into specific jobs.  My overriding point is that, because of agriculture’s 
sole productivity, because each triadic, group plays a vital role in the Tableau, and because Quesnay all 
but disregarded the potential for change via innovation, there is little room for significant variation within 
the socio-economic order. 
174 Smith seems to regard the distinction between town and country, an echo of Quesnay’s division 
between sterile, urban and productive, rural workers, as one of the most basic and fundamental divisions 
of labor.  In WN Book III “Of the different Progress of Opulence in different Nations,” Smith takes a 
more balanced view of the benefits from each side of a simple, geographic division of labor.  “The great 
commerce of every civilized society, is that carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of 
the country…. The gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all 
other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into which it is 
subdivided” (Smith, III.i.1). 
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increase profits by improving the rate of production relative to any additional costs of 
production.175  Smith identifies three advantages of the division of labor: 
This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of 
labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different 
circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to 
the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to 
another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and 
abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many. (Smith, , I.i.5) 
Of course, for the division of labor to increase prosperity, Smith must first assume that 
manufacturing produces wealth.  In the paragraph preceding this quote, Smith emphasizes that 
manufacturing is far more susceptible to and benefits from the division of labor than does 
agriculture, which is limited by its seasonal nature and likelihood that individuals often perform 
multiple, discrete daily tasks.  His first two “circumstances” that improve the “quantity of work” 
denote technical changes to manual practices which thereby become more efficient.  Such 
changes can increase wealth, but the third circumstance involves technological innovations in 
production processes which accrue over time to cause significant, socio-economic developments.  
The division of labor by technical and especially technological improvements typifies the 
difference between Quesnay’s and Smith’s economic theory; Quesnay sees almost no room for 
socio-economic change, whereas Smith sees the division of labor not as a fixed distinction 
between groups performing different types of labor but instead as the inherent potential to 
improve the manner and speed of productive processes.  Smith’s division of labor allows 
                                                          
175 Added costs of production would likely involve adding either more laborers or new instruments to the 
process. 
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economic sectors to gradually transform, though changes to production methods also have a 
range of unintended consequences for individual workers and for statecraft. 
 In addition to task-specific, profit-motivated increases in efficiency, divisions of labor 
produce various positive and negative effects that Smith called unintended consequences which 
become predictable given retrospective analysis.  Unintended consequences embody Smith’s 
claim that the progress of opulence proceeds due to the aggregate effects of many people 
pursuing personal economic interests rather than widely coordinated, technological innovation 
intended to produce major socio-economic changes.  Smith thought that the division of labor 
unintentionally impedes individuals from developing new physical and cognitive abilities by 
requiring them to perform repetitive, low skill jobs which may leave a person “mutilated and 
deformed in his mind, as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of his most 
essential members, or has lost use of them” (Smith, V.i.f.60).  The division of labor deskills 
individuals, limits their educational needs and socialization, and generally reduces the 
complexity of their life experience. TMS argues that individuals develop morality by taking an 
innate pleasure in sympathizing with other people’s emotions, desiring social approval, and 
eventually accepting moral norms.  Therefore, divisions of labor also unintentionally lead to 
moral decadence typified by a lack of social sympathy, selfishness, and corruption.  Immoral 
individuals may over-value luxury goods and fund gaudier but less profitable and less socially 
advantageous business.  The constant threat of public immorality requires compensatory, 
instructive, state-run institutions. 
 The division of labor’s positive, unintended consequences generate the economic 
dynamism and political mutability comprising the progress of opulence.  For example, as a 
nation urbanizes, and its individuals develop new, more efficient methods for creating wealth 
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outside of the agricultural sector, such individuals unintentionally drive the stadial transition 
from the third, agricultural mode to the fourth, commercial mode.  Increases in urbanization, 
manufacturing, and trade correlate with such progress.  WN proposes that investments in 
manufacturing are only somewhat less profitable than investments in agriculture which benefit 
from the aid of organic growth; therefore, profit-seekers confronted with a saturated agricultural 
sector optimize their revenues by investing in manufacturing and then in trade.  Further, because 
the division of labor benefits manufacturing more than the other two sectors, a nation can 
ultimately offset a land-poor or otherwise weak agricultural sector by adequately funding 
manufacturing and trade.  Whereas Physiocracy depends on maintaining equilibrium between the 
sterile town and the productive country, Smith’s progress of opulence allows the town to 
displace the country in terms of net production. 
 Smith’s innovative theory of the progress of opulence involved the claim that major 
socio-economic changes caused by private enterprise required states to develop responsive state 
apparatuses including rights-protecting, positive laws.  Quesnay attributed a modern, agrarian 
society’s stability to legal despotism’s compliance with fixed natural laws including respect for 
natural rights.  A key difference between Smith’s historico-materialist political economy and 
Physiocracy is that Smith portrayed many rights as both organically and technologically latent.  
By organically latent, I mean that Smith reads European history as showing that specific state 
apparatuses emerge predictably and in concert with each stadial age.  By technologically latent, I 
mean that the existence of state apparatuses depends not only on initial economic innovations, 
but also on governments’ legislation and establishment of requisite, auxiliary institutions.  
Crucially, Smith regarded many of the rights that georgic poets evoke with the term Liberty not 
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as natural rights derived from natural laws but as rights that only exist due, first, to prerequisite, 
stadial conditions, and second, by coming into being through their creation as positive laws.   
I reinforce this distinction between Quesnay and Smith first by showing that Smith understood 
justice not merely as an effect of social sympathy but also as determined by the progress of 
opulence.  Then I turn to Smith’s proposals for the influential state apparatuses suited to 
stadialism’s fourth, commercial age. 
 Smith claimed that societies and their governments recognize new liberties as they 
transition into each new stadial age rather than believing, as Locke and Quesnay did, that such 
liberties derive from timeless, God-given, natural laws.  We have insight into this branch of 
Smith’s moral philosophy thanks to two sets of class notes taken by his students, which are now 
compiled as Lectures on Jurisprudence.176  For Smith, jurisprudence fundamentally concerned 
codifying varieties of injury as positive laws along with plans for redress should such laws be 
transgressed.177  As LJ(B) states, “The object of Justice is the security from injury, and it is the 
foundation of civil government.”178  Governments expand and develop new state apparatuses, in 
part because subjects of successive, stadial ages recognize new forms of injury to persons and 
things.  However, Smith did not entirely deny the existence of natural rights.  LJ distinguishes 
between natural rights which exist independently of the progress of opulence and adventitious 
                                                          
176 Hereafter LJ, LJ(A), and LJ(B).  The notes comprising LJ(B) were discovered first and cover more 
lecture material but in less depth.  The notes in LJ(A) come from an earlier year (1762-1763), are more 
detailed, but cut off before the end of the lecture series.  Smith’s jurisprudential lectures sequentially 
covered the three areas of private, domestic, and public jurisprudence until the school year of 1763-4 
when the order was reversed.  We know this because the notes of LJ(B) were taken during the year when 
Smith adopted the new approach. 
177 “Smith’s entire system of jurisprudence is thus structured around the question of “in how many ways a 
man may be injured.”” Michael Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral 
Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105 
178 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 4. 
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rights which emerge as nations enter new, stadial modes.  For example, in the domain of private 
jurisprudence, a natural right disallows others from physically harming a person’s body 
regardless of the stadial age, though such natural rights still require complementary, positive 
legislation for courts to mete out justice.  By comparison, because the concept of property does 
not emerge until a society reaches the second stadial age of shepherding, neither do the 
adventitious, property rights that emerge contemporaneously with property itself.  Adventitious 
rights originate in and through contingent historico-economic circumstances and are codified, 
refined, and enforced by positive legislation and court systems.  The emergence and malleability 
of adventitious rights exemplify Smith’s view of statecraft as capable of dynamic compensatory 
responses to the progress of opulence’s unintended consequences. 
 That Smith accepted various regimes as viable means for supporting national economies 
further demonstrates that he viewed government as a far more adaptable and dynamic, political 
technology than had Quesnay.  Whereas Quesnay only accepted the absolute monarchy of legal 
despotism, LJ finds history validating three main types of regimes: monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy.  Each has disadvantages, and Smith suggested that mixed government may best 
serve modern commercial states by offsetting each type's potential weaknesses.  Dividing 
governmental powers may mitigate the threats posed by arbitrary monarchs or excessively self-
interested and corrupt, aristocratic republics.  For example, a mixed government can assign 
taxation and legislation to parliament while granting law enforcement powers to an independent 
judiciary.179  Dividing political power reduces the potential for its abuse, better secures the rights 
                                                          
179 Knud Haakonssen emphasizes the particular importance of an independent judiciary as well as a well-
educated populace in order to reserve strong checks on mixed governments.  Knud Haakonssen, The 
Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131-132. 
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of its subjects, while potentially strengthening the state by creating a denser network of 
interdependent, state apparatuses.180 
 To reemphasize, Quesnay and Smith both viewed governments as mutable, political 
technologies that serve their subjects by crafting securitizing and economy-supporting, state 
apparatuses.  Crucially, Quesnay and Smith also shared the liberal, economic theory that 
minimizing impediments to free trade facilitates wealth creation.  Therefore, like Quesnay, Smith 
preferred commutative justice, because redressing injuries to legally protected rights allows for 
more precise punishment and recompense than distributive justice’s redistribution of goods.181  
Though redistribution has merits such as directly reducing poverty, Smith regarded its methods 
and outcomes as imprecise and therefore unreliably just.182  Further, direct, economic regulation 
via subsidies, price ceilings and restricting access to domestic and foreign markets risks 
preventing goods from settling at their fair and proper prices.  Instead, reasonably free markets 
should naturally redistribute wealth and reduce the wealth gaps that may otherwise lead to 
                                                          
180 Regarding the potential for administrative creep, Susan E. Gallagher cites Smith’s tentative concern 
that governments and their state apparatuses may outgrow the proportions best suited to fulfilling political 
economy’s two “objects” and the state’s responsibility for securing justice.  Given the broad viability in 
government types, Smith appears less concerned with the problem of whether governments may accrue 
too much power or influence than with whether governments’ own efficiency or corruption impede the 
efficiency of their economies.  “However, having broadcast this warning against runaway government 
spending, Smith proceeded to note” with almost incredible optimism “that such ‘violent and forced’ 
encroachment on the productivity of society is extremely out of the ordinary.”  Susan E. Gallagher, The 
Rule of the Rich?: Adam Smith’s Argument Against Political Power (University Park: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1998), 95. 
181 Property rights, whether constituted by natural law or by the progress of opulence, exemplify Smith’s 
agreement with Quesnay that a government should only directly interfere in its subjects’ lives when 
personal or collective security is threatened.  Again, the meaning of threat or injury varies for each writer 
and for Smith can vary throughout a society’s duration. 
182 Michael Frazer’s study relates TMS’s theories of moral sympathy with states’ problem of establishing 
fair, politico-economic, jurisprudence.  Alluding to Smith’s preference for commutative justice, he also 
notes that Smith thought that policies based on the correction of harm tend to be more accurate than 
policies which try to impose good.  Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy, 105.  Winch notes that 
distributive justice is not only faced with the problem of how much redistribution is necessary to achieve 
the public good, but that such redistribution in the name of benevolence easily turns into unjust injury of 
those whose property the state expropriates.  Winch, Riches and Poverty, 97-101.  
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oligarchy and political corruption.  However, I showed with Le Despotisme de la Chine that 
Quesnay meant for states to retain considerable influence over their national economies.  
Revisiting the two types of public works addressed earlier, “those for facilitating the commerce 
of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people,” in WN will demonstrate 
Smith’s agreement that states should only indirectly support the economy (Smith, V.i.c.2).   
However, his recommendations for infrastructure and public education did not simply echo 
Quesnay’s interest in conforming subjects’ beliefs and practices to natural law.  Instead, Smith 
required states to account for the progress of opulence’s negative, unintended consequences so 
that subjects could take full advantage of modernity’s unfolding economic opportunities. 
 Again, infrastructure enables a state to indirectly influence its subjects by shaping the 
environments where wealth is created, circulated, and exchanged.  Both large and small 
infrastructural projects typify the progress of opulence’s endless stream of potential opportunities 
and challenges.  In addition to its need for upkeep, infrastructure is similarly susceptible to 
technological innovations that improve quality of life and wealth creation.  Even though WN 
preceded the Industrial Revolution, Smith saw the fourth stadial age of commerce affording more 
opportunities for urban development as manufacturing and trade outstripped rural agriculture and 
the agricultural revolution and enclosure guided people from the country into cities.    
 Smith largely agreed with Quesnay that state support for commerce requires taxes and 
publicly-funded labor to build, maintain, and improve highways, bridges, canals, and so forth.  
Both authors identified infrastructure as a worthwhile task suited to states, because the initial 
investment and upkeep of projects tend to exceed the financial means of most individuals and, if 
able, repay costs slowly.  While states must undertake large projects like highways, WN argues 
that bureaucrats of centralized states like France and China who oversee smaller, local projects 
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like roads often fail to do so with adequate care and efficiency (Smith, V.i.d.16-17).  Instead, the 
text recommends that provincial administrators should handle construction and maintenance by 
means of local tax collection and tolls; the interested parties served tend to be local, and 
decentering responsibility away from state officials and toward local markets reduces the 
potential for corruption.    
 Quesnay and Smith agreed on the necessity of public education, but its raison d'être for 
Smith dramatically shifts due to his regard for the division of labor’s negative, unintended 
consequences.  Whereas Quesnay’s homeostatic political economy required Tableau-enlightened 
subjects to be reproduced ad infinitum, Smith’s commercial age sees the division of labor 
aggressively expanding and continuously deskilling and desocializing subjects as capital flows 
toward urban, manufacturing enterprises.183  Over time, the aggregated, rational decisions of 
profit-seekers produce negative, unintended consequences which can destabilize a nation by 
corroding workers’ intelligence and morality.  To compensate for these negative consequences, 
Smith recommended that states fund and run educational institutions for both children and adults 
in order to maintain a high degree of corrective influence over its subjects throughout their lives.   
 Smith initially argues for public education’s cost-effectiveness; he states that “[t]he 
institutions for the education of the youth may, [like other public works], furnish a revenue 
sufficient for defraying their own expence” (Smith, V.i.f.1).  States must ensure that individuals 
can contribute to society by managing vulnerable groups; children from the lowest orders must at 
                                                          
183 “The man whose whole life is spent performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, 
perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to 
exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur.  He naturally 
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible 
for a human creature to become.  The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or 
bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, 
and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private 
life” (Smith, V.i.f.50). 
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least learn to “read, write, and account ... [f]or a very small expence the publick can facilitate, 
can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of 
acquiring those most essential parts of education” (Smith, V.i.f.54).  The public dissemination of 
common systems of measurement has been regarded by many authors as an effective 
subjectivizing technique for naturalizing calculative rationality and liberal economy.184  By 
comparison, the well-off typically can afford private tutors, attend public schools and 
universities, and generally acquire a high level of educational, cultural capital for their families.  
In addition to incentivizing study with small prizes, Smith recommends testing and credentialing 
as barriers to entering trades.   
 As most non-aristocratic individuals become adults, narrow working conditions enforced 
by the division of labor impede personal growth.  Consequently, Smith devotes a section of WN 
to compensatory state apparatuses for adult education to correct subjects’ deteriorating 
intelligence and morals.  He proposes programs partly designed to foster industriousness and 
critical thought and partly to suppress the superstitions to which he thinks small minds are 
susceptible.185  The first branch of his agenda reiterates the professionalizing education available 
to younger people: 
[T]he study of science and philosophy, which the state might render almost universal 
among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; (not by giving 
                                                          
184 For example, Andre Gorz argues that the ability to “measure, calculate, and plan” naturalizes an 
economic rationality that compels individuals to reckon all time in terms of potential “working time…”  
Leisure time becomes an effect of time not spent working or saved due to efficiencies implemented 
during the hours of labor.  Andre Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, trans. Gillian Handyside and Chris 
Turner (London: Verso, 1989), 3.  See also, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 25-33. 
185 With respect to European religion, he appreciates Christianity’s history of instilling some virtue and 
order in society, but its tendency to sow superstition and sectarianism reduces its utility and ultimately 
makes it unwelcome.   
138 
 
salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle,) but by instituting some sort 
of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every 
person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be 
received as a candidate for an honourable office of trust or profit. (Smith, V.i.g.14) 
Such programs train and credential individuals who aspire to both public and private positions of 
power.  Smith also expects such education to produce positive, downstream results in social 
morality: “Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where 
all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much 
exposed to it” (Smith, V.i.g.15).  The second branch of Smith’s agenda for adult education 
involves state-sponsored, cultural programs.  The state encourages all subjects to engage with 
various fine arts at and compete for prizes at public exhibitions; Smith expects these events to be 
agreeable experiences of creativity and liberty.  “[T]he frequency and gaiety of publick 
diversions” permits therapeutic, behavior management which enlivens and exercises minds 
stultified by religion and simple, repetitive work.   
 Public education’s many moving parts make it a strong example of a dynamic and 
refinable, state apparatus proper to modern, liberal states.  By accounting for both children and 
adults, the system can influence subjects throughout their lifespans.  Multiple schools and 
credentialing systems can standardize the basic knowledge required to sell one’s labor and buy 
commodities while also channeling subjects into economic sectors and jobs.  Smith’s and even 
Quesnay’s economic liberalism led them to insist that state apparatuses should not unduly 
regulate or artificially restrict the socio-economic flows understood by analogy with other, 
physiological or ecological systems.  To recall Larrère, liberal states’ apparatuses must not 
impede individuals’ economic pursuit of self-interest and pleasure, but as my next chapter 
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shows, what counts as artificial regulation and intervention becomes a question of perspective 
and a government’s ability to conceal its own labor.   
 Adam Smith’s division of labor and progress of opulence reflect a view of a socio-
economic order susceptible to innovation and broad transformation, a view reflected by British 
georgics which attribute stability and prosperity to advances in the sciences harnessed by private 
industry.  The Seasons’s genealogies of technology addressed in my second chapter anticipate 
and exemplify Smith’s progress of opulence and his mention of the “gift of Industry” suggests 
the individual work ethic and creativity which drive the division of labor.186  Looking ahead, 
Erasmus Darwin will echo TMS by arguing that humans innately take pleasure in imitating one 
another.  Imitation fuels the innovative syntheses of ideas which can be implemented through 
practical technological innovations which further expand individuals’ capacities for pleasure and 
liberty. 
 My next chapter addressing gardening texts by Horace Walpole and George Mason 
introduces my conceit of the georgic garden.  In light of British georgics’ expanding, disciplinary 
interests and especially their thematic shift away from hard, manual labor, gardens sometimes 
replace farms as sites for didactic instruction, representing physical and intellectual labor, and 
addressing socio-economic order through a self-reflexive deployment of aesthetic, literary 
beauty; Mason’s Preface even announces his poem’s use of the georgic mode.  Most importantly, 
I read the georgic garden as signifying a nation governed according to economic and political 
liberalism.  While Walpole and Mason admire a naturalistic garden’s landscaping, their flora, 
and their other physical elements, the texts acknowledge that a garden’s ideal, aesthetic harmony 
requires gardeners’ careful and constant influence but whose extensive interventions should be 
                                                          
186 James Thomson, Autumn, in The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 141. 
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well disguised.  The georgic gardener-as-politician must exert control over the garden’s organic 
economy to maximize the potential pleasure it can give. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Naturalistic Landscaping, Georgic Gardens, and the Proprietor-
 Politician 
Gardening and architecture owe as much to the nobility and to men of fortune as to the 
professors. 
-Horace Walpole, The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening 
 
4.1 Gentleman gardeners 
 In this chapter I argue that texts by Horace Walpole and William Mason, which dictate a 
style of landscape garden187 design, also imply that privately owned land and the free and 
rational enjoyment of property rights are linchpins of a liberal, plutocratic, political economy.188  
In The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening, Walpole identifies this gardening style as a 
new, English discovery; because he claims its aesthetic principles reflect an idealized form of 
nature’s own, creative principles, scholars describe this style as naturalism.189  The naturalistic 
style is also the theme of Mason’s georgic poem, The English Garden, which epitomizes my 
                                                          
187 Interchangeable with landscape park or English garden. 
188 By property rights more generally, I allude to the Lockean ideas that natural rights are granted by 
natural laws irrespective of government, that such rights inalienably belong to individuals, and that these 
rights are most fundamentally concerned with sole enjoyment and non-injury of one’s property in one’s 
person and goods.  The last chapter showed that Adam Smith disagreed that property rights were natural 
rights, but the overriding point is that the liberal government described in this chapter nominally 
prioritizes equal rights for individuals. 
189 In perhaps the text’s most famous quote, Walpole states that William Kent (1685-1748), who 
exemplifies the naturalistic style, “leaped the fence, and saw that all nature was a garden.”  Walpole 
conversely implies that nature’s own principles of composition must be brought into the literal garden 
where elements will be composed to their best and most pleasing effect.  All references to Walpole’s 
essay on gardening are taken from Horace Walpole, The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening (New 
York: Ursus Press, 1995), 43.  
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concept of the georgic garden.190  This concept, which I will also apply to poems by Erasmus 
Darwin in the next chapter, draws on the georgic’s traditional self-presentation as a didactic, 
aesthetic space comparable to a farm that receives the author’s labor.191  Georgics teach the 
importance of studying and respecting nature’s physical and moral laws while also emphasizing 
the virtue of personal industriousness.  Similarly, georgic gardens are literary spaces dominated 
by images of ecological economies that humans try to understand and instrumentalize.  Georgic 
gardens appear in poetic texts continuing the trend in Thomson’s The Seasons of decentering the 
georgic’s traditional topics of farming and manual labor; georgic gardens depict well-managed, 
often enclosed spaces in which beautifying natural resources convey the mutual importance of 
liberty and pleasure.  By subtly championing land ownership and exclusory, property rights, 
georgic gardens symbolize a sovereign, British nation; national prosperity depends on its 
government’s commitment to liberal, natural law-based rights and its ruling class’s commitment 
to “Th’ appropriate bounds of Pleasure, and of Use” in its own, private works that signify its 
fitness to rule (Mason, II.160).  The various natural and social economies depicted in georgic 
gardens convey moral principles that enable the public good and that governments must enshrine 
into law.   
 Given that georgics’ interest in the relation between labor, material nature, and nature’s 
moral laws connotes political economy, studying the use of the georgic mode in gardening texts 
lets us see how the discourse of naturalism props a plutocratic government favoring economic 
                                                          
190 All references to Mason’s poem are taken from William Mason, The English Garden: A Poem in Four 
Books (York: A. Ward, 1783). 
191 In the eighteenth century, the concept of the three sister arts reinforced this alignment of poetry and 
gardening which, with painting, shared a basis in imaginative, representational practice.  To clarify, the 
georgic garden is a space described by the poem, but the georgic mode’s convention of figuring itself as a 
cultivated space also allows the poem itself to become yet another figural iteration of the georgic garden. 
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and political liberalism.192  Texts advocating naturalism sublimate the material fact of wealth into 
the discourse of taste, which then justifies liberal, plutocratic government.  As John Barrell 
argues, “The main point…is to show how a correct taste, here especially for landscape and 
landscape art was used in this period as a means of legitimating political authority, particularly 
but not exclusively within the terms of the discourse of civic humanism.”193  In showing the 
importance of land beautification and property rights to the georgic garden, I thus use the georgic 
garden and the proprietor-political correspondence to argue that Mason’s and to a lesser extent 
Walpole’s texts compare the work of naturalistic garden design to the managerial work of liberal 
statecraft including its centering of property rights.  Mason asserts that proprietors of naturalistic 
gardens possess “plain Integrity, Contempt for gold, / Disdain of slav’ry, [and] liberal Awe of 
rule / Which fixt the rights of People, Peers, and Prince” (Mason, IV.683-685).  I build on prior 
chapters which argued that the innately politico-economic, georgic mode obfuscates the role of 
statecraft; the georgic garden helps us to unpack these texts’ sublimation of plutocratic liberalism 
into naturalism by framing the moments when politico-economic topics and figures for 
administration appear.  Whereas Walpole establishes correspondences between naturalism’s 
aesthetic principles and proprietors’ reverence for British liberty, two of Mason’s key vignettes 
analogize garden owners with politicians.  Ultimately, the georgic garden shows us that these 
texts cite naturalistic landscaping as evidence of proprietors’ right to rule by moralizing the 
proper uses of land while presenting property rights as a synecdoche for the other bundle of 
liberties that governments must secure. 
                                                          
192 Economic liberalism refers to a preference for free market trade and the perception of a disembedded 
economy.  Political liberalism refers to a legal system which tends to grant subjects equal rights that 
prioritize individual freedom from unjust acts or injuries from other individuals or from the government. 
193 John Barrell, The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 
41. 
144 
 
 My critique takes place within a larger conversation regarding the ideological work 
performed by European gardening styles.  John Hunt Dixon’s and Ronald Paulson’s foundational 
studies argue that eighteenth-century England’s shift from emblematic to expressive landscaping 
styles reflected a shift in their representational method and so also the qualifications for 
appreciating them.194 Emblematic gardens’ compositions of flora, architecture, and sculpture had 
fixed, allegorical meanings and retained more of the geometric elements popular in French, 
Italian, and Dutch formal gardens.195  Expressive naturalism displaced fixed, allegorical 
interpretation based on claims in texts such as Thomas Whately’s Observations on Modern 
Gardening (1770) that non-narrative designs would be more pleasing to those with objectively, 
morally correct tastes, because such designs better reflect nature’s own, timeless, creative style.  
Stephen Bending later argues that expressivism reinforces the ideological work of emblematism 
by replacing, for example, busts of politicians with landscapes that are instead “about nature” 
and are still interpreted through a “set of conventions” fixed in texts like Walpole’s essay and 
Mason’s poem, which associate taste with virtues corresponding to liberalist, Whig 
government.196   
 I begin with Walpole’s The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening.  I use this 
manifesto for naturalistic landscaping to establish its design principles and then to show that he 
                                                          
194 John Dixon Hunt, Emblem and Expressionism in the Eighteenth-Century Landscape Garden,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 4, no. 3 (Spring, 1971): 294-5; Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression: 
Meaning in English Art of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 19-22. 
195 William Kent filled the gardens at Stowe with classical statuary and busts of figures which, despite his 
identification with naturalism by Walpole, often required intimate knowledge to understand their 
significance and which also required spectators to occupy proper viewing positions signaled by paths and 
benches to appreciate a series of linked, statement-making scenes.  Paulson compares the emblematic 
garden to a text; Stowe’s Elysian Fields constituted a massive “verbal construct” in which a set sequence 
of viewpoints produced a narrative.  Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression, 24. 
196 Stephen Bending, “Re-reading the Eighteenth-Century English Landscape Garden,” Huntington 
Library Quarterly 55, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 379-389. 
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attributes those principles to quasi-physiological, aesthetic sensibilities.  Whereas The Seasons’s 
physico-theological argument uses depictions of nature’s physical laws to assert the force of 
moral laws, Walpole uses aesthetic sensibility, meaning a proper taste for naturalism, to index a 
person’s morality.  Walpole conveys that virtue is the subjective expression of an individual’s 
commitment to political justice and liberty.  He establishes this relation by giving 
counterexamples of tasteless French and Chinese gardens whose forms he blames on the 
immorality of the rich and powerful persons commissioning them.  The implication of their 
arbitrary and illiberal political power contrasts with English plutocrats whose tasteful, naturalist 
estates base their right to rule on their virtuous sensibility.  Walpole’s naturalistic aesthetics 
normalize plutocratic liberalism by analogizing land owner’s proper use of their land with 
government’s respect for property rights.  Walpole forecasts the analogy between the improving 
proprietor and the politician made more explicit in Mason’s vignettes.   
 Turning to Mason, I establish that Mason’s georgic poem shares Walpole’s commitment 
to naturalism with examples in which Mason oscillates between material details and general 
principles both moral and aesthetic.  I then explicate the concept of the georgic garden by 
showing that Mason’s English Garden recognizes its accountability to a wider world of labor, 
commerce, and political history.  In addition to passages telling its elite audience to balance 
land’s pragmatic and entertaining uses, many of the other evocations of politico-economic topics 
occur in the poem’s two main parables. The first concerns Alexander the Great having 
overthrown Sidon’s Persian despot and crowning the humble, industrious Abdalonimus, whose 
lengthily-described garden sanctuary signifies his virtue.  The second parable concerns the 
English aristocrat Alcander who has built an exemplary naturalistic estate.  He shelters and falls 
in love with Nerina, a refugee of the American Revolution who soon dies.  We learn that she had 
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been betrothed to Alcander’s other guest, Cleon, who had saved her father’s life, has been 
commending Alcander’s design choices during his stay, and consoles Alcander after Nerina’s 
death.  As Alcander recovers, he demonstrates his ability to manage his passions by tastefully 
adding to his estate.  The Abdalonimus and Alcander parables convey that proprietors who 
creatively express their good taste possess the civic virtues necessary for governing.  Though 
Abdalonimus is not initially wealthy, his humility demonstrates the disinterest that naturalism 
conveys to be the subjective, moral complement to liberalism’s equitable respect for personal 
rights.   
 Finally, I use Mason’s references to the genius loci197 -- in his telling a guardian spirit for 
naturalism -- to elaborate the proprietor-politician relation established in the parables.  I show 
that Mason delineates both active and passive aspects of each Genius, a duality which he invites 
us to map onto characteristics of both proprietors and liberal governments and which reinforces 
their interdependence.  Recognizing naturalism’s support for plutocratic, liberal political 
economy is an important addendum to the work of scholars like Terry Eagleton, who argue that 
in the eighteenth century taste and manners diffuse laws and moral prescriptions into aesthetics 
and sensibility.  Eagleton claims that people increasingly found themselves “free, equal, 
autonomous human subjects, obeying no laws but those they give to themselves…an entirely 
new human subject – one which, like the work of art itself, discovers the law in the depths of its 
                                                          
197 A figure from classical mythology, genius loci is a watchful spirit who protects a specific place.  
Alexander Pope (1688-1744) notably uses the trope in Epistle IV of his Moral Essays:    
Consult the genius of the place in all; 
That tells the waters or to rise, or fall; 
Or helps th' ambitious hill the heav'ns to scale, 
Or scoops in circling theatres the vale; 
Alexander Pope, Epistles to Several Persons: Moral Essays, ed. Frederick Wilse Bateson (London: 
Methuen, 1951), 57-60. 
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own free identity.” 198 However, Eagleton’s argument for an increasingly democratized access to 
taste disregards the extent to which the upper class’s ability to not simply appreciate beauty but 
to create it from their own stocks of wealth proves that private land use was not only a vital 
object of government protection but lent governments and politicians their moral authority. 
 
4.2 Modern tastes, timeless virtues 
 Known for authoring The Castle of Otranto (1764) and for being the son of Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745), Horace Walpole first presented The History of the 
Modern Taste in Gardening in his Anecdotes of Painting in England (1780).199  He self-
published this four-volume collection at Strawberry Hill Press, an imprint named after the Gothic 
Revival home he commissioned at Twickenham.  The text participates in an eighteenth-century 
subgenre of manuals instructing the rich to improve their large, rural estates.  Improvement could 
mean either techniques to increase agricultural production or landscaping practices thought to 
beautify the property in part by concealing reminders of the manual labor improvement required.  
Whereas manuals like Stephen Switzer’s Ichnographia Rustica (1741-1742) or Henry Home, 
Lord Kames’s Gentleman Farmer (1776) borrowed a georgic register to affirm that agricultural 
improvement signified civic virtue and even gave the land a sort of pragmatic beauty for its 
contributions to the commonwealth, Walpole’s essay argues for a similar link between 
proprietors’ efforts at naturalistic beautification and personal morality.  Despite Walpole’s claim 
that “it is not my business to lay down rules for gardens, but to give the history of them,” the 
essay’s aesthetic theory presents tasteful landscaping as “opulence of a free country” as well as 
                                                          
198 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 19. 
199 John Dixon Hunt notes, “Walpole’s essay was probably written during the 1750s and 1760s…”  John 
Dixon Hunt, “Introduction,” in Walpole, The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening, 5. 
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proof of the civic virtues needed to administer the laws which enable that opulence (Walpole, 51; 
58). 
 First comparing Walpole’s prose and Mason’s stated purpose for using georgic poetry 
allows us to recognize the association between naturalistic landscaping and liberalism.  In short, 
Walpole’s essay implies that the British aristocracy’s execution and patronizing of arts such as 
naturalistic landscaping conclusively proves the moral superiority of British government while 
Mason emphasizes the potential for creativity and satisfaction which Britain’s constitutionally 
protected rights and liberties afford its subjects.  Walpole specifically attempts to close debate 
over taste by claiming that naturalism’s timeless style emerged as gardeners shed past mistakes 
to finally mimic nature’s own, ideal forms.  His wit and high-minded yet dilettantish blurring of 
learned and conversable discourse interpellates a ruling class while disseminating naturalism to a 
wider public.200  The essay’s inclusion in the Anecdotes of Painting suggests that Walpole’s 
subject was meant for non-aristocratic connoisseurs with disposable income.201  Yet Walpole’s 
primary addressees possess an inherited right to improvable lands; the text’s emphasis on 
heritable property rights to estates implies that such rights metonymize the physical property 
itself, which stays in the hands of an elite ruling class, and thus also imply low social mobility.  
The prose identifies and speaks to a class of improvers about their corresponding obligations to 
                                                          
200 To the extent that Walpole advocates the naturalistic method of landscaping, only those rich enough to 
afford estates suitable to such landscaping would recognize themselves as the texts’ primary addressees.   
Robin Vivenza cites John Barrell’s discussion of Adam Smith’s division of labor to differentiate learned 
and conversable groups by differentiating those who practice a discipline from those who merely think or 
talk about it.  Crucially, Walpole’s essay confronts the possibility of lower ranks obtaining the tastes 
proper to a ruling “first rank” by presenting active improvement through naturalistic landscaping as the 
sine qua non of civic virtue and a capacity to govern Britain.  Robin Valenza, Literature, Language, and 
the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in Britain, 1680-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 18. 
201 “The public examines and reasons on their works, and spectators by degrees become judges.  Nor are 
persons of the first rank meer patrons…Gardening and architecture owe as much to the nobility and to 
men of fortune as to the professors” (Walpole, 59). 
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beautify England and oversee its freedom.202  Using a different style to convey a similar 
message, Mason’s Preface announces his intent to use the georgic mode to wash readers in the 
beauty attending both poetry and gardening in the service of his moralization of the 
government’s defense of “BRITISH FREEDOM” (Mason, v-vii; IV.687).  Framing his text as a 
“Didactic Poem, of which the Georgics of Virgil afford so perfect an example,” assumes the 
educated audience traditionally addressed by georgics.203  The georgic mode holds in tension its 
didactic assertion of fixed, moral laws of nature with earthier, subjective, detailed images of the 
world’s infinite variety of things which call for political economy.  Supported by the notion of 
cross-pollinating sister arts204, he also compares the aesthetic experience of reading his georgic 
poem with naturalistic landscaping and thereby poses both reading and gardening as appreciative 
and creative activities.205  Yet although middling classes might be able to read the poem in an 
associative, writerly fashion and even possess taste and civic virtue, they lack the wealth and 
                                                          
202 Peter De Bolla supports this point when he says that a cultural discourse of visuality emerged in the 
1760s, which encouraged connoisseurs to identify their own sensible taste as a sign that they should 
occupy an elevated, social position.  Walpole recognized liberal, Whig, political economy as participating 
in commerce-driven progress; however, his essay’s wide, naturalistic, landscape prospects use the 
conservative, pictorial regime of self-identification to fix the improver’s place in history as a member of a 
ruling class free from economic productivity and free to manage England’s symbolico-material and 
political liberty.  Peter De Bolla, The Education of the Eye: Painting, Landscape, and Architecture in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 9-10; 17; 108-112. 
203 Since their inception, georgic authors understood themselves to be addressing a leisure class who 
controlled land and were educated to appreciate the juxtaposition of the poetry’s high style with its earthy 
content.  Mason, “Preface,” in The English Garden, v. 
204 Eighteenth-century writers acknowledged the interdisciplinary influences between painting, gardening 
and poetry.  For example, naturalism’s advocates cite Italian painters like Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665) 
for having produced landscapes that more or less previewed naturalism’s design principles.  Desirable 
traits such as wide, deep, prospective views composed of tiers drawing the eye from the bottom to the top 
of the painting also influenced loco-descriptive poems.  The poems could then have new images created 
to be inset into the poem as Thomson had done with The Seasons. 
205 “This matter (of selecting the georgic mode) once determined, I did not hesitate as to my choice 
between blank verse and rhyme, because it clearly appeared, that numbers of the most varied kind were 
most proper to illustrate a subject whose every charm springs from variety, and which, painting nature as 
scorning control, should employ a versification for that end as unfettered as Nature itself.  Art at the same 
time, in rural improvement, pervading the province of Nature, unseen, and unfelt, seemed to bear a 
striking analogy to that species of verse…” Mason, “Preface,” in The English Garden, vii-viii. 
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property rights that allow for the landscape park’s creation and that ultimately legitimize political 
participation.206   
 Walpole argues for naturalism by tracking three, related trends in gardening which are 
useful for us to note because they ground naturalism’s evocation of liberty in histories of 
material practices dependent on wealth and ownership.  These three trends include the erasure of 
pragmatic, economy- or labor-evincing elements from pleasure gardens, a cultural-geographic 
progress, and stylistic shifts.  The first track distinguishes practical kitchen gardens -- which 
clearly display their affiliations with manual labor, economy, and care and which thereby differ 
in their purpose and appearance -- from the wide lawns, wandering paths, and sprinkled copses 
of entertaining, landscape parks.207  Walpole notes “how naturally and insensibly the idea of a 
kitchen-garden slid into that which has for so many ages been…distinguished by the name of a 
pleasure-garden” (Walpole, 24).  He begins with legendary, practical gardens in the hortus 
conclusus tradition.208  Walpole cites and dismisses Eden’s garden “prototype” (“it does not 
belong to the present discussion”) because naturalism does not love a wall, and because it was 
too obviously practical for being filled with “every tree that was pleasant to the sight and good 
                                                          
206 Barthes’s concept of an open, writerly text comports especially well with the georgic mode’s 
thematization of care, labor, seemingly infinite, ecological variety, and continuous production.  “…the 
writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, 
intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the 
plurality of entrances, the opening of network, the infinity of languages.” Ultimately, the British georgic 
presumes its themes to be contained and determined by natural law, but the text and the garden are both 
experienced from a subject’s necessarily limited, incomplete point of view.  Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. 
Richard Miller (New York: Blackwell, 2002), 5. 
207 For clarity, pleasure gardens are also purposefully useful in that they please and provide moral 
edification; yet, in addition to the differences above, they do not produce material wealth intended to 
satisfy subsistence needs. 
208 The long-standing, Western concept of the hortus conclusus with walls, flora, and a water source fits 
the OED’s definition of the garden as “[a] piece of ground, usually enclosed, where flowers, fruit, or 
vegetables are cultivated. In later use chiefly (esp. Brit.): a piece of ground adjoining a building (esp. a 
private property), often with grass, flowers, trees, etc., and generally used for recreation.” Oxford English 
Dictionary, s.v. "garden," accessed November 01, 2018, 
http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/76724?rskey=8w9Y0c&result=1&isAdvanced=false. 
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for food” (Walpole, 17; 18).  Other examples such as the garden of Alcinous, the hanging 
gardens of Babylon, and both rural and urban Roman gardens repeat Eden’s aesthetic sins by 
being mixed-use gardens and having defensive walls which disrupt scenic continuity and 
disagreeably recall utility and economy.209  However, some Roman villas and later, geometric 
European gardens, such as the seventeenth-century jardin à la française, expelled elements 
suggesting use-value.  Naturalism develops the premise of gardens-for-useless-beauty’s-sake by 
insisting that its own design principles could provide lasting, disinterested aesthetic pleasure and 
by obscuring even the labor required to refine landscape’s own distinct qualities. 
 Cultural-geographic and stylistic trends together led to the discovery and gradual 
implementation of naturalistic designs suited to England’s free soil.  In terms of geography, the 
shedding of tasteless styles occurred along a roughly occidental path from the aforementioned 
gardens in the current Middle East, to Greece and Rome, to early modern developments in Italy, 
the Netherlands, and France, before England’s discovery of a timeless style.  Stylistically, 
Walpole disdains designs in which elements tend to be geometric and abstract or excessively 
irregular and novel.  These approaches may overlap and each answer what he considers to be 
unhealthy or immoral preferences for artifice rather than for nature’s own tendencies towards 
irregularity and asymmetry. The gardens of Andre Le Notre (1613-1700) at Versailles typified 
the abstract style of French formal gardens.  Walpole finds the geometric style not only to raise 
unwelcome, socio-political associations with France’s arbitrary and absolutist government but 
also to contaminate English’s own practices; he thus disdains formal gardens’ right angles, 
symmetrical parterres, and lined paths.  Ornamental topiaries, fountains, and excessive statues 
and buildings reinforce his sense of French artificiality.  Walpole also rejects England’s fondness 
                                                          
209 “Gardening was probably one of the first arts that succeeded to that of building houses, and naturally 
attended property and individual possession.” (Walpole, 17) 
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for novelty, which he associates with Chinese influence.  Elements such as an “artificial 
perpendicular rock” or a “mæandring bridge” feed a misguided taste for surprising forms or 
juxtapositions that artificially heighten a viewer’s interest.210  Unlike unnatural, French and 
Chinese styles, naturalism prefers smooth curves and borders blurred, serrated, or otherwise 
made irregular.  Carefully employed asymmetry and gradual transitions between colors ensure a 
coherent aesthetic capture by the idea of unity in variety.  Though nature may elsewhere be 
sublime, rugged, or barren, naturalism’s modest variety and timeless beauty continuously please 
viewers, whereas novel, exaggerated, and overwrought elements lose their power to hold a 
viewer’s interest.  By explicating the three tracks, Walpole asserts naturalism’s timeless ability to 
satisfy viewers’ disinterested, aesthetic sensibilities. 
  Walpole based the aesthetics of naturalistic beauty on a quasi-physiological theory of 
intellectual pleasure which seemed to prove that tasteful landscaping principles required moral 
sensibility for their discovery and appreciation.  On this topic he borrows significantly from John 
Locke and Joseph Addison in that his essay’s defense of naturalism attributes the ability to 
perceive visual beauty to a person’s righteousness, civic virtue, and commitment to liberal 
principles.211  Both Addison and Walpole absorbed Lockean epistemology and thought that 
                                                          
210 “[Chinese gardens] are as whimsically irregular as European gardens are formally uniform, and 
unvaried—but with regard to nature, it seems as much avoided, as in the squares and oblongs and strait 
lines of our ancestors. … In short, this pretty gaudy scene is the work of caprice and whim; and when we 
reflect on their buildings, presents no image but that of insubstantial tawdriness.”  (Walpole, 38-39) 
211 We have seen that John Locke and Adam Smith oriented their liberal, political economy theories 
regarding property rights and liberty around the concept of pleasure.  For instance, Locke describes 
liberty as the volitional choice of a rational, moral preference that pleases the individual and benefits both 
herself and society.  Smith argues that the experience of sympathizing with and being thought worthy of 
merit by other people instinctively causes pleasure and so will lead people to act according to moral 
norms.  Marion Harney’s Place-Making for the Imagination: Horace Walpole and Strawberry Hill shows 
the similarity of Joseph Addison’s “On the Pleasures of the Imagination” Spectator essays (1711-1712) to 
Walpole’s text.  For example, “The literary concept of painting scenes in narrative together with 
gardening practices first delineated by Addison were to become an important part of Pope’s poetics and 
Walpole’s philosophy.”  Spectator 414 cites landscaping to prove naturalism’s superiority to blatantly 
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associative pleasure arises in conjunction with the transitions from objective, primary sensations 
to subjective, secondary sensations and then to a network of contingent, personal associations.212  
Reason compares new perceptions with its pre-existing ideas as a prelude to developing and 
refining complex ideas.  Pleasure arises when reason discovers identity, affinity, and difference 
between new images and accepted ideas.  Though Paul Guyer claims that Addison did not 
ground his aesthetic theories in morality, Addison nevertheless suggests that the pleasure in 
reasoning exists to pursue timeless principles:213 
The final cause, probably, of annexing pleasure to this operation of the mind was to 
quicken and encourage us in our searches after truth, since the distinguishing one thing 
from another, and the right discerning betwixt our ideas, depends wholly upon our 
comparing them together, and observing the congruity or disagreement that appears 
among the several works of Nature.214 
Addison’s belief that pleasure serves the search for truth echoes natural law’s premise that 
human reason can derive moral principles from the empiric study of physical nature, though he 
admits that scenic pleasures of the imagination do not themselves produce original, innovative 
understanding.  Walpole’s pleasures of the prospective imagination are not themselves innately 
instructive, but rather index people’s civic virtue by resonating with their own moral beauty.215  
                                                          
artificial designs for pleasing viewers.  Marion Harney, Place-Making for the Imagination: Horace 
Walpole and Strawberry Hill (London: Routledge, 2013), 40. 
212 Addison distinguishes between “…primary pleasures of the imagination, which entirely proceed from 
such objects as are before our eyes; and…secondary pleasures of the imagination which flow from the 
ideas of visible objects, when the objects are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our 
memories.”  However, he is more optimistic about association and its ability to give pleasure than Locke, 
who thought that association can easily misguide reason and inhibit truth-seeking.  Joseph Addison and 
Richard Steele, The Spectator Vol. IV, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 411. 
213 Paul Guyer, A History of Modern Aesthetics Volume I: The Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 70. 
214 Addison and Steele, Spectator, 416. 
215 Walpole’s position aligns with Anthony Ashley-Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury’s (1671-1713) sense 
that aesthetic taste reflected moral beauty and that even apparatuses like governments were aesthetic and 
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Naturalism’s design principles are superior to other styles because they provide enduring, visual 
interest as opposed to the artificial and distasteful forms found rejected by modern English taste.  
Conversely, an object or form’s ability to give consistent pleasure indicates that it is consistent 
with nature and possesses moral truth.   
 While Addison provided Walpole with naturalism’s aesthetic theory, William Hogarth’s 
Analysis of Beauty (1753) more clearly explicates its visual design principles.216  Walpole’s 
landscape design principles such as curved lines, variety, and simplicity echo topics in Hogarth’s 
text.  For example, Hogarth prefigures Walpole’s preference for moderate, respectable 
irregularity in “Of Simplicity, or Distinctness”: “[W]hen variety is join’d to (simplicity), then it 
pleases because it enhances the pleasure of variety, by giving the eye the power of enjoying it 
with ease.”217  Moderate variety in shapes, colors, and chiaroscuro offer many objects for the 
                                                          
therefore potentially morally beautiful objects.  Though my project only occasionally touches on 
Shaftesbury, his claim for a nation’s government as an aesthetic object has obvious similarities with my 
own claim that the georgic garden is a figure for the nation:   
There are several ways in which we can take our bearings in these proposals for rural and 
extensive gardening and see their connections with the georgic tradition in seventeenth-century 
England. …We can look at actual estate layouts of the period, and we can consult a somewhat 
opaque pronouncement by the third Earl of Shaftesbury, whose genius presides over much more 
of this material than is generally accepted today (not least because of his strong determination 
that English art should discover its own taste and style). 
 What is relevant here are the gardening consequences of Shaftesbury’s notion set out in 
The Moralists that each natural thing has an inherent character; we may have lost sight of these 
qualities, but Shaftesbury nonetheless argues that inherent perfections or characters can be 
relearnt – perhaps by seeing them refined and reasserted in the artificial world of a garden where 
man has cultivated the nascent taxonomy of natural forms.   
John Dixon Hunt, “’Gard’ning can Speak Proper English’,” Culture and Cultivation in Early Modern 
England, eds. Michael Leslie and Timothy Raylor (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992), 201-205. 
216 Walpole’s “Account of William Hogarth, and Catalogue of his Prints” in Anecdotes of Painting in 
England establishes his familiarity with Hogarth’s work; he admits to possessing perhaps the largest 
collection of prints in England.  Horace Walpole, Anecdotes of painting in England; with some account of 
the principal artists; and incidental notes on other arts; collected by the late Mr. George Vertue; and now 
digested and published from his original Mss. by Mr. Horace Walpole. To which is added The History of 
the Modern Taste in Gardening. Volume the Fourth and last (Strawberry-Hill: Thomas Kirgate, 1771), 
80, Eighteenth Century Collections Online. 
217 William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 21. 
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cognitive free play that Walpole associates with imaginative pleasure.  Hogarth goes on to say 
that “The shapes and colors of plants, flowers, leaves,…seem of little other intended use than 
that of entertaining the eye with the pleasure of variety” and “I mean here, and everywhere 
indeed, a composed variety; for variety uncomposed, and without degree is confusion and 
deformity.”218  Transitions from ground cover, to shrubs, to large trees and mixing species of 
shrubs and flowers create subtle gradations of color and light and achieve Walpole’s desired 
smoothness and harmony.  Borders should be irregular or blurred, and asymmetric curves should 
replace straight lines to create visual interest.  Walpole cites Milton’s “prophetic eye of taste” 
which saw that Eden possessed these agreeable, naturalistic characteristics:219 
--from the sapphire fount the crisped brooks, 
Rolling on orient pearl and sands of gold, 
With mazy error under pendent shades 
Ran nectar, visiting each plant, and fed 
Flow’rs worthy of Paradise, which not nice art 
In beds and curious knots, but nature boon 
Pour’d forth profuse on hill and dale and plain, 
Both where the morning sun first warmly smote 
The open field, and where the unpierc’d shade 
Imbrown’d the noon-tide bow’rs. — Thus was this place 
A happy rural seat of various view. (Walpole, 30-31) 
                                                          
218 Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty, 17. 
219 Walpole invokes Milton in order to borrow the authority of his voice, not just as a preeminent, 
creative, English Genius but as the poet of a distinctly English, political liberty. 
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Emphasizing Walpole’s preference for “nature” rather than “nice art,” the passage includes key, 
naturalistic elements; flowers are grouped in irregular, “curious knots,” and the “mazy” streams 
exhibit “freedom of pencil” (Walpole, 30).  Of William Kent’s designs, Walpole praises “the 
beauty of the gentle swell, or concave swoop” and states that the “gentle stream was taught to 
serpentine seemingly at its pleasure” and that “borders were smoothed, but preserved their 
waving irregularity” (Walpole, 43; 45).  Walpole suggests that smooth curves and irregular 
borders connote viewers’ civic virtue and commitment to political liberty; his pictorial references 
to “freedom” of design, the “open field,” and the free pencils of both the landscaper and Milton 
imply that the personal motive to improve property originates from liberalism itself.220  
 Walpole conveys that a naturalistic beautification signifies a proprietor’s capacity for 
government administration by arguing that such improvements reflect personal virtues 
corresponding with an individual’s ability to be consistently disinterested, fair, and just rather 
than being arbitrary, capricious, and mercenary.  He makes this point by attributing tasteless 
landscaping in China and France to the debased virtues of the ruling elite and by implication 
their larger political systems.221  The Chinese taste for novel, whimsical, and grotesque forms 
such as those in the imperial gardens show that the gardens’ “pomp,” “caprice and whim” and 
“unsubstantial[ity]” connotes the despotism of China’s government, which corrodes its rulers’ 
valuation of liberty and taste for beauty (Walpole, 25; 39).  Similarly, fecklessness affects 
Chinese and French aristocrats and causes an immoderate “pursuit of variety” (Walpole, 54).   
                                                          
220 While Annie Richardson argues that Hogarth implied an amoral aesthetic theory in which beauty 
inherently attracts a pleasure-driven eye, Walpole considers that landscapes reflect the moral dispositions 
of proprietors.  Annie Richardson, “From the Moral Mound to the Material Maze: Hogarth’s Analysis of 
Beauty,” in Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods, eds. Maxine Berg 
and Elizabeth Eger (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 122-125. 
221 “…the Chinese have passed to one extremity of absurdity, as the French and all antiquity had 
advanced to the other, both being equally remote from nature…”  (Walpole, 40). 
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 Arbitrary political power and the excessive pursuit of self-interest by elites loom behind 
these improper foreign tastes; such problems also threaten the virtue and taste of English persons 
whose wealth enables retirement on secluded estates.  Great wealth and rural seats may lead 
proprietors to quell the potential tedium of country life with visual extravagance.  Walpole states, 
“A modern French writer has in a very affected phrase given an account of this, I will call it, 
distemper.  He says, l’ennui du beau amene le gout [sic] du singulier.”222  The French quote 
implies that isolation can produce peculiar, immoderate, self-serving, and anti-social tastes.  
Whether caused the corruption, love of luxury, or boredom, le gout du singulier contrasts with 
naturalism’s simplicity and timelessness.  However, proprietors insulated by wealth and distance 
from commercial centers may also theoretically be less involved in mercenary, self-interested 
business and should therefore be freer to take a general interest in overseeing public liberty and 
the commonwealth.  Retired land owners on estates with wide, open prospects secured by 
property laws at once exemplify happy, private citizens and symbolize a well-governed nation in 
harmony with natural laws.   
 Liberty depends on the existence of a wealthy, virtuous, administrative class.  The essay’s 
first words avow the importance of land ownership: “Gardening was probably one of the first 
arts that succeeded to that of building houses, and naturally attended property and individual 
possession” (Walpole, 17).  Walpole presents the garden as relieving economic care and 
permitting moral stability.  The garden’s development into naturalistic landscapes enjoyed by the 
first rank represents the expansion of rights to the wider, British polity: “Truth…will probably 
                                                          
222 (Distaste for the beautiful leads to the taste for the singular), (Walpole, 54).  The quote is of unknown 
provenance.  We can speculate whether Walpole might mean for distemper to connote “[d]erangement, 
disturbance, or disorder (esp. in a state or body politic).”  Oxford English Dictionary , s.v. "distemper," 
accessed October 30, 2018, 
http://www.oed.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/Entry/55608?rskey=IiSTsR&result=1&isAdvanced=false. 
158 
 
not carry our style of garden into general use on the continent.  The expence is only suited to the 
opulence of a free country where emulation reigns among many independent particulars” 
(Walpole, 58).  Having seen unity in variety as an aesthetic principle, here it suggests that an 
individual’s enjoyment of their personal wealth is a function of the government-protected rights 
which belong to each English citizen, though in practice the public might only avail itself of 
bare, personal rights such as habeas corpus rather than enjoying possession of landed property.  
The taste and virtues necessary for creating landscape parks’ open fields contrast with the caprice 
and arbitrariness signified by artificial gardens’ “geometry of power”; moreover, English gardens 
signify their proprietors’ ability to protect the public’s rights through the managerial work of 
government.223  Similarly, Walpole identifies naturalism as a distinctly English rather than 
British style of gardening.  He seems to suggest that England plays a structurally similar role in 
the British Empire as estate-owning plutocrats do in England’s socio-economic order.  Though 
other countries and territories nominally benefit from exposure to British markets and rule, 
England alone embodies the unifying principle of freedom and can maintain stability amid the 
cultural variety of the larger empire. 
 
4.3 Garden management 
 Where Walpole’s essay implies a correspondence between moral requirements for the 
work of improving proprietors and the work of statecraft, Mason’s didactic vignettes draw a 
direct analogy.  Mason’s poem is the work of a somewhat reclusive, Cambridge-educated, Whig 
clergyman.  Sharing Walpole’s dilettantish interests in the sister arts, Mason also collaborated 
with Walpole on An Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers (1773), a satirical poem rebuking 
                                                          
223 Tom Williamson, Polite Landscapes: Gardens and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 29.   
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Chambers’s welcoming Dissertation on Oriental Gardening (1772).  Mason’s dramatic tragedies 
Elfrida (1752) and Caractacus (1759) received moderate praise and like his juvenilia exhibit the 
classicism permeating The English Garden.  The poem’s four books, written between 1772 and 
1782, are written in georgics’ characteristically hybrid style of history, parable, allegory, 
biography, scenic descriptions, fragments of gardening instructions, fragments of aesthetic 
theory, elegy, odes, and ekphrasis on painting.  The Preface to the poem’s corrected edition of 
1783 announces his intention to adapt the georgic mode to an innovative, poetic defense of 
naturalistic gardening.  Mason tells readers that his poem, like the naturalistic garden, uses 
beautiful content to convey moral principles while also insinuating the georgic garden’s 
symbolization of a nation whose laws and officers manifest those principles.  Compared with 
Walpole’s essay, the poem explicitly argues that proprietors who beautify their gardens in the 
naturalistic style thereby demonstrate a civic virtue that suits them for liberal government. 
 A few examples evince The English Garden’s agreement with Walpole’s essay in 
advocating naturalism.  The following quote shows that Mason argues by giving detailed 
examples of naturalism’s aesthetic principles rather than by narrating the history of their 
discovery; in one passage he figures their implementation by narrating an imaginary person’s 
walk through a sequence of improved prospects.224  The preceding stanza establishes Mason’s 
                                                          
224 In the Abdalonimus parable, Mason details scenery visible along the path Alexander takes into 
Abdalonimus’s grove: 
A pathway brown 
Led thro’ the pass, meeting a fretful brook, 
… 
From the flower’d verge 
Of this clear rill now stray’d the devious path, 
… 
Now, to the left, the path ascending pierc’d 
A smaller sylvan theatre, yet deck’d 
With more majestic foliage. (Mason, II.504-505; II.513-5.14; II.526-528) 
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familiarity with landscape’s painterly optics by highlighting the placement of this stanza’s flora 
in the low, foregrounded third of the three, conventional, color-differentiated tiers:225  
Where’er thou wind’st 
That path, take heed between the scene and eye, 
TO vary and to mix the chosen greens. 
Here for a while with cedar or with larch, 
That from the ground spread their close texture, hide 
The view entire.  Then o’er some lowly tuft, 
Where rose and woodbine bloom, permit its charms 
To burst upon the sight; now thro’ a copse 
Of beech, that rear their smooth and stately trunks, 
Admit it partially, and half exclude, 
And half reveal its graces; in this path, 
How long soe’er the wanderer roves, each step 
Shall wake fresh beauties; each short point present 
A different picture, new, and yet the same. (Mason, I.204-215) 
Mason presents the landscape—and ultimately Britain—as a carefully, though not too obviously 
composed space designed for occupants’ enjoyment.  A winding path’s perspectival 
discontinuity creates visual interest for viewers walking along it.  The path is also more 
interesting to look at from a hilltop than from a straight, tree-lined alley would be due to the 
                                                          
225 John Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840: An Approach to the Poetry of 
John Clare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 6-9. 
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innate pleasure of curves, and because paths guide the eye through the landscape.226  The third 
line paraphrases naturalism’s principle of unity in variety.  Sightlines are interrupted by the path, 
by artfully placed shrubs and clumps of trees and a gently rolling terrain that together repeat the 
path’s sinuous line of beauty.  Mason augments the passage’s naturalistic beauty with the poetic 
beauty of blank verse while moving between abstract, design principles and detailed examples. 
 The English Garden begins its first and last books by apostrophizing naturalism’s 
timeless principle: Simplicity.  Like Walpole’s core principle of unity in variety, Simplicity 
invites difference and complexity; yet, in doing so it excludes highly irregular, deviant, and 
overwrought garden elements that would disturb holistic visual harmony.227  The poem opens by 
describing Simplicity as an authoritative moral standard for judging landscaping, georgic poetry, 
and by extension the georgic garden’s liberal political economy: 
TO thee, divine SIMPLICITY! to thee, 
Best arbitress of what is good and fair, 
This verse belongs.  O, as it freely flows, 
Give it thy powers of pleasing; else in vain 
It strives to teach the rules, from Nature drawn, 
Of import high to those whose taste would add 
To Nature’s careless graces (Mason, I.1-7) 
Mason presents his poem’s own georgic method of beauty serving didacticism as an instance of 
the principled subordination of pleasure to practical purposes that will inform estate 
                                                          
226 The hilltop views associated with many loco-descriptive poems demonstrate the prospective eye, 
which we have seen in The Seasons and which sublimates both epistemological and imperial urges to 
comprehend and control the material world and its peoples. 
227 To foreshadow my point, though the passage defends tasteful naturalism against tasteless artifice, it 
also represents a preference for liberalist policies to the exclusion of mercantilist interventionism and the 
violence of repressive state apparatuses.  
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improvement.  “Good and fair” play on the idea of pleasure’s proper uses and “bounds” in the 
sense that pleasure itself can be a useful, even pedagogical tool for cultivating taste given that 
beauty can index the righteousness of a thing and its maker.228  Book Four’s apostrophe rejects 
the “foreign” and the “false” in “Art’s domain” to indict the shifting fashions that Walpole had 
associated with French venality and inconstant virtue (Mason, IV.4; IV.2).229  The apostrophe to 
Simplicity also forecasts the poem’s address to and instruction of an elite audience by implicitly 
framing the reader as a witness to the poet’s own invocation.230  The passage goes on to specify 
that while it may teach tasteful appreciation, it interpellates its primary, elite audience by 
identifying subjects wealthy enough to beautify their estates by “add[ing] / To Nature’s careless 
graces.” 
 Naturalism’s aesthetic principles of simplicity and unity in variety describe a method 
within a narrow, artistic field for imposing order on nature.  The naturalistic aesthetic sublimates 
plutocrats’ moral obligations to impose order across politico-economic domains in a world 
whose complexity and challenges Mason’s poem illustrates in greater detail than does Walpole’s 
essay.  Georgics readily admit that scarcity and care guide humans to study the challenges and 
opportunities of their natural environment.  The georgic garden and the well-governed British 
                                                          
228 Elsewhere, Mason’s reinforces this tenet of propriety though with a more plainly economic meaning. 
“But chief consult him ere thou dar’st decide / Th’ appropriate bounds of pleasure, and of Use” (II.159-
160).  The subordination of pleasure to use means that a land’s economic uses should be prioritized but 
also that in georgic poetry and gardening the pleasure of the beautiful can serve use and itself become 
useful by directing attention toward or signifying moral principles.  Mason’s theory of the georgic 
suggests that poetic beauty and ornament offer a sort of superficial pleasure analogous to artifice or 
novelty in landscaping, but which acquires moral validity to the extent that it serves the poem’s didactic 
message. 
229 “If I smile at such visions, still one must be glad that in the whirl of fashions, beneficence should have 
its turn in vogue; and though the French treat the virtues like every thing else, but as an object of mode, it 
is to be hoped that they too will, every now and then, come into fashion again.”  (Walpole, 41) 
230 Jonathan Culler argues that poetic apostrophe stages the poet’s visionary voice and teases readers’ 
awareness of their own, spectatorial presence.  Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, 
literature, deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2001), 156-157. 
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nation it represents are, in my project’s language, apparatuses which regulate the world for the 
purpose of helping individuals to freely and rationally pursue pleasure.  In the georgic garden’s 
case, the study, appreciation, and naturalistic replication of nature’s aesthetic beauty serves an 
end similar to the study of physical nature in The Seasons; such studies cultivate the moral 
principles that legitimize states which unify the nation by equitably enforcing private rights.  
From the perspective of variety and particularity, the study of nature, whether with an eye toward 
aesthetic or physical rules, gives individuals methods for better instrumentalizing otherwise 
scarce material resources.  Regarding the poem’s central theme of landscaping, material nature 
determines the local conditions and limitations which would-be improvers must negotiate, 
organize, and harmonize to create landscape parks.  For example, English gardens require 
adequate water sources that must not form a contrived, artificial, “stiff unlink’d chain / Of flat 
canals” (Mason, III.425-426).  Mason emphasizes landscaping’s deference to nature in terms of 
proprietors’ negotiation of contingent, material conditions in addition to naturalistic principles: 
Learn that, whene’er in some sublime scene 
Imperial Nature of her headlong floods 
Permits our imitation, she herself 
Prepares their reservoir; conceal’d perchance 
In neighb’ring hills, where first it well behoves 
Our toil to search… (Mason, III.438-443) 
By “Permit[ting the] imitation of “Imperial Nature,” Mason claims that nature itself authorizes 
naturalism’s imposition on nature to better control it and connotes a similar authorization for 
England’s control and exploitation of the British Empire.  More narrowly, the passage insists that 
proprietors reproduce nature’s best likeness with the resources afforded.   
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 Elsewhere, Mason cites different climates and anticipates hardiness zones to exemplify a 
more general condition limiting plant selection.  Nature differentiates indigenous plants apt to 
thrive in English gardens from plants requiring careful oversight: 
Nor will [Art], scorning truth and taste, devote 
To strange, and alien soils, her seedling stems; 
… 
From Nature’s laws 
[Art] draws her own; Nature and she are one. 
… 
Nor will [Art’s] prudence, when intent to form 
One perfect whole, on feeble aid depend, 
And give exotic wonders to our gaze. 
She knows and therefore fears the faithless train: 
… 
Warn’d by his error, let the Planter slight 
These shiv’ring rarities (III.226-227; III.230-132; III.240-243; III.287-288) 
Mason reinforces the idea that English gardens’ design principles are subject to and conditioned 
by nature’s physical laws.  Chauvinist tropes emphasize that exotic species may be hard to 
integrate into the garden’s unity given that their visual interest relies on a potentially 
disconcerting novelty.  More fundamentally, England’s climate simply prevents Mediterranean 
and Indian “Aliens” from surviving without recourse to greenhouses (Mason, III.286).  The use 
of opportune waterways and appropriate flora exemplify attention to harmonizing local, 
ecological conditions via general design principles.  Poetically oscillating between abstract 
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principles and concrete details, Mason conveys that the georgic garden signifies an apparatus that 
is itself created in harmony with nature’s law and diffuses that harmony among the various 
elements within the space that it organizes and unifies. 
 Complementing naturalism’s negotiation of local, ecological conditions, The English 
Garden acknowledges politico-economic topics such as pragmatism, commerce, and labor.  Such 
topics appear in Mason’s moralizing statements about pleasure and use and in the Abdalonimus 
and Alcander vignettes; they are important for my argument because the georgic garden 
analogizes these worldly objects of liberal, political economy with the material objects 
transformed by naturalistic beautification.  Mason takes a sober, practical tone early in the poem 
by establishing unpleasant work to be the universal lot of “Industrious man, by heav’n’s first law 
ordain’d / To earn his food by labour” (Mason, I.105-106).  Gardening for pleasure can only 
occur when the more pressing needs of subsistence have become a remote concern; meantime, 
pragmatism and “use” must be prioritized over pleasure as in georgic poetry.  Mason warns 
proprietors to beware of “Th’ appropriate bounds of Pleasure, and of Use; / For Pleasure, lawless 
robber, oft invades / Her neighbour’s right” (Mason, II.160-162).  The line tropes on property 
rights to warn against not only a corrupt taste for unnatural gardening styles but also the more 
general love of luxury that would sacrifice farmland and the public good to personal pleasure.231   
                                                          
231 Mason describes an Elizabethan aristocracy’s unwelcome taste for pomp, fashion, and excessive 
refinement, which inspired the production of artificial and unappealing landscapes: 
Not but the mode of that romantic age, 
The age of tourneys, triumphs, and quaint masques, 
Glar’d with fantastic pageantry, which dimm’d 
The sober eye of truth, and dazzled ev’n  
The Sage himself; witness his high-arch’d hedge, 
In pillar’d state by carpentry upborn,  
With colour’d mirrors deck’d, and prison’d birds. (Mason, I.422-428) 
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 In addition to citing rural land’s economic utility as farmland and aneconomic, pleasure-
giving utility as naturalistic landscape, the poem also refers to manual labor and trade networks 
that enlarge the commonwealth and influence the socio-economic order.  For example, Mason 
recognizes that garden improvement directed by rich owners requires the manual labor of the 
lower ranks.  He acknowledges the work of the “plodding hind” and the meager “Cot” where 
“Penury and Toil within reside” (Mason, II.400; II.406; II.409).  Later, Mason presents Alcander 
as the creative designer of an arguably overwrought estate, but there again we see “hinds, / 
Call’d to the task, their willing axes wield” (Mason, IV.639-640).  The appearance of human 
capital managed by Alcander and the background upheavals of the American Revolutionary War 
indicate a larger socio-economic order beyond the story’s three dignified, lead characters.232  In 
the Abdalonimus story devoted to “To Commerce and to Care,” Mason establishes the setting to 
be a major trade port that will contrast with the discovery of Abdalonimus’s humble home: 
…[the sun’s] slaunting beams 
Shot to the strand, and purpled all the main, 
Where Commerce saw her Sidon’s freighted wealth, 
With languid streamers, and with folded sails, 
Float in a lake of gold.  The wind was hush’d… (Mason, II.488-492) 
This parable of moral government starts by recognizing Sidon’s status as an important, economic 
nexus in a wider network of international trade.  The scene’s calm weather and the unfilled sails 
suggest that tyranny and war have arrested the port’s usual business.  Abdalonimus’s 
contentment and his carefully tended garden sanctuary insulate him from the city’s profiteers.  
                                                          
232 Again, the upheavals signify the imperfection in nature’s beauty; Mason’s georgic insists that 
naturalism should be able to control these aberrations and implies that proprietor-politics should also be 
able to manage the global, socio-political instabilities arising in the course of Britain’s imperial project. 
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Though he is not wealthy, his retirement and his humble work ethic designate his ability to 
oversee the legally protected liberties that allow a society to prosper.  The pleasure he takes in 
his sanctuary, which Alexander admiringly reiterates, signals that property rights are among the 
most important of these liberties. 
 
4.4 Two faces of the genius 
 The georgic garden’s liberal political economy implies that property rights are the basis 
for socio-economic stability and are therefore a crucial object for government oversight.  The 
texts rarely refer to property rights; instead, the texts address them indirectly by referring to 
freedom and liberty in aesthetic or broad political contexts in addition to the central thematic of 
private land use.  For example, Walpole describes naturalism’s “freedom of pencil” and the 
“[f]reedom…given to the form of trees” and Mason refers to his poem’s “freely flow[ing],” 
blank verse as means for matching superficial beauty of aesthetic creations to the moral beauty 
of nature’s principles (Walpole, 30; 45; Mason, I.2).  These contrast naturalism’s affiliations 
with disinterested taste and political liberty with French formal gardens’ geometry of arbitrary 
political power.  Mason invokes past and present political history to champion a liberal, rights-
oriented concept of freedom.  He identifies “Liberty and Peace” as a nation’s “best blessings” 
and on multiple occasions contrasts his positive visions of Britain’s political freedom with 
examples of tyranny, violence and slavery (Mason, II.602).  For example, he calls the “freeborn” 
“sons of Albion” the inheritors of Greek liberty and unfavorably compares Rome (“While Rome 
was free”) with the modern papal state subjected to “slavish superstition” (Mason, I.51; I.50; 
I.61; I.62).  He reproaches Charles II for having been an “abject tool to France, / C[o]me back to 
smile his subjects into slaves” (Mason, I.468-469).  By contrast, he praises the British 
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government’s respect for natural rights while hinting at the risk of backsliding with his brief, 
sympathetic gesture to the Thirteen Colonies in the Alcander parable.  Mason’s georgic garden 
figures this relation between liberal political economy, property rights, and rights in general as 
the basis for individual and collective prosperity: 
Each plant that springs 
Holds, like the people of some free-born state, 
Its rights fair franchis’d; rooted to a spot 
It yet has claim to air; from liberal heav’n 
It yet has claim to sunshine, and to showers; 
Air, showers, and sunshine are its liberty. (Mason, III.179-184) 
In this allegory, the garden represents England and the plants England’s rights-bearing citizens.  
The plant’s figurative property rights give way to a larger bundle of rights.  The allegory implies 
that individuals have a right to life-sustaining resources; more cynically, individuals may claim a 
proprietary right to enjoy resources should they be able to appropriate or “claim” them in the first 
place.  For many English people, being “rooted to a spot” refers to their inclusion in a national 
identity that grants them legal protections as well as referring to their inclusion in a proto-
capitalist, socio-economic order rather than guaranteeing their ownership of a homestead.  Yet, 
even prior to possession of any material property, the passage figures natural rights, whether to 
property, to non-injury, or otherwise, as themselves a type of permanent property.  Security 
against physical injury may be a more fundamental natural right, but property rights become a 
sort of archetypal right that a person innately “Holds,” because the poem’s liberalist version of 
natural law regards natural rights in toto as fixed possessions which enable the enjoyment of 
one’s life, health, and liberty, as well as possessions.  In a poem about land use, the ability to 
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properly employ and enjoy beautified land takes on heightened significance to become the 
emblematic object of governmental protection while also providing a figure for the correct 
performance of that oversight. 
 Given the centrality of property rights and especially land ownership to the georgic 
garden’s liberal, political economy, Mason’s use of the genius loci provides a heuristic for 
understanding his analogy of naturalistic landscaping with liberal government.  Mason invokes 
multiple Geniuses; most guard famous or privately-owned plots of land while one guards the 
whole of England.  In each case, the Genius is a withdrawn, watchful steward who only emerges 
in order to inflict mostly undefined retribution against transgressors who misuse the land 
including betrayals of its naturalistic aesthetic.  Thus, each Genius possesses both a passive, non-
interventionist aspect and an active, interventionist aspect.  Moreover, Mason associates 
Geniuses with both gentleman gardeners and politicians; because the Abdalonimus and Alcander 
stories frame gardening and governing as comparable, even interdependent roles, applying the 
Genius’s passive-active duality to each of these two roles clarifies The English Garden’s sense of 
plutocratic liberalism. 
 Mason’s longest passage on a local Genius describes it as ensuring that improvements to 
its local plot of land comport with naturalism.  He applies explicitly political terms to the Genius, 
which gives naturalism’s aesthetic principles a juridical, moralizing cast: 
Him then, that sov’reign Genius, Monarch sole 
Who, from creation’s primal day, derives 
His right divine to this his rural throne, 
Approach with meet obeisance; at his feet  
Let our aw’d art fall prostrate. 
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 …Yet to those 
Who do him loyal service, who revere  
His dignity, nor aim, with rebel arms, 
At lawless usurpation, is he found 
Patient and placable… (Mason, II.110-114; II.119-122) 
Each Genius tends to be grand, stately, retiring, and “Awfull still” in “his shadowy pomp” 
(Mason, II.137; II.155).  Beyond their phantasmatic character, Geniuses remain withdrawn 
unless enforcing aesthetic laws.  As a “sylvan Despot,” the Genius even blurs between figuring a 
political personage and figuratively embodying the law itself.  Given the Genius’s typical 
passivity, its character models a liberalist approach to implementing and enforcing laws, which is 
to say that the state largely restricts its direct interventions into the socio-economic order to 
preventing and punishing injuries to personal rights. 
 Due to their attachment to local plots of land, Mason’s Geniuses are most immediately 
affiliated with estate owners whose wealth, civic virtue, and taste should incline them to estate 
improvement.  Walpole and Mason contrast naturalism’s simple, mimetic refinements with 
artifice and intervention.  Naturalistic landscaping reflects a proprietor’s humble compliance 
with the Genius’s prescriptions as opposed to chasing self-gratifying novelty or fleeting fashion 
by imposing peculiar ideas and forms on the land they share with its Genius.  Naturalistic 
improvement adapts itself to each new landscape, which it simply refines rather than actively 
imposing artificial designs.  As mentioned, Abdalonimus carries out the naturalistic aesthetic, 
and Alcander’s emotional rebalancing turns on his  recovered interest in competent estate 
improvement.  Further, Geniuses’ tendency to be withdrawn correlates with land owners’ 
retirement from the worlds of venal commerce and fashion.  Financial security and retirement are 
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the best means to cultivate disinterest and to prevent one’s morals from being corrupted by 
profit-seeking or the desire to impress others with ornamental displays of wealth, though 
Abdalonimus achieves as much with his remarkable example of a simple life of seclusion and 
toil.  Problematically for plutocracy, the lower ranks may acquire both taste and civic virtue.  
Still, the best evidence of civic virtue is not tasteful appreciation, but instead submitting to 
Geniuses’ intentions for their land’s best use.  Taken further, civic virtue fundamentally depends 
on the transmission and inheritance of aristocratic wealth which functions like a passively 
acquired birthright. 
 Correlative with Geniuses’ tendency to be withdrawn, politicians govern best by only 
directly interceding in the nation’s domestic affairs to correct clear disruptions of a natural order 
in which socio-economic divisions are maintained and individuals are free to pursue their self-
interest.233  Mason shares Adam Smith’s preference for liberal markets and states but speaks less 
directly about institutional or repressive state apparatuses than do Thomson or Darwin.  
Repressive state apparatuses must be restrained and kept inoperative unless needed to restore 
order and defend liberties.  Geniuses’ usual restraint not only implies which citizens should 
govern but that they should govern according to a liberal, political economy prioritizing natural 
rights and commutative justice.234  By prioritize, I mean that liberal government prevents the 
                                                          
233 For example, I read the following passage on gardening methods as applicable to broader, economic 
administration.  The following lines threaten a vengeful Genius’s appearance should the recommended 
methods not be followed: 
But learn to rein, 
O Youth! whose skill essays the arduous task 
That skill within the limit she allows. 
Great Nature scorns controul: 
… 
’tis thine alone 
To mend, not change her features. (Mason, II.71-7) 
234 As discussed in the last chapter, commutative justice focuses on defining rights and redressing 
transgression rather than trying to achieve distributive justice by actively attempting to redistribute 
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infringement of private citizens’ rights by both other citizens and the state itself.  My last chapter 
showed that nations can assert their commitment to economic and political liberalism as long as 
institutional state apparatuses’ use soft power to subjectivize their nation’s public rather than 
engaging in interventionist protectionism or flagrantly turning repressive state apparatuses 
against private citizens.  The cessation of trade in Sidon due to the political violence caused by 
Persian tyrant Azemilcus and by the conquering Alexander provides a counterexample to 
peaceful liberalism’s positive, economic effects.  By contrast, Abdalonimus imposes neither on 
nature’s beauty nor on society.  He demonstrates his fitness to rule by secluding himself in his 
remote garden sanctuary and by letting nature, or perhaps the local Genius, the “Parent of good,” 
direct his toil (Mason, II.557).   
 Turning to Geniuses’ active characteristics, Mason warns that Geniuses react to 
landscapers overtly tampering with natural beauty with vaguely defined violence: 
But dare with caution else expect, bold man 
The injur’d Genius of the place to rise 
In self-defence, and, like some giant fiend 
That frowns in Gothic story, swift destroy, 
By night, the puny labours of thy day. (Mason, I.83-87) 
As I noted, Mason’s Geniuses barely demonstrate an active, non-punitive aspect.  Rather, as a 
source to be consulted, Geniuses embody natural laws like simplicity and unity in variety, which 
regulate people’s creative activities while remaining a benign, enabling factor.  However, 
Geniuses, when required, actively respond to transgressions of their principles with sublime, 
overwhelming violence.  Again, Mason does not specify the form of this violence, but his 
                                                          
resources.  Commutative justice is therefore comparatively non-interventionist and was considered to be a 
more precise form of justice by political philosophers such as Adam Smith. 
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Orientalist characterizations of the Genius trope on conventional associations of despotic, 
arbitrary power to evoke the sublime, moral force of the natural laws that condition aesthetic 
principles235 and that justify the wielding of repressive state apparatuses by legitimate 
governments.236  Local Geniuses’ own retribution may simply be the glaring, tasteless 
unsightliness that unnatural, formal, and arbitrary landscapes force on viewers’ sensibilities.  
Thus, Geniuses’ violence would not only respond to but coincides with the violence of false 
aesthetics; we can then extrapolate the moral force or justice of the acts which Geniuses’ 
retributive violence represents. 
 Proprietors actively demonstrate their fitness to govern not by imitating Geniuses’ active 
interventions, but by freely improving their estates within the bounds of naturalistic principles.  
Though improvement possesses a passive aspect in that proprietors subject themselves to 
naturalism’s tenets, here the demonstrated will to improve is the significant side of the same 
coin.  Active improvement of estates is crucial for Mason, because unlike taste alone, 
improvement evinces regard for the proper, virtuous uses of wealth.  By themselves, taste and 
land ownership remain inert credentials that merely enable civic virtue; instead, taste should 
motivate the wealthy to improve their estates, rather than remaining the barely engaged 
appreciation described by Addison.  The improving proprietor organizes the technical 
knowledge, material resources, and manual labor required to make a pleasing, orderly landscape.  
                                                          
235 Referring to the mind’s fitness for perceiving aesthetic beauty and recognizing truth and moral 
principles in nature’s material face.   
236 Mason invokes oriental despots to evoke sublime power: 
 They of Ind, 
The Tartar tyrants, Tamerlane’s proud race, 
Or they in Persia thron’d, who shake the rod 
Of power o’er myriads of enervate slaves, 
Expect not humbler homage to their pride 
Than does this sylvan Despot. (Mason, II.114-119) 
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The georgic garden frames English gardens’ aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic pleasure more 
generally as an aneconomic form of use encompassed by and subservient to practical, 
instrumental use.  The proprietor’s improvement tropes on the economic activity of other 
industrious private citizens; however, while evincing proprietor’s managerial capacity as other 
labor might, beautification is the expensive, disinterested creation of the aneconomic pleasure 
offered by these apparatuses, which in turn uniquely enables proprietors to prove their capacity 
to govern.   
 Both Abdalonimus’s and Alcander’s beautification efforts exemplify active proprietors’ 
virtuous taste, work ethic, and land management.  For example, Mason designates Abdalonimus 
as “the man of toil” (Mason, IV.674).  His rulership is “doubly dear / By birth and virtue”; he 
possesses the right to rule by passive, dynastic inheritance, but also because his demonstrated 
“virtue,” meaning the physical labor invested in his garden, validates that right.  Alexander 
crowns him because Abdalonimus’s humble retirement, benevolence, and soft, naturalistic touch 
in his gardening evince qualities necessary for stewarding commercial Sidon into a new period of 
“Liberty and Peace” (Mason, II.602).  In the Alcander parable, Alcander channels his grief for 
Nerina into modest, tasteful “sylvan arts” (Mason, IV.642).  When “Alcander’s taste / Disdains 
to trick with emblematic toys / The place,” the poem attributes his restrained approach to 
improvement to a correlative self-management and sense of aristocratic responsibility.   
 Finally, Geniuses’ stewardship and potential for vengeance illustrate two, active modes 
of liberal government.  The first mode, subtler and exemplary of liberalism in general, relates to 
Geniuses’ embodying naturalism’s principles given that Geniuses oversee, enforce, and 
ultimately epitomize their force and truth.  Naturalism’s principles provide for modest 
refinements that optimize landscapes.  Similarly, liberal, positive laws create the conditions that 
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foster national prosperity by maximizing the freedoms and protecting the rights of profit-seeking 
subjects.  Though Mason’s Geniuses do not themselves act in ways that satisfyingly correspond 
with legislation or establishing and running institutional state apparatuses, to the extent that they 
embody naturalism’s nomic force, naturalism’s advocates nevertheless acknowledge that its 
method includes artificially manipulating an environment.  That is, proprietors’ transformations 
of their estates signify the administrative conditioning of the vast domain of the nation’s 
disembedded economy by means of laws and other state apparatuses; naturalism sublimates 
nature’s moral laws while liberal government codifies them to encourage acceptable, socio-
economic activity and to define disorderly activities that require corrective intervention.  By 
contrast with Geniuses’ embodiment of light-handed, liberal stewardship, their sublime, “swift 
destroy[ing]” retributions confirm through the threat of righteous violence the moral authority 
investing naturalism’s aesthetic principles.  Such violence has a clearer analogy in the repressive 
state mechanisms that Mason illustrates in his parables.  Violence appears most visibly when 
Alexander enters Abdalonimus’s sanctuary.  The great conqueror ends the permanent state of 
emergency installed by the Persian, arbitrary despotism by crowning Abdalonimus and so 
validating the proprietor-politician analogy.  Moreover, the crowning by Alexander demonstrates 
violence to be a founding element of even legitimate states, and while the laws administered by 
proprietor-politicians maintain states’ legitimacy, the state violence figured by avenging 
Geniuses remains a latent, potential force for re-imposing order. 
 In figuring the Genius as naturalism’s guardian spirit, Mason’s descriptions of the 
managerial aspects of landscaping convey various aspects of liberal political economy.  He also 
conveys virtues such as an equitable, disinterested taste for what is morally and aesthetically 
good as suiting a person for government.  Naturalistic beautification is excellent evidence of the 
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civic humanism proper to politicians obliged to protect natural law-based liberties with the 
apparatuses of a lean government.  The pleasing beauty of Mason’s naturalistic georgic garden 
figures the socio-political unity and the common prosperity achieved through good policy.  By 
comparison, as we shall see, Darwin’s georgic gardens also thematically re-center pleasure in the 
georgic mode, but his poems instead adopt a scientific approach to argue that human’s desire for 
pleasure cooperates with the expansion of a liberty understood as cognitive capacity to drive 
technological progress. Darwin’s poems, like Locke’s philosophy, present a physiological theory 
of liberty, but one which implies an evolutionary continuum between vegetables, animals, 
humans, and human’s technological productions.  Rather than discussing landscaping, Darwin’s 
georgic gardens more closely follow The Seasons by arguing that the study of nature teaches us 
the benefits of pursuing a sympathy-moderated hedonism while also offering resources to pursue 
a technologically-driven progress of opulence.  As with Smith, Darwin imagines a synergistic 
expansion of human liberty and prosperity which annuls the most intrusive and violent 
apparatuses of government.  Darwin’s incomplete Progress of Society forecasts the destiny of the 
georgic garden’s described in Economy of Vegetation and Temple of Nature such that bio-
technological evolution leads to a cosmopolitan world ruled by nature’s all-comprehending, 
pleasure principle. 
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Chapter 5 
5 “Perhaps all the productions of nature are in their progress to greater 
 perfection!”: The Pleasures of Physiology and Mythopoeia in Erasmus 
 Darwin’s Georgic Gardens 
 
5.1 Darwin’s origins 
 The major poems of Erasmus Darwin continue the trend in georgics such as Thomson’s 
The Seasons and Mason’s The English Garden of displacing images of agricultural labor to 
instead emphasize intellectual labor and the discoveries of natural philosophy, which enable 
humans to better control nature.  I argue that Darwin’s poems, like Thomson’s and Mason’s, do 
the ideological work of naturalizing liberal, political economy primarily through an analysis of 
the physiology presented in The Temple of Nature and with reference to his The Loves of the 
Plants (1789) and The Economy of Vegetation (1791) which he compiled together with Loves in 
The Botanic Garden.  While Darwin’s poems employ Mason’s motif of georgic gardens, Darwin 
is closer to Thomson in their shared desire to popularize the sciences.  Relative to earlier 
chapters, I spend less time discussing states, state apparatuses, and political economy because 
Darwin deploys georgic gardens to reorient the georgic around physiological pleasure and 
liberty.  Rather than the tasteful, aesthetic pleasure of Mason’s georgic, English gardens, 
Darwin’s georgic gardens tend to be botanic and thus reflect science’s role in understanding and 
encouraging physiology’s contributions to individual and collective development.   
 I argue that Darwin’s physiological theories of volition and association refute the idea 
that liberty derives from an abstract, natural law that would precede and determine nature’s 
physical being.  Nor does liberty derive from government, though governments may limit it with 
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state apparatuses.  Liberty is a physiological effect of individual and collective evolution and is 
indexed by the strength of an individual’s volitional capacity.  John Locke, François Quesnay, 
and Adam Smith each address the state’s politico-economic problem of enabling its subjects to 
freely pursue rational self-interest, securing their personal rights, and minimizing undue 
government interventions.  Darwinian physiology fuses pleasure, volition, and a broadly 
interpreted labor into a hedonistic ethic moderated by social sympathy and the cooperative 
exchange and development of ideas.  Pleasure motivates organisms to associate, cooperate, 
complicate, and hybridize and thus accounts for sexual reproduction, evolution, technological 
progress, language, and Darwin’s own literary experiments.   
 Amanda Jo Goldstein states in Sweet Science: Romantic Materialism and the New Logics 
of Life, “Romantic, revisionary poetic sciences…challenged emergent life-scientific and aesthetic 
protocols to understand ‘raw’ sensation itself as susceptible and generative of social and 
rhetorical transformation…”237  I begin by delving deeply into Darwin’s fourfold sensorium, a 
flexible physiological model that helps him to explain the life processes of all organisms.  I dwell 
on Darwin’s understanding of sensory pleasure and volition at greater length than many critics 
who discuss his physiology, because these attributes of organisms are linchpins for his 
justification for reprioritizing pleasure and mythopoeia in the context of the georgic mode.238  
                                                          
237 Amanda Jo Goldstein, Sweet Science: Romantic Materialism and the New Logics of Life (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2017), 8. 
238 Some older authors whose work on Darwin’s physiological model include James Venable Logan, The 
Poetry and Aesthetics of Erasmus Darwin (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972), 21-47; Maureen 
McNeil, Under the banner of science: Erasmus Darwin and his age (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1987), 87-107.  For more recent work, see C. U. M. Smith, “All from Fibres: Erasmus Darwin’s 
Evolutionary Psychobiology,” in The Genius of Erasmus Darwin , eds. C. U. M. Smith and Robert Arnott 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 133-140; Patricia Fara, Erasmus Darwin: sex, science, and serendipity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 230-243; Catherine Packham, Eighteenth-Century Vitalism: 
Bodies, Culture, Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 152; Janelle A. Schwarts, Worm Work: 
Recasting Romanticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 40; 48-49; Martin 
Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin: Enlightened Spaces, Romantic Times (Burlington: Ashgate, 
2013), 123-138. 
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His physiological model also allowed him to compare lifeforms, recognize evolutionary 
continuities, and claim that universal self-interest innately causes individual organisms to 
transform themselves through engagement with their environment.  I then emphasize two, crucial 
principles which determine the sensorium’s methods for integrating and instrumentalizing 
information drawn from its environment.  The principle of pleasure, poeticized by Darwin as 
passions and tastes, motivate the sensorium and are volition’s main interest.  Consequently, in a 
variation of the georgic mode previewed in Mason’s poem, pleasure displaces manual labor as 
the georgic’s central thematic.  Underwritten by the sensorium, Darwin’s botanic, georgic 
gardens establish a universal ethic of hedonism.  The second principle, imitation, broadly 
characterizes the operations of the sensorium and provides a basis for organisms’ ability to 
develop their own capacities by integrating sensations, forming innovative, synthetic ideas, and 
executing volitional actions.  Imitation enables organisms to transform themselves and to 
participate in wider transformations of collective species-life through both organic and inorganic 
means. 
 The philosophy of technology has been helpful to my understanding of the ways in which 
Darwinian physiology implies that organic self-transformation forecasts humanity’s 
technological progress. As Arthur Bradley begins Originary Technicity, “In the beginning, [life] 
was already a machine.”239  He observes that despite the long history of philosophers attempting 
to distinguish technology from nature, others have argued that nature demonstrates mechanistic 
qualities or that organisms instinctively create and manipulate technological objects.  
Technology may naturally emerge from the desires and capacities of living beings, develop in a 
                                                          
239 Arthur Bradley, Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology from Marx to Derrida (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1. 
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quasi-deterministic fashion adjudicated by physical laws, and play a significant role in 
transforming human societies and their environments. 
 Alan Bewell connotes the significance of Darwin’s physiology-based version of originary 
technicity for liberal, political economy by stating that Darwin’s botanic gardens “were more 
prospective than retrospective in character, less about the discovery of a lost order of nature than 
about making something new.”240  I identify his fourfold sensorium as expressing originary 
technicity, because Darwin presents technological innovation as logically continuous with the 
sensorium’s internal developments caused by imitation and volitional synthesis.  Originary 
technicity usefully frames Darwin’s prospective optimism for a peaceful, prosperous future if we 
recognize that volition expands liberty by expanding its own techn(olog)ical means for pursuing 
pleasure.241  For example, Darwin states, “Thy potent acts, VOLITION, still attend / The means 
of pleasure to secure the end.”242  While association empowers volition, Darwin’s footnote to 
these lines adds that “it is the greater energy and activity of the power of volition, that marks 
mankind, and has given them the empire of the world” (III.435n).  An organism’s volitional 
labor may directly alter the capacities of its own sensorium by training or learning technical 
                                                          
240 Alan Bewell, “Erasmus Darwin’s Cosmopolitan Nature,” ELH 76 (2009): 33.  Darwin identifies 
liberty, freedom of thought and action, and creativity as co-implicated, improvable capacities immanent 
and unique to each individual.  For Darwin, liberty does not exist apart from an organism’s operable 
capacities for sensation, volition, association, and the various, external means that collectively enable it to 
interact with its environment.  Though political government is largely peripheral to this chapter due to 
Darwin’s attribution of liberty to physiology, to the extent that all life and all of life’s creations are 
apparatuses, states and state apparatuses are tools which may enhance or restrict individuals’ capacities.   
241 I often refer to Darwin’s imagined continuity between organic techniques and inorganic technologies 
as techn(olog)ical progress.  I distinguish the technical which refers to techniques or skills that are 
internal to an organism from technological which refers to crafted instruments external to an organism.  In 
the course of my discussion, we will see that Darwin’s theories of the sensorium and evolutionary 
progress convey that technological developments are a natural extension of and coordinate with the 
technical developments in individual organisms or across a species. 
242 Erasmus Darwin, The Temple of Nature, ed. Martin Priestman, 
http://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/darwin_temple/, III.435.  All further references to Darwin’s The Temple 
of Nature are taken from this edition. 
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processes. It also may indirectly alter its own capacities by crafting tools and environments for 
its own use.   
 Having argued volition and association to be the aspects of the sensorium which truly 
free humanity’s creativity, I address language as a particularly significant innovation emerging at 
the blurry juncture of internal, skill-based technique and external, instrumental technology.  I 
emphasize human language’s technological characteristics such as its being a mutable apparatus 
exterior to any, single individual which suits it for exchange, education, philosophical inquiry, 
and mythopoeia.243  Scholars of Romantic life sciences have noted Darwin’s recognition of 
evolutionary epigenesis, or the passing on to genetic inheritors characteristics obtained during 
life.244  Language offers a powerful means for transmitting information; each of Darwin’s poems 
establishes its own botanic, georgic garden to be a site for readers’ education.  Dahlia Porter 
observes that by writing Temple of Nature, Darwin recognized that his distinction between loose 
and strict analogies, his heuristic for distinguishing beautiful poetic language and more precise, 
philosophical language, was collapsing:   
the work of containment and differentiation performed by Darwin’s verse–note 
composite is continually unraveled by the composite form itself…In registering the 
divisions that would become the foundation of disciplinary separation in the structure of 
                                                          
243 The defining feature of technological innovation is the exteriorization of a conceived idea or plan into 
the physical form of a durable apparatus separate from its creator. “The whole of our evolution has been 
oriented towards placing outside ourselves what in the rest of the animal world is achieved inside by 
species adaptation.”  Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. Anna Bostock Berger 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 235.   
244 In addition to Goldstein’s book, see also, Denise Gigante, Life: Organic Form and Romanticism (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) and Helmut Müller -Sievers, Self-Generation: Biology, Literature, 
Philosophy around 1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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the text, Darwin allowed this boundary to be transgressed over and over, always 
reconstituting itself only to be dismantled.245   
Porter’s use of “allowed” connotes that Darwin’s agency in maintaining the “boundary” was 
itself compromised by the proliferating syntheses of his loose and strict analogies which we see 
in his overdetermined figures such as the garden itself.   The sensorium comprehends both loose 
and strict analogies under its more general practice of imitation and, even more fundamentally, 
executes both in the service of pleasure.  Here again, Darwin elevates beauty and pleasure from 
their conventional, subsidiary role in the georgic, a change reflected by the prominence he gives 
to his own mythopoeic, loose analogies.  Having shown that imitative ideation and language are 
inadequate to defining the essential qualities of life-originating pleasure, I observe that pleasure 
exceeds understanding, and pushes organisms to exceed themselves through self-transformation.  
Consequently, Darwin uses his loose, allegorical “machinery” and especially his retrospective 
and prospective, botanic, georgic gardens to demonstrate how myth is an appropriate vehicle for 
performatively eliciting pleasure and signifying the excessive, originary technicity of 
physiological pleasure.246  Addressing four ways in which the trope of botanic gardens 
influenced his poetry, I conclude by noting that a mythic, georgic garden functions as a 
prospective myth representing the coming Age of Philosophy whose details remain uncertain, 
but which promises the continued, general expansion of pleasure and liberty. 
 
 
                                                          
245 Dahlia Porter, Science, Form, and the Problem of Induction in British Romanticism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 102. 
246 Darwin’s refers to his myths and loose allegories as his “machinery” in Temple’s Preface.  “In the 
Eleusinian mysteries the philosophy of the works of Nature, with the origin and progress of society, are 
believed to have been taught by allegoric scenery explained by the Hierophant to the initiated, which gave 
rise to the machinery of the following Poem.” (ii) 
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5.2 Pleasure, imitation, and volition in the sensorium 
 Darwin’s medical career informed the majority of his writing as well as his interest in the 
botanic garden.  Darwin received his medical training at the Edinburgh Medical School and, like 
Quesnay, theorized a hedonistic morality based on materialist physiology.  At Edinburgh, in 
addition to a two-year course in moral philosophy, Darwin learned the popular theories of John 
Brown (1735-1788), who thought that bodies enjoy and benefit from regular stimulation while 
avoiding excessive inputs.247  Building upon Brown’s ideas, Darwin crafted his own, unique 
theory of physiology by integrating Albrecht von Haller’s (1708-1777) theory that all living 
organisms are composed of a variety of sensitive, contractile fibers.  Darwin presents his 
physiological theories of animal economies and vegetable economies in the treatises Zoonomia; 
or the Laws of Organic Life (1794) and Phytologia; or, The Philosophy of Agriculture and 
Gardening (1800) respectively.  His attempts to popularize botany among women by writing the 
whimsical yet densely foot-noted Loves of the Plants aroused his own enthusiasm for writing 
poetry in no small part because the poem itself was widely popular.  His appreciation for 
poetry’s beauty and didactic potential grew, and his Botanic Garden was also well-received for 
many years, though his attempt to condense his physiological theories into Temple of Nature met 
with less success in part due to its radical, evolutionary implications.  Temple of Nature argues 
that all organisms from the first “gluten-threads” to contemporary humans respond to and engage 
with their environments through a tactile sensibility based on the contractions and relaxations of 
different types of fibers composing tissues and organs.248    
                                                          
247 Richard Olson, Scottish Philosophy and British Physics 1750-1880: A Study in the Foundations of the 
Victorian Scientific Style (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 13. 
248 Erasmus Darwin, The Economy of Vegetation, in The Botanic Garden (London: J. Johnson, 1791), 
I.401n. 
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 Before starting these works, Darwin had already established a successful medical practice 
in Lichfield where he arrived soon after finishing his formal education.  Here, Darwin grew 
attracted to Anna Seward ,who would encourage him to cultivate a botanic garden, would write 
his first biography, and from whom he would crib lines of poetry.249  He also founded the 
Lichfield Botanical Society and published a multi-volume translation of the botanic taxonomies 
of Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), which became the subject for his first, long poem The Loves of 
the Plants.  Loves of the Plants thematizes erotic pleasure, sexual reproduction, and taxonomic 
variety by narrating the playful courtship of men and women whose groupings Darwin based on 
the counts of stamens and pistils of diverse flower species.  The later, Economy of Vegetation 
purports to describe “the physiology of Plants…and the operation of the Elements as far as they 
may be supposed to affect the growth of Vegetables”; in fact, the “operation” takes over the 
poem and shows the garden to be a figurative setting for allegorizing natural forces and heroizing 
scientists and inventors.250  Though Janet Browne asserts that Loves initiates Darwin’s poetic 
career as the “equivalent of a genre painter or, more appropriately, a landscape gardener,” The 
Botanic Garden’s Preface announces its georgic agenda of making literary beauty serve 
philosophical instruction by stating Darwin’s famous aim “ to inlist Imagination under the 
Banner of Science.”251  He attests science’s value by appending enormous sets of footnotes, 
sometimes doubly layered, to each poem in order to explain the poetic figures in up-to-date, 
academic detail. 
                                                          
249 Desmond King-Hele, Erasmus Darwin: A Life of Unequalled Achievement (London: Giles de la Mare, 
1999), 177. 
250 Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden (London: J. Johnson, 1791), v. 
251 Janet Browne, “Botany for Gentlemen: Erasmus Darwin and ‘The Loves of the Plants’,”  Isis 80, no. 4 
(December, 1989): 616; Darwin, The Botanic Garden, v. 
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 Darwin’s final poem, The Temple of Nature, claims that the level of development of 
organisms’ pleasure-oriented, physiological constitutions determines their freedom of action.  
His description of volitional liberty as an improvable, physiological capacity contrasts with much 
of the moral philosophy I have addressed in earlier chapters.  For example, Locke argued that 
fixed, moral laws and subsidiary, natural rights together enjoin and support socio-economic 
prosperity by offering individuals various liberties such as the right to own property.  Locke’s 
own quasi-physiological theory of volition related to his theory of natural rights insofar as 
possessing volition identified a person as rational, answerable to natural law, and deserving of 
rights.  By contrast, Darwin presents liberty as identical with and operating through an 
organism’s ability to willfully manipulate its environment.252  In short, Darwin thought that 
pleasure motivates organisms to engage with their environment, which adds to their cognitive 
and motor capacities and thus expands their volitional freedom of action. 
 The Temple of Nature’s third canto, “The Progress of Mind,” describes Darwin’s 
physiological model based on combinations of sensitive, contractile fibers.  He organizes his 
model around a fourfold sensorium with tiers designating physical capacities.  The sensorium 
proposes to explain the behavior of all organisms, the potential for simple organisms to develop 
higher, cognitive processes such as rational judgment and creativity over long spans of time, and 
ultimately humanity’s technologically complex, socio-economic orders.  The four capacities of 
the sensorium are as follows: 
1. Irritation: the internal, involuntary reaction of fibers to external stimulation. 
2. Sensation: the retention of ideas which coincide with perceptions of pleasure or 
displeasure caused by stimuli. 
                                                          
252 My first chapter explicates the dependence of Locke’s labor theory of natural property rights on his 
theory of volition. 
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3. Volition: a motivating desire to act or not act for the purpose of experiencing the 
pleasure or to avoiding the pain of various sensations and experiences. 
4. Association: groups sensations into complex ideas and memories.   
Haptic irritation enables simple organisms’ automatic, life-sustaining processes and enables 
sensation and voluntary action in more complex organisms.  A complex organism’s recognition 
of pleasurable sensations encourages its engagement with its environment, leads to organisms’ 
self-transformation through learning and repetition, and anticipates individual and collective 
development.  That the higher, creative capacities of volition and association enable voluntary 
pleasure-seeking, as we shall see, explains how Darwin’s revision of the georgic mode prioritizes 
pleasure, scientific education, and mythopoeia. 
 Each capacity of the sensorium represents a range of physical processes which occur in 
and through the sensitive, excitable fibers constituting an organism’s parts.  For example, 
nervous fibers differ from muscular fibers though they may cooperate.  External stimulation 
causes chains of fibers to contract.  In complex animal economies, such contractions first affect 
superficial, irritable fibers before travelling through fibrous networks to reach nerves in the 
brain.  Brain fibers retain stimuli as sensations which form mutable ideas through contingent 
associations with other sensations.  Volition manipulates ideas by recalling them, forming 
associations, or deploying them as motivations for world-engaging actions. 
 Darwinian physiology fuses the concepts of pleasure and utility which are the 
cornerstones of the georgic mode.  Whereas The Seasons’s physico-theological method of 
argument sought to prove the validity of nature’s moral laws by reconciling empiric, natural 
philosophy with scripture, Darwin asserts that a hedonistic ethic encouraging self-empowerment 
and self-transformation is immanent in the sensorium’s operations.  Darwin attributes organic 
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life’s individual and collective progress to the physiological principle that complex organism’s 
involuntary reactions to stimuli can produce sensations that are pleasurable, edifying, and instill 
a volitional desire for their repetition: 
 …young SENSATION permeates the brain; 
Through each new sense the keen emotions dart, 
Flush the young cheek, and swell the throbbing heart. 
From pain and pleasure quick VOLITIONS rise, 
Lift the strong arm, or point the inquiring eyes… (I.270-274) 
The quote captures the transition from pleasurable sensations both involuntary, physical 
reactions like blushing and the voluntary, pleasure-seeking actions such as looking at an 
interesting object.  John Brown’s physiological theory adopted by Darwin posited that organisms 
enjoy moderate amounts of stimulation and particularly stimuli which satisfy their innate, self-
preserving desires.  For example, animals typically appreciate warmth and diet-appropriate food 
that generates pleasurable sensations and reinforces their volitional desires. Temple of Nature 
calls such desires passions and tastes. 
 Passion designates an organism’s volitional desire for a sensation or object.  Passions 
vary from simple, animalistic urges to volitions refined by complex, associative comparisons.  
Darwin cites two basic desires: “in wild groups tumultuous Passions stand, and Lust and Hunger 
head the Motley band” (III.155).  Though Lust and Hunger suggest uncivility, Temple of Nature 
and Loves of the Plants enthusiastically view sex as an efficient and pleasurable means for 
creative reproduction and reflect his more general view that pleasure benefits from innovation.  
The sensorium’s pragmatic hedonism regards passions to be virtuous to the extent that they keep 
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organisms happy, healthy, and productive.253  Similarly, “TASTE impassion’d” keeps the 
associative, appreciation of aesthetic objects grounded in bodily pleasure and utility (III.246).  
Darwin’s theory of taste differs from the version described in my last chapter as a disinterested 
appreciation for the timeless beauty of objects like naturalistic landscapes.  Rather than defining 
taste as a calm, aesthetic appreciation which disregards objects’ appeals to sensory, appetitive 
desires, Darwin insists that tastes for abstract, formal beauty remain inseparable from artworks’ 
associations with familiar, sensory pleasures.  For example, Darwin cites William Hogarth’s 
claim that humans find curves aesthetically pleasing, because a mature sensorium retains the 
infant’s pleasing memories of feeling for its mothers’ breasts with fingertips and lips: 
As the pure language of the Sight commands 
The clear ideas furnish'd by the hands; 
Beauty's fine forms attract our wondering eyes, 
And soft alarms the pausing heart surprise. 
Warm from its cell the tender infant born 
Feels the cold chill of Life's aerial morn; 
Seeks with spread hands the bosoms velvet orbs, 
With closing lips the milky fount absorbs;                     
… 
And learns erelong, the perfect form confess'd, 
IDEAL BEAUTY from its Mother's breast. (III.163-176) 
Infants quickly learn to desire soft and warm sensations because, though not necessarily useful, 
such sensations are comfortable.  Darwin suggests that the “clear[est] ideas” are not those 
                                                          
253 “Sweet Hope delights him, frowning Fear alarms, 
And Vice and Virtue court him to their arms.” (III.443-444) 
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formed by associative, intellectual labor, but are instead the tactile sensations which often 
involuntarily define a person’s passions and tastes.  Thus, “IDEAL BEAUTY” is better 
understood as an analogy for “clear ideas” than as connoting the appeal of abstract artworks.  
Though Darwin insists that the capacity for sensation requires an advanced nervous system, an 
impersonal, automated form of self-interest must also motivate vegetable economies to survive 
by a series of involuntary, mechanistic contractions.  Again, in animal economies this automatic, 
physiological process that converts irritation into passions naturalizes an acquisitive hedonism 
causing organisms to desire certain sensations and to develop higher facilitative capacities for 
pursuing those sensations. 
 The arousal of pleasure depends on a series of imitative operations occurring through the 
sensorium’s capacities.  Darwin presents imitation as one of the sensorium’s overarching 
principles (along with pleasure and self-transformation) though he does not include it as one of 
the four capacities.  Involuntary, imitative contractions underpin the sensorium’s dynamism by 
predicating techn(olog)ical innovation on pleasurable, edifying iteration.  Irritative contraction, 
the most basic form of physiological imitation, enables the more complex, volitional forms of 
iteration.  In a footnote to Temple of Nature, Darwin highlights the educational effect of the 
sensorium’s imitative operations on organisms’ skill-development; he then elaborates that 
irritated fibers imitate stimuli to produce sensations and ideas:  
The origin of this propensity to imitation has not been deduced from any known 
principle; when any action presents itself to the view of a child, as of whetting a knife, or 
threading a needle; the parts of this action in respect of time, motion, figure, are imitated 
by parts of the retina of his eye; to perform this action therefore with his hands is easier to 
him than to invent any new action; because it consists in repeating with another set of 
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fibres, viz. with the moving muscles, what he had just performed by some parts of the 
retina; just as in dancing we transfer the times of the motions from the actions of the 
auditory nerves to the muscles of the limbs. Imitation therefore consists of repetition, 
which is the easiest kind of animal action; as the ideas or motions become presently 
associated together; which adds to the facility of their production; as shown in Zoonomia, 
Vol. I. Sect. XXII. 2. 
        It should be added, that as our ideas when we perceive external objects, are believed 
to consist in the actions of the immediate organs of sense in consequence of the stimulus 
of those objects; so when we think of external objects, our ideas are believed to consist in 
the repetitions of the actions of the immediate organs of sense, excited by the other 
sensorial powers of volition, sensation, or association. (III.309n) 
Imitation or “repetition, which is the easiest kind of animal action,” originates in irritation’s, 
involuntary, mimetic archiving of responses to stimuli, and characterizes many operations of 
both vegetable and animal economies.  The final sentence asserts that recalling ideas reproduces 
the chain of imitative contractions originally caused by objects’ stimulating qualities.  The first 
paragraph demonstrates that the sensorium’s tendency to learn about its environment through 
imitation causes the self-transformation of organisms which instinctively develop knowledge and 
skills.  Further, pleasurable imitation encourages organisms to adopt, engrain, and elaborate the 
qualities and capacities of other organisms in progressive networks of individual and collective 
development. 
 Imitation can be novel or repetitive and each may improve the sensorium’s capacities.  
Novel experiences are stimulating,254 and certain experiences whose interest may fade with 
                                                          
254 Irritability provides for the possibility that experiences may be too stimulating and therefore serves as 
the first line of defense for helping organisms to self-regulate by managing inputs. 
191 
 
familiarity stimulate an organism only for being novel.  “[T]he novelty of our ideas is generally 
attended with pleasurable sensation” and pleasurable experiences instill neophilic “Curiosity” in 
immature organisms, which inspires further engagement with their environment (III.145n).  
Pleasurable novelty encourages organisms to integrate new sensations and ideas.  These 
additions usefully transform the organism’s associative network by increasing the resources 
available to volition.   
 Organisms enact a second-order mode of imitation by simply recalling retained ideas or 
by repeating gestures and actions.  (“Imitation therefore consists of repetition, which is the 
easiest kind of animal action…”)  For example, recalling an idea requires an organism to will 
neural fibers to execute a unique set of physical contractions.  Repeating such processes 
increases their familiarity, and though familiarity may decrease any pleasure owing to novelty, 
the act may itself still involve innately pleasurable sensations.  Most importantly, possessing a 
skill facilitates the acquisition and refinement of associated skills.  This iterative model of self-
improvement applies to cognition as well as motor skills and tool manipulation.   
 Darwin’s theory of imitative sympathy reduces the sensorium’s potential for becoming 
too hedonistically self-serving.  Temple of Nature notes Adam Smith’s description of sympathy 
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments as a process by which innately self-interested individuals 
recognize that their own interests coincide with those of other people: 
From our aptitude to imitation arises what is generally understood by the word sympathy, 
so well explained by Dr. Smith of Glasgow.  Thus the appearance of a cheerful 
countenance gives us pleasure, and of a melancholy one makes us sorrowful. Yawning, 
and sometimes vomiting, are thus propagated by sympathy; and some people of delicate 
fibres, at the presence of a spectacle of misery, have felt pain in the same parts of their 
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bodies, that were diseased or mangled in the object they saw. 
        The effect of this powerful agent in the moral world, is the foundation of all our 
intellectual sympathies with the pains and pleasures of others, and is in consequence the 
source of all our virtues. For in what consists our sympathy with the miseries or with the 
joys of our fellow creatures, but in an involuntary excitation of ideas in some measure 
similar or imitative of those which we believe to exist in the minds of the persons whom 
we commiserate or congratulate! (I.466n) 
Both Darwin and Smith claim that involuntary, sympathetic imitation forms and maintains social 
affinity networks.  Sympathy operates on the principle that humans innately enjoy imitating each 
other’s emotions even when displeasure is displayed.  For Smith, sympathy socializes individuals 
by gradually inducting them into a shared morality which values justice and merit.255  Darwinian 
sympathy denotes a similarly pleasurable process but attributes it to the sensorium’s series of 
imitative functions.  The sensorium’s ethic of future-oriented, techn(olog)ical progress casts 
sympathy as one affect-oriented mode for encouraging people to engage with their milieu; it uses 
innately individualistic pleasure to draw curious individuals together and integrates them into 
cooperative, productive collectives. 256    
                                                          
255 Socialization is achieved by a series of sympathetic imitations of other people’s emotions as Smith 
describes in the following passage: 
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the 
sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and 
suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when upon bringing the case home to himself, he 
finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and 
improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them.   
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, eds. D.D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1984), I.i.3.I. 
256 Pleasure is innately individualistic, because it manifests in one’s own body, and because Darwin 
characterizes pleasure, (or self-interest in vegetable economies), as each organism’s motive force.  
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 Further, sympathy proves poetically evocative through its correlation with love and so 
also through love’s analogization with a variety of organic and inorganic, attractive forces.257  
Temple of Nature introduces Love and Sympathy in Canto I, uses them to organize Cantos II and 
III respectively, and sees them culminate in the social harmony of Canto IV’s “Of Good and 
Evil”: 
FIRST, if you can, celestial Guide! disclose 
From what fair fountain mortal life arose, 
Whence the fine nerve to move and feel assign'd, 
Contractile fibre, and ethereal mind: 
 
How Love and Sympathy the bosom warm, 
Allure with pleasure, and with pain alarm,                    
With soft affections weave the social plan, 
And charm the listening Savage into Man. (I.215-222) 
Each stanza and most of the lines parallel one another by aligning a cause with an effect.  The 
first stanza connects the earliest, oceanic appearance of “contractile fibre[s]” to their evolution 
into the brain’s ineffable structures.  The second stanza imagines that the basic, pain-pleasure 
sensitivity of irritative fibers will eventually cause humans to form civil, productive societies.  
Sympathy’s short- and long-term effects demonstrate that one’s knowledge acquisition and 
creativity are not simply self-serving but facilitate broader human-nature or human-human 
rapprochement.  Sympathy encourages individuals to recognize the value of other people’s 
                                                          
257 Immortal Love, or Eros, indicates any attractive force, including the poorly understood concept of 
gravity, which Darwin speculated would produce cycles of Big Crunches and Bangs.  Darwin suggests 
four examples: "Press drop to drop, to atom atom bind, / Link sex to sex, or rivet mind to mind" (I.25-6). 
194 
 
experiences both affective and skill-oriented.  Sympathetic, social engagement remains pleasure-
oriented for each party while reducing people’s potential to treat each other as instruments for 
satisfying their own volitions. 
 Association and volition help us to understand how the largely imitative integration of 
sensations can foster innovative ideas and works.  The sensorium integrates imitative sensations 
into associative, ideational networks; in a footnote referencing David Hume (1711-1776), 
Darwin identifies the main, associative relations between ideas as “contiguity, causation, and 
resemblance,” and he speculates that a person’s tendency to privilege one type of relation may 
correlate with an inclination for certain vocations.258  The mind’s tendency to privilege a single, 
associative relation and for forming inaccurate associations based on contingencies like temporal 
proximity demonstrate the sensorium’s inadequacy for discovering Truth.  Still, association and 
volition together constantly reorganize and refine mimetic ideas of the world.   
 Though association ranks higher among the sensorium’s tiers, volition judges, organizes, 
and executes associated ideas to facilitate its pursuit of pleasure.  Crucially, Darwin argues that 
reason and liberty improve in concert with volition. Volition is empowered to the extent that 
sensation provides it with ideas provisionally organized by association:   
 Whence REASON'S empire o'er the world presides, 
And man from brute, and man from man divides; 
Compares and measures by imagined lines 
Ellipses, circles, tangents, angles, sines; 
                                                          
258 “Those who have connected a great class of ideas of resemblances, possess the source of the 
ornaments of poetry and oratory, and of all rational analogy. While those who have connected great 
classes of ideas of causation, are furnished with the powers of producing effects. These are the men of 
active wisdom who lead armies to victory, and kingdoms to prosperity; or discover and improve the 
sciences which meliorate and adorn the condition of humanity.”  (IV.299n) 
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Repeats with nice libration, and decrees 
In what each differs, and in what agrees; 
With quick Volitions unfatigued selects 
Means for some end, and causes of effects; 
All human science worth the name imparts, 
And builds on Nature's base the works of Arts. (III.401-410) 
Volition reasons by willfully recalling ideas for comparison and differentiation, processes 
Darwin likens to spatial measurement.  Volition’s identification of related “causes and effects” 
serves its primary function of acquiring means for achieving pleasure.  “REASON’S empire” 
signifies volition’s tendency to annex as much information about the world as possible.  In 
addition to synthesizing new ideas, volition exteriorizes its ideational plans into new, durable 
objects by executing skillful actions.  In a quote evoking originary technicity, volition’s intrinsic 
operations improve organic life via inorganic means by “build[ing] on Nature’s base the works 
of Arts.”  Darwin elsewhere notes that human artifice replicates the sensorium’s own basic 
tendency to imitate nature.  From the “Muse of Mimicry” derive “The sculptor's statue, and the 
poet's song, / The painter's landscape, and the builder's plan, / And IMITATION marks the mind 
of Man.”  “Marks” collapses the notions that involuntary contractions impress mimetic 
sensations on the mind and that imitation characteristically precedes innovation and creative 
production.  Artworks and other durable, exteriorized apparatuses offer archives of knowledge 
useful for educating individuals and accelerating collective progress; but it is malleable language 
that stands above other technologies for its malleability and as a vehicle for easing the imitation 
of ideas. 
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 Language replicates the sensorium’s own dynamism and is a useful apparatus for 
developing and exchanging ideas.  For example, “Association’s mystic power combines / 
Internal passions with external signs” (III.355-356).  The quote highlights a person’s ability to 
use their own ideas and linguistic tools to manipulate each other.  Darwin conveys human 
language to be an elaboration of the various gestures and utterances observable throughout the 
animal kingdom:259 
From these dumb gestures first the exchange began 
Of viewless thought in bird, and beast, and man; 
… 
 Thus the first LANGUAGE, when we frown'd or smiled, 
Rose from the cradle, Imitation's child; 
Next to each thought associate sound accords, 
And forms the dulcet symphony of words… (III.357-9; III.363-366) 
Calling language “Imitation’s child” uses the metaphor of individual maturation to suggest the 
evolutionary continuity among species as well as the progression from “Savage-Man” to civility.  
Darwin again observes that innovatively producing words involves the ineffable step of matching 
ideas to sounds, though most of a person’s language acquisition occurs through the “exchange” 
                                                          
259 Thus jealous quails or village-cocks inspect 
Each other's necks with stiffen'd plumes erect; 
Smit with the wordless eloquence, they know 
The rival passion of the threatening foe. 
So when the famish'd wolves at midnight howl, 
Fell serpents hiss, or fierce hyenas growl; 
Indignant Lions rear their bristling mail, 
And lash their sides with undulating tail. 
Or when the Savage-Man with clenched fist 
Parades, the scowling champion of the list; 
With brandish'd arms, and eyes that roll to know 
Where first to fix the meditated blow… (III.343-354) 
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or sympathetic imitation of other people’s speech.  The actions and emotions of other people 
become “natural signs” which cause infants to sense that visible things might signify deeper, 
perhaps inaccessible meaning whether they be person’s ideas or an object’s inner workings. 
 According to its preface, The Botanic Garden seeks to “inlist Imagination under the 
banner of Science; and to lead her votaries from the looser analogies, which dress out the 
imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones which form the ratiocination of philosophy."260  
Association forms analogical relations between distinct ideas sharing similarities; language 
exteriorizes these analogies to facilitate their development and to better or understanding of the 
world.  Devin Griffith’s explains Darwin’s theory of analogy’s educational potential by noting 
that “[f]or [Francis] Bacon, (and for Darwin), analogy is an attribute of the world, not ascribed to 
it; it is not applied to nature by the scientists but is “of” the “things” themselves.”261  Griffith’s 
point is that the sensorium can empirically access bits of truth, because sensations capture 
imperfect information about a natural world whose unity manifests as a network of analogies 
immanent among its parts.  As language more accurately describes an idea, its analogies become 
stricter.  On one hand, neither ideas nor language’s analogies can ever be identical with the 
things which they describe.  By consequence, truths regarding the absolute origins, causes, or 
essences of all things are permanently foreclosed.  On the other hand, the sensorium’s innate, 
imitative and innovative functions compel humanity’s collective, language-assisted search for 
truth. 
 
 
                                                          
260 Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden (London: J. Johnson, 1791), v. 
261 Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2016), 72. 
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5.3 Mythopoeia and georgic gardens 
 Darwin distinguishes between loose and strict analogies in order to show their productive 
cooperation in his own georgic works.  Darwin’s “Banner of science” and his compulsive 
outstripping of his own poetry with explanatory notes imply the precedence of science’s strict, 
didactic analogies.  However, the loose analogies correlated with poetic beauty and the strict 
analogies correlated with rigorous, scientific discovery and innovation cooperate in serving the 
universal pursuit of pleasure.  The following quote suggests that loose analogies, being imprecise 
associations which bear poetic beauty, are more suited to giving immediate pleasure: 
Call'd by thy voice Resemblance next describes 
Her sister-thoughts in lucid trains or tribes; 
Whence pleased Imagination oft combines 
By loose analogies her fair designs… (IV.305-309) 
I noted that resemblance is one of the three main types of association.  By contrast, relations of 
contiguity are more apt for working towards philosophy’s strict analogies.  Resemblance forges 
more tenuous associations but rewards creators and readers by allowing greater, volitional free 
play among ideas.  Since language’s loose analogies are better tools for conveying beauty rather 
than approaching truth, they are more plastic and susceptible to imaginative revision than strict 
analogies.  Still, loose analogies can be useful propaedeutics for engaging readers and guiding 
them toward the stricter analogies just as Darwin’s poetry directs readers to his footnotes and on 
again to his treatises. 
 Recognizing that Darwin regards myth as a type of loose analogy helps to explain his 
poetry’s use of the georgic garden as its master-myth.  Myths may be as influential as religious 
stories or as trifling as juvenile similes.  He rejects treating popular, received, moralizing myths 
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with unquestioning reverence, because shared incuriosity may incite stultifying and potentially 
volatile, public superstition.262  His use of larger organizing myths like the georgic garden and 
smaller myths like Economy of Vegetation’s gnomes and nymphs exemplify the beautiful figures 
which georgics conventionally subordinate to their nominally more important moral message of 
labor’s virtue.  His syncretic mythopoeia takes advantage of loose analogy’s ability to both 
please and inform; it also refurbishes received myths as vehicles for his innovative scientific 
content and, I argue, revises the georgic mode in which they appear by contributing to the 
revaluation of pleasure also found in his discussion of the sensorium.263  As an example of 
Darwin’s playful repurposing of myths, he organizes Economy of Vegetation’s four cantos 
according to Rosicrucianism’s four elements of water, earth, air, and fire, which he then 
associates with gnomes, sylphs, and other fantastic creatures.264  He also mixes his own 
references to biblical stories with earlier classical imagery, which he then argues depends on 
even earlier Egyptian legends.  Comparable to strict analogies leading to even stricter analogies, 
myths are continuously preceded by other myths.265  Martin Priestman’s analysis of Darwin’s 
                                                          
262 Darwin loathed superstition and regarding printing and literature as its remedies.  For example, ”…the 
curst spells of Superstition blind, / And fix her fetters on the tortured mind…” (IV.83-84).  Darwin saw 
the first-hand results of persecutorial superstition when reactionary Birmingham rioters targeted the 
members of the progressive Lunar Society to which belonged. 
263 Darwin’s machinery reflects wider contemporary interest in comparative histories of religion.  Major 
examples include Joseph Spence’s Polymetis (1747), David Hume’s The Natural History of Religion 
(1757), Richard Payne Knight’s infamous A Discourse on The Worship of Priapus (1786), and Volney’s 
Les Ruines, ou méditations sur les révolutions des empires (1791). 
264 Darwin adopted Rosicrucianism, because he imagined it to exemplify euhemerism, the belief that 
mythic stories originate in a kernel of truth and are elaborated over time to potentially include 
supernatural elements.  Darwin states that “[t]he Rosicrucian doctrine of Gnomes, Sylphs, Nymphs, and 
Salamanders, was thought to afford a proper machinery for a Botanic poem; as it is probable, that they 
were originally the names of hieroglyphic figures for representing the elements.”  Darwin thus seems to 
be led more to adopt his structure due to the perceived beauty and order of the four, allegorized elements 
than any commitment to their function as a strict analogy for understanding physical laws.  Darwin, The 
Botanic Garden, vii.  Martin Priestman similarly argues that Darwin’s Preface to Temple demonstrates 
knowledge and practice of euhemerism.  Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin, 185.   
265 Recognizing that both myths and ideas are forms of loose analogies, tracking myths backwards into 
prehistory would arrive at something like pre-literate or even pre-imagistic, mythic ideas.  My blurring of 
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spatial poetics argues that this regression of myths correlates with simplification, flattening, and 
reliance on education by means of images typified by as yet illegible Egyptian hieroglyphics.266  
To his compelling argument I would add that this regression leads back to an originary, founding 
pleasure only understandable as and through mythopoeia.  Thus, Darwin’s philosophical 
revaluation and own georgic demonstration of mythopoeia sought to justify the continuous 
remaking of myths which are beautiful and pleasurable to the extent that they retain a kernel of 
immutable truth.   
 Life’s innovative, originary technicity and its anticipated volitional expansion entail that 
the myths which infinitely regress into the past must also serve to figure a conjectural future 
typified by wide-spread liberty and pleasure amid humanity.  Darwin judges myth to be the 
appropriate mode for signifying pleasure’s innate, ineffable, and creative excess as it appears in 
his works at life’s origin and humanity’s future.  Pleasure must be understood through myth, 
because knowledge of the sensorium at once tells us that pleasure originates and motivates267 all 
life while imperfect understanding also forecloses any strict understanding of that origin’s 
essential Nature.  Darwin collapses in the single emblem of the georgic garden mythopoeia’s 
importance and his assertion that pleasure sits at the beginning and end of all things.  An 
exploration of four ways (botanic) gardens inform Darwin’s revision of the georgic will help to 
show that the georgic garden’s associations with pleasure and volition imply humanity’s nigh-
utopian future to resemble cosmopolitan, liberal political economy.  
                                                          
terms is meant to reassert that Darwin regarded the imitative sensorium as possessing “clear ideas” of its 
own passions but not of the objects inspiring them (III.164). 
266 Dahlia Porter similarly argues that the Egyptian hieroglyph “maps a direct corridor from scientific 
knowledge to poetry.” Porter, Science, Form, and the Problem of Induction in British Romanticism, 104. 
267 Pleasure strictly originates all life due to the pleasure Darwin associates with procreation but also more 
loosely as the motive force of organic life’s originary technicity. 
201 
 
 Firstly, as I mentioned, Darwin’s personal experiences with botanic gardens inclined him 
to associate them with bodily well-being, education, and creativity.  In the centuries leading up to 
and including Darwin’s own, botanic gardens providing medical palliatives grew to include 
domestic and foreign plants and so also became a resource for studying plant physiology.268  
Darwin’s own botanic studies led him to attribute his sensorium model to both vegetable and 
animal economies; Molly Maureen Mahood observes that Darwin’s interest in botanic garden 
reflects his desire to forge tenuous, taxonomic analogies between species, a desire that extended 
to myths as he wrote each poem.269  Beyond being a site for scientific inquiry and knowledge 
production, the plants in botanic gardens physically demonstrate creativity through their own 
reproduction and potential for hybridization.  Plants’ demonstrated capacity for sensory 
irritability and their photosynthetic capacity discovered by Darwin’s associate Joseph Priestley 
(1733-1804) suggested to Darwin that plants share with more complex organisms basic forms of 
involuntary imitation.  Their vegetable economies seemed to serve what might reasonably be 
analogized as an unwitting self-interest consistent with Darwin’s concept of originary pleasure. 
 Secondly, I highlight two effects of Darwin’s foregrounding of botanic gardens on his use 
of georgic mode.  I have already addressed mythopoeia’s greater prominence as a co-effect of 
pleasure’s own revaluation.  Here I address the botanic garden’s influence on his revaluation of 
pleasure and its incitement of the paratexts whose strict analogies support that revaluation.  
                                                          
268 In order to evoke the ways in which plants’ irreducible materiality at once encouraged their taxonomic 
arrangement by botanists to confirm nature’s grand order yet still resisted and disturbed easy, epistemic 
systematization, Theresa M. Kelley invites us to “[i]magine live plants and dried plants crossing the 
globe, some sent in or with letters and across seas, sinking with ships that sink,” and also to “[imagine 
now their current arrangement in cabinets of natural history museums…as specimens associated with 
orders, genera, and species, along with whatever else might illustrate their traits…”  Theresa M. Kelley, 
Clandestine Marriage: Botany & Romantic Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1. 
269 Molly Maureen Mahood, The Poet as Botanist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 70-
77, 60. 
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Patricia Fara and Alan Bewell both suggest that Darwin’s poetry applies older literary styles to 
new objects.  According to Bewell, “Darwin adopted a dated poetic style in order to present a 
thoroughly modern conception of a natural world that was undergoing ceaseless change and 
transformation and was inescapably bound up with global commerce, industry and 
consumption.”270  The topics of Darwin’s poems do indeed reflect contemporary natural 
philosophy; yet floral taxonomy, recent technology harnessing nature’s physical laws, and the 
pleasure-driven sensorium are consistent with georgics’ long-standing interest in instructing 
readers about the operations of nature and the practical implications and uses of such 
knowledge.271  Fara’s and Bewell’s descriptions of Darwin’s applying an older literary style to 
new objects miss the extent to which his topics cause him to emphasize or deemphasize the 
georgic mode’s conventional themes and formal aspects.   
 Though Darwin’s scientific topics are modern, they fundamentally revise the georgic 
mode by reprioritizing its standard hierarchy in which beauty and pleasure are subservient to 
utility, labor, and economic rationality.  Loves of the Plants is the least georgic of Darwin’s three 
major poems, yet it establishes that pleasure, the scientific instruction, and mythopoeia would 
marginalize the virtue georgics traditionally attribute to toilsome, manual labor.  Priestman and 
Griffiths both support this point by considering Loves of the Plants to be markedly pastoral; its 
                                                          
270 Alan Bewell, Natures in Translation: Romanticism and Colonial Natural History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press), 54.  Romantics “regarded [Darwin] not so much as an individually poor 
writer, but more as their chosen representative of an outdated poetic movement…Darwin insisted that 
poets should versify only what they see in front of them…In contrast, the Romantics deliberately turned 
their gaze inwards, emphasizing the importance of imagination and self-reflection.”  Fara, Erasmus 
Darwin: sex, science, and serendipity, 44-45. 
271 The Seasons exemplifies this latter development, though it also appears in other poems of varying 
popularity such as Richard Savage’s London and Bristol Delineated (1744), John Dyer’s The Fleece, and 
George Cockings’ Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce (1769).  To some extent, Darwin synthesizes 
Thomson’s georgic centering intellectual over manual, agricultural labor with Mason’s georgic which 
also displaced farm and toil by pleasure gardens and the design theory involved in their making.   
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tone and content are comic, and extrapolating stories from its vignettes of socializing and 
courtship inclines a reader to imagine marriages and procreation.272  Though pain and death 
appear in the poem when Darwin mentions the healing properties of specific plants, Loves 
implies that plants transcend death and their own species’ physiology through procreation.  The 
internal, life-sustaining processes of vegetable (and animal) economies are strictly understood as 
labor.  However, Darwin’s predicates these happy processes on a universal, physiological, 
pleasure principle emblematized by the joyful atmosphere infusing the botanic garden where 
they take place.  This dissociation of labor from desperation contributes to a georgic mode in 
which pleasure rather than labor becomes the principle ethic.   
 A panoply of paratextual notes reinforce the role of georgic gardens as sites of 
instruction which return the reader to the topic of hedonism by detailing the physiological 
production of pleasure.  Again, Loves of the Plants, the Preface to Botanic Garden, and Temple 
of Nature’s frame story all announce to readers that they employ garden settings to facilitate the 
reader’s education in botany, physiology, or otherwise.  The gardens’ flora may themselves be 
the objects of scientific inquiry or the garden may simply be a conducive setting for instruction.  
Each poem acknowledges its garden to be the place where a Botanic Muse (Loves), Botanic 
Goddess (Economy), or Muse (Temple) will offer scientific knowledge directly to readers or 
through a proxy student.  Noel Jackson entertains the popular idea that “Darwin’s philosophical 
poetry…is a mere prop to the serious and entertaining matter of his scientific notes,” but grants 
that Darwin believed that poetry is not “subordinate to philosophical ratiocination but [is] its 
unlikely ground.”  Jackson claims that the disjunction between science and mythopoeia in 
Darwin’s “philosophic poetry” prevented modes such as the physico-theological epic and the 
                                                          
272 Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin, 50; Griffiths, The Age of Analogy, 62. 
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georgic from being viable vehicles for Romantic poetry.273  Darwin repeatedly prompts readers 
to refer to his poems’ notes, to his other treatises, and other authors’ treatises; all use strict 
analogies to complicate the reader’s understanding of the subject matter.274  Still, the sensorium’s 
imperfect tools ensure that a thorough understanding of pleasure will forever exceed the 
explanatory abilities of natural philosophers.  Nevertheless, volition will compel them to try 
while philosopher-poets continuously rewrite the myths which lead to para- and intertexts’ ever-
expanding matrix of strict analogies. 
 Thirdly, the figure of the botanic garden traverses his major poems, but Temple of Nature 
best demonstrates how the garden-as-myth symbolizes life’s pleasure-driven excess.  The 
georgic garden is an emblematic myth loosely analogizing these stricter, though still relatively 
loose analogies.275  My discussion of retrospective and prospective mythopoeia helps us to better 
understand Temple’s mythopoeic treatment of the garden of Eden.  Having shown that Darwin’s 
prominent use of myth correlates with his prioritization of pleasure in life and literature, his 
master myth of the botanic, georgic garden signifies that pleasure drives organisms’ 
techn(olog)ical transformation via their various, natural, self-educating processes.  Recall that 
Temple’s narrative involves initiation into hidden knowledge of life’s origins and operations by 
means of the sensorium.  Canto I informs the reader that the temple where the educational rites 
                                                          
273 Noel Jackson, “Rhyme and Reason: Erasmus Darwin's Romanticism,” Modern Language Quarterly 
70, no. 2 (2009): 181; 182.  On the physico-theological epic of which The Seasons is an example, see H. 
Grant Sampson, “The Physico-Theological Epic in the Later Eighteenth Century,” Canadian Society for 
Eighteenth Century Studies 2 (1984): 49-60.  Percy Shelley’s (1792-1822) Queen Mab; A Philosophical 
Poem; With Notes (1813) represents a late, quixotic effort to revive the style, but he did not use it again, 
and the poem had an unfortunate afterlife for being used in court as evidence of Shelley’s atheism. 
274 Similarly, he interleaves Loves’s four cantos with Socratic discourses between the characters Poet and 
Bookseller, who dictate Darwin’s aesthetic theory of poetry, painting, and music.  These discourses 
restate his argument that the pleasurably loose ideas obtained during relaxed, fantasizing reveries may be 
useful adjuncts to scientific inquiry, but they are also self-justifying in their beauty.   
275 Relatively loose compared to those in Temple’s notes. 
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takes place has been built over the remains of Eden in Syria.276  A credulous, in Darwin’s terms 
superstitious reader of the Bible would understand Eden to be humanity’s absolute origin, God 
having created Adam and placed him in the garden.  A reading of Temple disrupts the ability to 
view Eden as a potentially instructive myth, because knowledge of the sensorium involves 
understanding that the subtitular Origin of Society is itself a false starting point and in fact 
depends on an evolutionary process beginning long before the appearance of any humans. 
Darwin suggests that the attempt to learn about any origin not only depends on imperfect though 
refinable analogies, but that we will necessarily be led back through a series of prior, perhaps 
unexpected causes just as human life depends on earlier, organic evolutions and even the first 
“Organic forms…kindled into life” arose emerged from the “elemental strife” of inorganic, 
marine material (I.4; I.3).  Similarly, Darwin’s retrospective mythography iterates that 
investigating past knowledges for truth also confronts one with a regressing series of earlier, 
loose, mythic analogies.  Locating his own mythic garden of Eden in a geographically 
identifiable space, Darwin registers Eden as an attractive, but false, mythic origin; the myth 
necessarily points to the existence of time and things existing prior to itself precise knowledge of 
which remains inaccessible.  Despite Eden being a  false origin, which the poem depicts as a 
wasteland, the poem’s picturesque imagery still associates an Eden-as-mythic-garden with 
pleasure and beauty:  
Four sparkling currents lav'd with wandering tides 
Their velvet avenues, and flowery sides; 
                                                          
276 Darwin notifies us that his identification of Eden’s location in this “cradle of the World” follows Lord 
Monboddo’s (1714-1799) philological and Jacob Bryant’s (1715-1804) mythological studies (I.36).  Their 
work and Monboddo’s foundational, evolutionary theories, which particularly influenced Darwin, invite 
the reader to consider multiple, earlier origins for human society.  Bryant’s work argued for the influence 
of the Egyptians on the Greeks; Darwin’s accepted this argument and took it as encouragement for 
forming his own, playful, syncretic myths. 
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On sun-bright lawns unclad the Graces stray'd, 
And guiltless Cupids haunted every glade… (I.37-40) 
Darwin even deploys tropes of naturalistic landscaping such as the sinuous rivers and mixed light 
effects of sunny lawns and shady glades.  His georgic Eden suggests that, though life’s 
origination in and through pleasure277 may only be understood indirectly through imperfect, 
mythic analogies, life’s propensity for producing beautiful, mythopoeic figures validates 
humanity’s commitment to that pleasure. 
 The temple figures Darwin’s prospective myth of the georgic garden, a revision that 
indicates his own revaluation of modern mythopoeia.  In the narrative, though the first Eden has 
been obscured by the sands of time, the temple that replaces it miraculously extends far into the 
earth and to the sky such that, as Priestman notes, “the more we look at it, the more it takes up 
the whole of space, above and below ground” (I.69n).  The temple need not strictly iterate the 
conventional elements of Eden’s garden as long as it still offers a site for intellectual discovery 
and innovation and conveys pleasure’s importance to life’s innate creativity.  The poem 
concludes with the instructor lifting the “mystic veil” from the Goddess Nature to reveal 
“TRUTH DIVINE” (IV.522; IV.524).  No text follows the unveiling; Darwin leaves the reader to 
reckon and synthesize the poem’s matrix of loose and strict analogies.  The poem seems to 
suggest that the reader, having been transformed by the text, return to its beginning and generate 
yet more associations.  However, this conclusion also functions as an absence or an ineffable 
excess into which prospective mythopoeia signified by the georgic edifice must continue to 
project itself.  Though this future remains uncertain, the poem insists that techn(olog)ical 
progress entails pleasure, and the “trembling awe” with which the novitiate discerns this lesson 
                                                          
277 In the sense that pleasure tends to drive and attend the reproductive, sexual act as well as being a 
motive force for other types of creative work. 
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conveys that the future promises the health and happiness characteristic of botanic, georgic 
gardens (IV.522).  Moreover, the reader recognizes that such boons will be enjoyed in the real 
world to the extent that socio-political institutions restrain the potentially anti-social, even 
illiberal tendencies which commercialist hedonism can invite.  However, this effect caused by, 
among other things, new, industrial manufacture, and a concomitant encounter with plutocracy 
are recuperated as necessary steps in Darwin’s anticipated advance of civilization. 
 Finally, my fourth chapter argued that the georgic garden represented a nation governed 
according to liberal, political economy; this signification continues to be true for Darwin’s 
gardens though his gardens largely do so by addressing liberty and pleasure in terms of natural 
philosophy rather than landscaping.  Darwin’s botanic, georgic gardens differ from William 
Mason’s naturalistic, georgic gardens primarily because Darwin bases his sanguine prospects for 
English political economy on the sensorium’s pleasure principle and the promise for driving 
techn(olog)ical progress.  Mason’s English Garden conveys the idea that plutocrats’ performance 
of naturalistic landscaping demonstrates their civic virtue and respect for property rights as a 
synecdoche for rights in general.  The poem’s aesthetic appreciation for tasteful naturalism 
masks its claim for the massive wealth gaps exemplified by plutocrats’ landscaped estates.  
Mason deems such estates necessary in part to enable the landscaping that seemingly uniquely 
demonstrates a person’s subjection to nature’s aesthetic and moral principles, their civic virtue, 
and the managerial skills required to perform the functions of liberal government.  By contrast, 
Darwin deploys mythic, georgic gardens to describe distant, sometimes obscure, physiological 
causes and the socio-economic effects which they anticipate.  For example, the comparatively 
contemporary, if fantastic garden settings of Loves of the Plants and Temple of Nature 
respectively describe botany and organic physiology.  These evolutionarily retrospective themes 
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instruct readers in the variable operations of a common, pleasure-driven physiological model that 
accounts for organic life’s hedonistic ethic and its originary technicity.  Supplemented by 
sympathy, the imitative, autodidactic sensorium anticipates volitional improvements to 
humanity’s collective quality of life.278   
 The georgic garden in Temple appears on the cusp of the fourth (“Commerce”)  and 
fifth (“Philosophy”) ages described in Darwin’s unfinished poem, The Progress of Society;279 
again, the mythic temple which replaces Eden’s earlier georgic garden projects itself through 
physical space as an analogy for liberty and pleasure expanding in concert with techn(olog)ical 
progress.  Darwin’s schema of human progress in stadial terms reinforces his radical 
materialism.280  Each stadial age reflects humanity’s greater control over nature as an effect of 
their growing internal and external capacities; as food becomes more dependable, the sciences 
advance, education spreads, and apparatuses which contribute to pleasure are invented and 
exchanged.  As I have said, this physiological model defines liberty in terms of the volitional 
capacity unique and immanent to individuals.  State apparatuses may protect or restrict 
individuals’ ability to pursue their volitional desires, but neither states’ positive laws nor natural 
                                                          
278 Recall that as more sensations, ideas, and associations become available to individuals, their volitional 
capacities also tend to develop.   The empowerment of volition increases the ability to reason, sort ideas 
and form innovative associations, select appropriate sources of pleasure, and organize better means for 
achieving those pleasures.   
279 Darwin abandoned a late poem titled The Progress of Society perhaps partly due to the chilling effect 
of the Birmingham riots that affected his associates, but also because Richard Payne Knight had recently 
published the similar The Progress of Civil Society (1796).  Further, Darwin considered that a rigorous 
description of the origins and operations of life would provide a firmer foundation for explaining that the 
origins of society must be understood with references to the origins of life itself.  Still, the outline and 
fragments of the unfinished poem offer useful insight into the politico-economic values represented in his 
other work.  Darwin’s five, stadial ages are “Hunting,” “Pasturage,” “Agriculture,” “Commerce,” and 
“Philosophy.”  Erasmus Darwin, The Progress of Society, ed. Martin Priestman, 
https://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/darwin_temple/progress/progress.html. 
280 Materialism here refers to his belief that all physiological processes including thought involve physical 
movement, which also informed his belief that a society’s collective quality of life is determined by its 
technological progress and by its mode of subsistence in particular. 
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laws originate or grant liberty by means of a common bundle of rights.  Instead, the Age of 
Commerce’s profusion of wealth and ideas effects a transformation in the socio-economic order 
entailing a general but unevenly distributed improvement in a society’s aggregate, volitional 
capacities.   Temple of Nature’s narrator anticipates the fifth Age of Philosophy that Darwin 
outlined in Progress of Society: 
Four past eventful Ages then recite,  
And give the fifth, new-born of Time, to light; 
The silken tissue of their joys disclose, 
Swell with deep chords the murmur of their woes… (I.9-12) 
The fifth age, uncertain in its details, must be depicted in prospective myth; it will be joyful, but 
these visions can only be “tissue” comparable to other, loosely analogical, veiling myths.281 
Though the Age of Philosophy assures a general improvement of quality of life over the fourth 
age, the fifth age’s indistinct “woes” convey that it will not be utopic.  Darwin’s outline of the 
fifth age seems to attribute progress to a collective expansion of volition rather than any major, 
technological innovation or stadial change to subsistence modes.  Progress of Society implies but 
avoids detailing technological and economic improvements with the phrases “Elements subdued” 
and “Every man under his fig tree.”282  The latter assertion signifies a crucial transition from the 
extreme exploitation characterizing the Age of Commerce, when “gold triumphant rules the 
world enslaved,” which I take to signify Darwin’s distaste for a plutocracy founded on extreme 
wealth gaps and exploited, lower orders.  In the transition to the Age of Philosophy, either 
enough wealth has been created for each person to possess property or for a voluntary or 
                                                          
281 “Tissue” and “chords” also trope on the idea that pleasure and pain only occur in and through nervous 
fibers. 
282 Darwin, The Progress of Society, Canto IV. Age of Philosophy. 
210 
 
involuntary redistribution of wealth to have occurred.  Darwin does not say which, but his 
optimistic theories would seem to favor the idea that technological progress has eased 
individuals’ ability to acquire enough wealth to support themselves.  Still, the majority of the 
notes suggest that society’s general increase of happiness owes to a collective expansion of 
volition suggested by the Age’s first, central concept of “Liberty.”  From this new liberty which 
necessarily reflects the expansion of society’s collective, volitional capacities derives other 
boons such as “Philosophy,” Science,” “Peace,” “Swords turned to Plough,” and some lingering 
“Ruins of superstition” the last of which again suggests that utopia has not been achieved.   
 Having said that the georgic garden represents prosperous and well-governed, liberal 
nations, Darwin invites us to extrapolate that the benefits England best enjoys will gradually 
spread to other parts of the world.  Organic life’s techn(olog)ical progress thus far seemed to him 
to offer hope for continued improvement into the future.  Moreover, good-will amongst societies 
should continue to expand in circles of sympathy forerun by the expansion of markets to produce 
the global cosmopolitan signified by the fifth age’s “No [war]” and “Moral World.”283  The 
broadening of social networks, industrialization’s potential to increase time for leisure and 
intellectual labor, and the expansion of liberty complement one another and offer hope that 
originary technicity only accelerates in rewarding earth’s good and happy people with liberty and 
with new and greater pleasures. 
 
 
 
                                                          
283 I borrow the term circles of sympathy from Fonna Forman-Barzilai.  Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Adam 
Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  Darwin, The Progress of Society, Canto IV. Age of Philosophy. 
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Conclusion 
 Common wisdom has the georgic all but vanishing from Britain’s literary scene by the 
nineteenth century.  The poetic mode’s veneration of both manual, agricultural labor and 
intellectual, scientific labor became increasingly unfashionable for being inadequately poetic.  
In part, the mode seemed incompatible with the Romantic ideology’s valuation of the author’s 
subjective, imaginative genius.  In a canonical example, though several poems in Lyrical Ballads 
(1798) focused on the experiences of various folk from the lower orders, Wordsworth’s own 
intellectual labor superseded and left little room for the details of their rural labor.  Lyrical 
Ballads reflected and amplified the georgic’s traditional investment in demonstrating authors’ 
literary skills, which were employed in depicting a more idyllic nature; to the extent that poets 
analyzed nature’s works, their investigations seemed to enable the poet’s synthesis with nature 
through subjective, literary production.   
 Further, as Noel Jackson discusses with regard to Erasmus Darwin’s later poems, 
philosophic poetry’s blocks of prosaic notes formally exhibited the impropriety of poeticizing 
new sciences’ increasingly technical understandings of nature.284  Similarly, Mary Poovey’s 
work shows the georgic to be one among a variety of writing modes which not only addressed 
economic topics but which collectively developed standards for differentiating fictional and 
factual knowledges.285  The rise of the fact as the dominant episteme for defining truthful, 
practical knowledges and the fact’s co-emergence with seemingly self-evidentiary techniques of 
                                                          
284 Noel Jackson, “Rhyme and Reason: Erasmus Darwin’s Romanticism,” Modern Language Quarterly 
70, no. 2 (June 2009): 171. 
285 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Science of Wealth and 
Society (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1998), 1-7. 
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counting and measurement allowed statistical sciences such as economics to accrue privilege 
among the social sciences and become a crucial element for informing statecraft. 
 Calling William Cowper’s The Task (1785) one of the last georgics, Ted Underwood 
argues that “Cowper finally succeeds in blurring the boundary between work and nature so fully 
as to create an intermediate category…a kind of work that can be made to seem genteel.”286  I 
would argue for an alternate, bi-polar version of this blurring in which natural philosophers 
investigated nature’s own workings, and politico-economic theorists were redefining humans’ 
work in terms of humans’ own nature.  Georgics aestheticized the various ecological and 
physiological circulatory systems being discovered by experimental natural philosophers.  Such 
systems were alternately described in detail then broadly attributed to the sublime and ineffable 
management of Nature’s Hand.  On the other hand, emergent social sciences drew on nature’s 
physical systems and the laws governing them for analogies for the operations of socio-economic 
flows.  Gradual improvement in the understanding of economic forces lent new significance to 
labor, property, property rights, and liberty, even when thinkers such as Adam Smith recognized 
some of these categories to have been socially constructed according to the needs of contingent 
economic circumstances.  Nevertheless, Locke convincingly presented property rights as a 
central concern of liberal statecraft by arguing them to be necessary for fulfilling the natural laws 
obliging the reproduction of societies.  Underwritten by personal volition and liberty, property 
rights could seem to serve both rational self-interests and each individual’s obligation to promote 
a communitarian good.  Many literary authors were at pains to show that concentrations of 
wealth in land could benefit the socio-economic order. 
                                                          
286 Ted Underwood, The Work of the Sun: Literature, Science, and Political Economy, 1760-1860 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 89. 
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 Through stylistics such as extensive loco-description, georgics such as The Seasons, 
Windsor Forest, and The English Garden contributed to shifting the mode’s focus from 
agricultural labor to the great estates owned by oligarchs.  By sacralizing property, georgics 
reinforced the significance of liberty, which emerges from a common self-interest increasingly 
understood in physiological terms, but which also depends on a well-run, securitizing 
government.  Georgic poems patriotically admired the mixed government of Britain’s 
constitutional monarchy and invoked the virtues of classical politicians in order to warn against 
corruption’s threat to modern states’ legitimacy and to the public good.  The poems deployed the 
images of landscape park to signify the liberty nominally shared by the British polity, and they 
thereby interpellated a financial and political elite who seemed to be the stewards though also the 
primary beneficiaries of Britain’s political economy.  While georgics proclaimed British 
freedom, their nods to commerce connoted the various state apparatuses required to facilitate a 
domestic economy supported by maritime empire.  Smith’s Wealth of Nations offered a sense of 
how ideological state apparatuses tend to proliferate alongside the progress of opulence then 
enjoyed by Britain.  His emphasis on public education as the antidote to proto-capitalism’s 
corrosion of individuals’ intelligence and civic virtues demonstrated a commitment to a 
biopolitical which enables a stable, economic and political elite to continue profiting from the 
nation’s stock of land and labor.  Reading early politico-economic texts allows us to better 
understand the theories of liberty and statecraft which are often only fleeting glimpsed in georgic 
poetry. 
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